

FARMERS AND WORKERS IN AMERICAN POLITICS

BY

STUART A. RICE, A. M.

*Assistant Professor of Sociology
Dartmouth College
Sometime Gilder Fellow in Sociology
Columbia University*

~~NOT~~ SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN THE
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK

1924

COPYRIGHT, 1924
BY
STUART A. RICE

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Ca

THE MEMORY OF MY FATHER

FOREWORD

OUT of the Middle West has come what purports to be a new alliance in American politics between farmers and workmen. In the opinion of one of the world's great newspapers, it is a union of "deadly opposites." "Farmer-Labor" says this journal, "is a contradiction and an absurdity in terms."¹ Nevertheless, a farmer-labor "movement" appears to be an actuality in at least a dozen states, and in one of them, Minnesota, a Farmer-Labor Party has badly worsted both of its old-party opponents at the polls. The probability or improbability of a durable farmer-labor alliance in American politics is thus a political and sociological problem of immediate importance. It devolves itself into the more primary question whether farmers and industrial workers are like-minded or mutually antagonistic in their respective political attitudes.

The aim of the present work is to approach this question without bias, and by the use of exact methods of analysis. In essence, the study is behavioristic. It is based upon public records of political behavior, especially upon election returns and upon the roll-call votes of farmer and labor members of legislative bodies. Analyses of this data are presented in Chapters IV, V and VI.

Materials for deductive inference, on the other hand, are not neglected. Chapters II and III contain a review of economic, biological and cultural factors, the similarity or divergence of which in the two groups might be expected to

¹ *New York Times*, Aug. 6, 1923, editorial "Deadly Opposites." The same opinion has been repeatedly expressed on the Times' editorial page.

produce modes of like-mindedness or hostility between them. Chapter I is introductory and speculative. It attempts to find in the existing political situation some gauge of the significance of the problems with which the study deals.

The writer wishes to acknowledge his obligation to a large number of state officials and to officers of labor and farmers' organizations who have furnished much of the data upon which the study is based. To his teachers in the Department of Sociology at Columbia University, Professors Giddings, Ogburn, Tenney, Lindsay, Chaddock and Ross, he is especially grateful for patient and helpful counsel and suggestions. His thanks are due likewise to his friend Professor Malcolm M. Willey for criticism and suggestions, to Miss Irene Thomas for assistance with the manuscript and to the cordial and efficient staff of the public document division of the New York Public Library.

CONTENTS

PART I

DEDUCTIVE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

SECTION	PAGE
1. The formation of groups; groups never wholly unified; the Malbone Street Disaster as a group-forming experience; potential and active groups distinguished	17
2. Political devices for the measurement of like-mindedness; variability of individual attitudes; the vote as a gross measure; formation of parties and "blocs"	20
3. Current indications of political instability; reversals in popular elections since the World War; party policies indistinguishable; appearance of congressional "blocs"; opinions regarding break-down of party lines in England and America . .	25
4. Proposed farmer-labor and other alignments; farmer-labor alliance; farmer-manufacturer; middle class-farmer; middle class-capital; middle class-farmer-labor: complicating factors in proposed alignments; classes themselves diverse; economic interests and political attitudes	30

CHAPTER II

THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF FARMERS AND INDUSTRIAL WORKERS

5. Farmers and industrial workers as entrepreneurs; the farmer always an entrepreneur; the worker receives orders; elements of supervisory function among workers; effects on farmers' and workers' attitudes	37
6. Control of the capital upon which the labor of farmers and workingmen is expended; farmers' capital is mainly "farm property"; ownership of farm property; workers as owners of working capital; conservative influence of property ownership	39
7. Farmers and workers as borrowers and debtors; farm mortgages; economic dependence among farmers; relation between farm mortgages and tenancy: workers are likewise debtors .	42

329] 9

SECTION	PAGE
8. The relationship of tenancy and farm mortgages to political unrest; which states are "insurgent"; criteria of "insurgency"; "insurgency" and farm tenancy in rural states; "insurgency" and farm mortgages in rural states; "insurgency" and "economic dependence" in rural states; "insurgency" and farm-mortgage increases.	46
9. Incomes among farmers and industrial workers: findings of the National Bureau of Economic Research; farmers' incomes, 1920-1923; incomes of industrial workers; farmers' and workers' incomes compared; effects of comparison on attitudes of farmers and workers	56
10. Interest, wages and profits in the products of agriculture; calculations of the National Bureau of Economic Research; comparison of wage and profit factors in incomes of farmers and workers	63
11. Farmers and industrial workers as investors and speculators: estimates of investments; speculative interests of farmers in land values; speculations on nature and on markets; hypothetical effects on farmers' attitudes	66
12. The factor of farm labor; geographical differences in expenditures for farm labor; the farmer's labor bill; the farm hand's wage; farm labor highly seasonal; agricultural labor analyzed; migratory labor as an irritant to the farmer; farm-labor and "insurgency" in rural States	68
13. Farmers and industrial workers as employers and employees; changes in the economic status of farmers and workers; farmers' criticisms of the worker based on comparative status; workers' criticisms of farmers; conditions which break down hostility	77
14. The relation of taxes to the political attitudes of farmers and industrial workers; farmers under-taxed by federal government but over-taxed by state and local governments; a classification of states according to tax burdens; are voters' interests distributed according to their tax burdens; "insurgency" and the distribution of taxes; political apathy in the South; agriculture, labor and the tariff	81
15. Producers, consumers and middlemen; the fundamental contrast in economic function; opposing views concerning the producer-consumer antithesis; the farmer and the commission house; the farmer's case against labor and the middlemen presented by the National Agricultural Conference; the triangularity of economic interest; statement by Federal Trade Commission; the middleman's function and the interest of labor therein; findings of the Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry	88

SECTION	PAGE
16. "Ins" and "outs"; political cooperation easier among groups which are not in power; which groups are regarded as "in" and which as "out"	101
17. The rights of organization and collective bargaining; labor concerned with wage bargain, farmers with the price bargain; the rights secured by each; so long as rights remain in doubt, they will be ends in themselves.	103
18. Summary and conclusions of Chapter II	105

CHAPTER III

CULTURAL AND BIOLOGICAL FACTORS

19. The urban and rural contrast; exceptions to usual status; rural and urban stimuli; effects on social types	109
20. Geographical concentration; northern and eastern concentration of industry and workers; western and southern concentration of agriculture and farmers; sectional types	111
21. Racial differences; white and colored races among farmers and industrial populations	112
22. Nationality differences; persistence of national traditions affects political attitudes; proportions of native and foreign stock among urban and rural populations; native and north-European descent higher among farmers; in nationality farmers homogeneous, workers heterogeneous	113
23. Age differences; farmers predominantly older than industrial workers	117
24. Families and homes; balance between sexes in urban and rural areas; marriage more general among farmers; children more numerous in rural areas; home-ownership affects attitudes; city and country compared	121
25. Summary and conclusions of Chapter III	126

PART II

INDUCTIVE

CHAPTER IV

FARMER-LABOR CLEAVAGES IN CONGRESS

26. Reflection of popular attitudes in the behavior of legislators; popular desires and opinions reflected in elected representatives; the function of "bosses"; men of the "kind" elected; attitudes of groups may be determined by attitudes of their representatives; do farmers and workers support the same legislators and the same types of measures?	128
27. The Senate "blocs"; the farm bloc: the labor bloc; coincidence of support	130

SECTION	PAGE
28. The House "blocs"; the farm bloc; the labor bloc; supporters of agriculture segregated by votes on four bills; chance and actual coincidence; sectional coincidences between agricultural sympathy and labor support	132
29. Farmer and labor legislation in Congress; the American Federation of Labor as a spokesman for labor; farmers' organizations; the American Farm Bureau Federation; the Farmers' National Council; the National Board of Farm Organizations; measures favored by farm bureaus and organized labor; "chance of coincidence" between farmer and labor bills; measures opposed by farm bureaus and by labor; measures favored by other farm organizations and by labor	135
30. Summary of Chapter IV	142

CHAPTER V

FARMER-LABOR CLEAVAGES IN NATIONAL AND STATE ELECTIONS

31. The presidential election of 1920; urban and rural communities as seats of party strength; Republican strength greatest in the larger cities except in New England; Republican strength in the South is rural; urban voters more sensitive to public opinion; situations sought in which factor of party allegiance does not enter an election	143
32. New York; election for governor in 1920; classification of election districts; urban and rural vote for Smith segregated and analyzed	149
33. Pennsylvania; primary election of 1922; Pinchot appealed to farmers; Burke appealed to labor vote; vote for Pinchot and for Burke negatively correlated	150
34. Washington; geographical characteristics and their effects on political character; the farmer-labor movement of 1920; various votes and factors correlated; labor vote negatively related to criteria of agricultural interest; a farmer-labor alignment resulted under certain favoring conditions	152
35. Wisconsin; political characteristics; primary election of 1920; determination of "conservative" and "labor" wards in Milwaukee; Blaine support strongest in farming areas and labor wards	156
36. Minnesota; farmer-labor party successes; Shipstead vote in 1920 and 1922; farmers and workers united; geographical and crop area cleavages in 1920 and 1922 elections	159
37. North Dakota; highly agricultural character; industrial elements; labor legislation passed by a farmer legislature and its significance; lines of political cleavage; vote on state-owned	

SECTION	PAGE
bank; peculiar political complexion of Red River Valley in North Dakota and Minnesota	163
38. South Dakota; the Farmer-Labor and Non-partisan parties in 1920; industrial characteristics; vote of 1920 analyzed; political cleavages sectional	168
39. Iowa; primary election of 1920; the vote analyzed; sectional and economic cleavages coincide	171
40. Nebraska; the "progressive slate" in 1922; county support of Bryan and Howell correlated; an index of progressivism; sectional lines of non-party cleavage	174
41. A middle western "culture area" of political discontent; the anthropological concept described; types of political opinion as elements of culture; apparent lines of diffusion; caution necessary in accepting hypothesis: value of the concept for this study	177
42. Summary and conclusions of Chapter V	182

CHAPTER VI

FARMER AND LABOR VOTE IN STATE LEGISLATURES

43. Scope and character of the analysis; what is attempted; extent of the study; numerical indices of the voting behavior of groups; index of cohesion within groups; index of likeness between groups; range of variation in each from 0 to 100; the range illustrated; meaning of the indices explained; the variable factor of party affiliation among farmer and labor legislators: the variable held constant by classification; questions which may be answered by use of the two indices; some examples of the method of inference; when farmers and laborites belong to different parties; when farmers and laborites belong to the same political party; opposing wings within a party; the concept of "swing" within a party . .	184
44. Cohesion among farmer legislators; summary by legislative sessions; farmers more cohesive than party members generally; sectional differences obscure; summary by types of measures voted upon; farmers most in agreement on moral issues; explanation found in prevalence of individualism among farmers	195
45. Cohesion among labor legislators; summary by legislative sessions; laborites more cohesive than farmers, but more variable in cohesion; high party regularity has lowered the index in some cases; summary by measures voted upon; laborites most in agreement on labor legislation; labor most cohesive where farmers least cohesive	199

SECTION	PAGE
46. The "likeness" between farmer and labor legislators; index of likeness significant only in relation to party affiliations; summaries by legislative sessions when farmers and laborites (a) are in separate parties, (b) are in the same party; farmer-labor agreements less frequent than expectation; summaries by types of measures when farmers and laborites (a) are in separate parties, (b) are in the same party; summary of tendencies toward like and unlike behavior by types of measures; most disagreement on moral questions; less disagreement where rational calculations of interest are involved	205
47. Summary of Chapter VI	215

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

48. The grounds of agreement and disagreement between farmers and industrial workers; the theory of group formation in Chapter I borne out; succession of issues effects a constant realignment; agreement unlikely upon issues founded in prejudice or tradition; agreement possible upon issues involving rational calculation of interests; questions upon which alliance might develop; prediction of issues not attempted	217
--	-----

APPENDIX A

Criteria employed for classifying legislators as "farmer" or "labor"	221
--	-----

APPENDIX B

The "swing" of two sub-groups within a party group	226
VITA	233

TABLES AND CHARTS

TABLE	PAGE
I Arithmetic differences in percentages of total vote polled at successive presidential elections by Republican and Democratic parties	26
II Farms operated by owners in the United States on January 1, 1920, by number and per cent mortgaged	43
III Mortgage debt on farms wholly operated by owners in the United States on January 1, 1920	43
IV American farmers on January 1, 1920, who were obligated to make payments to other persons on account of the land they tilled, and farmers who were free of such obligations	45

TABLE		PAGE
V	Score of American states on ten criteria of "progressivism" or "insurgency"	50
VI	Comparison of vote cast for president and for governor, and per cent state and local of total taxation, by states, 1919-1922	84
VII	Total numbers and proportions of native-white of native parentage, in selected occupational groups of employed persons, 1910, also proportions of persons 45 years of age and over in the same occupations	118
VIII	Sectional coincidences between agricultural sympathy and labor support in the United States House of Representatives	134
IX	Democratic vote for president, 1920, expressed as a percentage of the combined Democratic and Republican vote by selected urban and rural counties in each state.	146
X	Number of votes cast for Alfred E. Smith, Democratic candidate for Governor of New York, 1920, with percentage of total votes for governor received by Smith, by various population units	150
XI	Coefficients of correlation by grades between certain votes and certain population characteristics in 36 counties of Washington	154
XII	Vote of John J. Blaine in Wisconsin Republican primary, 1920, by certain population units including farming and working-class areas	158
XIII	Vote of Henrik Shipstead in Minnesota, 1920 and 1922, by certain population units including farming and working-class areas	160
XIV	Vote of Henrik Shipstead in Minnesota, 1920 and 1922, by certain groupings of counties according to geographical location and crop specializations	163
XV	Votes cast for and against House Bill 18 establishing the Bank of North Dakota, in referendum election, June 26, 1919, by various groupings of counties	166
XVI	Number and percentage of votes cast for Bates, non-partisan candidate for governor of South Dakota, 1920, by various groupings of counties	170
XVII	Votes cast for Brookhart and Cummins in Republican senatorial primary, Iowa, 1920, with percentage of combined vote received by Brookhart, by various groupings of counties	172
XVIII	Summary of indices of "cohesion" among farmer members of state legislatures, by legislative sessions	196

TABLE		PAGE
XIX	Summary of indices of "cohesion" among farmer members of state legislatures, by types of measures voted upon	198
XX	Summary of indices of "cohesion" among labor members of state legislatures, by legislative sessions	200
XXI	Summary of indices of "cohesion" among labor members of state legislatures, by types of measures voted upon	203
XXII	Summary based upon indices of "likeness" between farmer and labor members of state legislatures, when each occupational group is wholly affiliated with a <i>separate</i> political party, by legislative sessions	206
XXIII	Summary based upon indices of "likeness" between farmer and labor groups in state legislatures, when both are wholly affiliated with the <i>same</i> political party, by legislative sessions	208
XXIV	Summary based upon indices of "likeness" between farmer and labor members of state legislatures, when each occupational group is wholly affiliated with a <i>separate</i> political party, by types of measures voted upon	211
XXV	Summary based upon indices of "likeness" between farmer and labor members of state legislatures, when both are wholly affiliated with the <i>same</i> political party, by types of measures voted upon	212
XXVI	Summary of roll-call comparisons, indicating tendencies toward like and unlike voting behavior, when farmer and labor legislators are either in the same or in different parties: classified by types of measures voted upon.	213
XXVII	Numbers in party groups and sub-party groups included in Table XXIII, with the percentages of the total constituted by the non-farmer-non-labor group	229

FIGURES

I	Apparent lines of diffusion of radical political opinion in a mid-western culture area of political discontent	179
II	Distribution of Republican votes in one roll call in the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, 1919	193

CHAPTER I

REALIGNMENT OF FORCES IN AMERICAN POLITICS

I. THE FORMATION OF GROUPS

SOCIAL groups, like individual personalities, are never completely unified. Each is built around some common center of stimulation, some fraction only of the totality of stimuli which play upon every individual. No single group can wholly provide expression for all of the social interests and impulses of any one of its members. Varying stimuli are continually sorting people, re-grouping them in accordance with new experiences or in accordance with dispositions or characteristics that may have been hitherto unrecognized, but which lead them, in a given situation, to respond alike.

The truth of these assertions will be evident if we see how one particular group was formed. On November 1, 1918, a Brighton Beach train of the Brooklyn Rapid Transit Company, outward bound during rush hours from Park Row, Manhattan, was wrecked at the Malbone Street Tunnel in Brooklyn. Ninety-one passengers were killed and more than 100 injured. As the ill-fated train left its terminal on Brooklyn Bridge, the passengers for the most part were total strangers to each other. They were of both sexes and of all ages, occupations, points of view and stations in life. Except for residence of the greater number in the Borough of Brooklyn, participation by most in the affairs of city, state and nation, and the desire of all to travel in the same direction, there was no common bond of interest or disposition among them. There was no common denominator

sufficient to make of them, by themselves, a social group. They were merely an "aggregation" of homeward bound citizens.¹

Following the fatal accident, all this was changed. Consciousness of participation in a common disaster almost immediately sprang up among the survivors and gave them a fellow-feeling toward each other. At this point they became a group. Their "consciousness of kind",² as it has been termed by Professor Giddings, was no doubt at first a simple state of mind with respect to the wreck. It grew out of like responses to the common stimulation.³ However they may have differed in mental attitudes toward politics, religion, morality or the war, the survivors of the wreck experienced physical injury or pain, nervous shock, fear and horror under circumstances such that each understood, sympathized with, and in turn was stimulated by the feelings and actions of his fellows. Later on, the "consciousness of kind" became more complex as the survivors realized that they had material interests in damage claims, and in the prevention of recurrences of the disaster, which might advantageously be pressed in unison. They organized the Malbone Tunnel Wreck Association, a social group sufficiently cohesive and coherent to make its voice heard nearly five years later on the occasion of another elevated railroad accident in the same community.⁴

¹"Aggregation" is here used in the precise sense of "congregate aggregation" employed by Giddings in *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 91-96. Additional discussion will be found in Professor Giddings' *Inductive Sociology*, while illustrative material is presented in his *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*.

²For an exposition and numerous illustrations of "consciousness of kind," see Giddings' *Descriptive and Historical Society*, pp. 275-325.

³Giddings has given technical formation to this concept and has termed it *pluralistic behavior*. See his *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, ch. xv.

⁴*New York Times*, June 6, 1923 news article under heading "Declares Hyman uses Wreck for Politics."

Potential and Active Groups Distinguished. It should be noted that "consciousness of kind" among members of the Malbone Tunnel Wreck Association would probably be found only, or mainly, upon matters within a definite and limited sphere. Another wreck upon the Brooklyn elevated lines, by directing attention to the experiences which are possessed in common, and producing once more like responses to a like stimulation, has brought and would again bring the group to a high pitch of unified feeling and action *with reference to the wreck*. Upon other matters, the feelings and behavior of members of the Association are undoubtedly dissimilar, and perhaps highly opposed in character. This is to say that the Malbone Street accident group is *active* only when some reminder of the common bond is present as a stimulus. At other times, the group is inactive or, for the time being, non-existent. That is, it is *potential* rather than actual.

The illustration concerns an unusual occurrence, but the processes of group formation disclosed are of everyday occurrence. Their very familiarity tends to obscure their importance for an inquiry such as ours. They underlie not only all non-political social groupings but all political alignments as well. The number of potential political issues is inexhaustible. So also is the number of potential points of resemblance or difference between individuals which new political issues or situations may emphasize or create. Suppose, for example, that the Malbone Street wreck should in some manner have become a dominating political issue. It is not difficult to imagine a number of ways in which an event of such importance might have been projected into the political arena. Whatever the previous political alignments among the wreck survivors, they would undoubtedly have been found in overwhelming proportion on the same side of the new alignment.

In this illustration, the supposed new political alignment centered around an unforeseen and harrowing experience. The process is nearly identical if, instead of a new experience, closely similar *mental patterns* of habits, customs, prejudices or social standards, existing in the minds of a number of people simultaneously, are for the time associated with a new issue. The *mental patterns* are likely to be made up more largely of unconscious than conscious elements. The new issue, in such a case, provides a stimulus for old mental habits of emotional response, bound up in the *mental patterns* which are "set off." Thus, according to the issues which are uppermost in public attention, race, nationality, religious affiliation or belief, fraternal associations, sex, income, geographical location, or even attitude toward Darwinian theory may play a decisive role in determining political affiliations and behavior. The individual's *mental pattern* with respect to each of these things—his habitual attitudes and prejudices—make him a member with other like-minded individuals of a *potential political group* concerning each of them. The potential group may become active whenever common stimulation, in the form of an issue which arouses similar mental patterns in different individuals, is presented.

2. POLITICAL DEVICES FOR THE MEASUREMENT OF LIKE-MINDEDNESS

The tendency of a number of people to respond alike to the same situation produces the spontaneous intersecting groupings of common social intercourse. These groupings do not alone make possible the collective decision and activity essential to political democracy. By themselves, they are intangible, indefinite and non-measurable. Collective decision requires groupings that are tangible, definite and measurable.

This requirement may be illustrated by reference to a particular issue now confronting the American people, namely, the enforcement of the 18th Amendment. Individual attitudes regarding prohibition vary in a number of directions. They are distributed all the way from intense hostility at one extreme, through indifference, to intense fervor of support at the other. They differ not only in intensity, but in kind, persistency, origin, and type of content, whether emotional or rational. One man believes in the prohibition of whiskey but not of light wines and beer; one has held the same attitude since childhood, while another's opinion follows his change of newspapers; one takes a disinterested stand as the result of clinical experience with inebriety; his neighbor reaches the same position by reflecting on the prosperity of his candy business.

The Vote as a Gross Measure. It is obvious that these diverse attitudes are not of equal value, yet it is equally clear that no way exists by which the variations of opinion along these many planes can be measured. Political society, therefore, resorts to measurement in the *gross*. The vote has been devised as a highly artificial lumping together of diverse attitudes into divisions of pro and con.

The voter is usually given a clear-cut alternative on a question, or a clear-cut choice of candidates,¹ but these may not be the particular alternatives, nor the exponents of the particular issues, upon which he would like to express a preference. Since the alternative is likely to be drawn somewhere near the center of the range of opinion, the extremist often finds it impossible to register his convictions on his ballot. Hence, as in the case of the syndicalist, he often decries political action as useless and advocates more "direct" means of attaining his desires. When, on the other hand, extremists succeed in forcing a vote on their

¹ Cf. A. Lawrence Lowell, *Public Opinion in Peace and War*, ch. iii.

own formulation of an issue, the moderate, who "sees both sides," is compelled to abandon his position and cast in his weight with the extremists on one side or the other.¹ In either event, the result may be regarded, to use statistical terminology, as a consolidation into two discontinuous classes of opinions which are normally distributed continuously in accordance with a number of separate characteristics.²

Those on either side of a political issue, therefore, are only relatively like-minded—may in fact possess many utterly dissimilar motives for their behavior. When opposing sides are evenly balanced, it is the comparatively indifferent voters who determine the result. Attitudes held lightly may be easily changed. The electorate as a whole may thus give an appearance of instability which is in reality a phenomenon of indifference confined to the central quartiles of an invisible distribution.

Formation of Parties and Blocs. If an assemblage of strangers were called upon to settle a number of controversial questions, a new segregation of relatively like-minded persons might be expected whenever a vote was taken. If some of the questions at issue were similar, however, the alignments upon them would closely correspond. The association of the same persons on the same side of successive divisions would tend to become habitual. These persons would become accustomed to working together, and would develop loyalty to each other and to the symbols under which they presented their views. Imperceptibly, perhaps, a party would arise and would of itself become a point of resemblance among individuals. Members of the same

¹ Something like this has occurred in the case of various referenda on the question of prohibition and its enforcement.

² Cf. the writer's note, "The Political Vote as a Frequency Distribution of Opinion," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, March, 1924.

party would thenceforth vote alike upon many questions on which they might have disagreed, if the merits of the issue alone had been considered. Starting as a correlation between lines of cleavage among voters on a number of issues, the party eventually becomes one of the principle vote-determining influences with which voters are surrounded.

Nevertheless, the correlation between lines of cleavage on differing issues is seldom so high as to enforce complete "party regularity," even in matters on which the party has taken a definite position. In the first place, the very fact that individual opinions are subordinated to a party opinion, evokes a clash between rival individuals or sub-groups, who seek to fasten their own views upon the party as a whole. Moreover, there are always new issues the spontaneous alignments upon which cut across the recognized lines of party division. Where this is the case and the new issues are persisting, the formation of recognized *blocs* may be expected. If the new issues are vital, and not immediately settled, and if, in addition, the issues upon which the recognized parties divide are losing their vitality, either of two outcomes is probable; the old parties will realign themselves with respect to the new issues, or new parties will grow out of the *bloc* alignments on the new issues.¹

¹ In an article bearing the suggestive title "Parties in Non-Partisan Boston," David Stoffer in the *National Municipal Review*, February, 1923, draws the following inferences from Boston's experience since 1909 with nonpartisan municipal elections: "(1) The separation of local from state and national elections requires a group effectively organized for the purpose. (2) The very nature of its work compels such an organization to adopt tactics which stamp it as a party, even though it assumes the name Good Government Association or Municipal League. (3) *The loosening of the bonds of national political affiliations tends to effect a realignment of the voters on the basis of racial, religious and class differences*, since men whose interests are similar, or who are otherwise bound by close ties tend to gravitate together." (Italics ours).

In other words, the cleavages among the voters which result when

Blocs may thus be regarded as potential parties, just as any grouping resulting from a political issue may be regarded as a potential bloc. The appearance of numerous blocs is an indication that existing parties have ceased to provide clear-cut alignments on vital questions. At such times the parties make their appeal to habit, custom and tradition; blocs make their appeal to economic interest, emotional prejudice or a consciousness of resemblance arising out of the particular situation with which the voters as a whole are confronted.

certain mental patterns associated with race, religion or class are stimulated, cut across the cleavages which result when the mental pattern bound up with national party loyalty is stimulated. Mr. Stoffer leads us to infer that it was the appeal to traditional party loyalty that constituted the real issue (or stimulus) when municipal elections in Boston were conducted under national party emblems. When nonpartisan elections were instituted, new alignments, or more accurately old alignments newly brought into the political field, were aroused, because the issue (or stimulus) was changed. The new alignments, as Mr. Stoffer shows in his article, have tended to become correlated and well-defined. Hence his contention that new municipal parties and party loyalties have arisen.

A somewhat similar situation has arisen in the State of Minnesota, where all members of the State House and Senate must by law be elected "without party designation." During and after the campaign which resulted in the election of Magnus Johnson to the United States Senate, complaints were numerous from leaders of the Republican and Democratic parties in Minnesota, that the non-partisan election laws had destroyed party loyalty and party discipline in the state. But there is every evidence in Senate and House Journals that partisanship runs strong in the Minnesota legislature. Hon. Mike Holm, Secretary of State, writes: "It is a fact, however, that about 21 members of the 1921 House and Senate owned allegiance to the so-called Non-Partisan or Farmer-Labor Party, and I believe there is a slightly increased number in the present House and Senate. However, this is largely a matter of conjecture and cannot be taken as absolutely authentic." (Letter dated Dec. 19, 1922). The absence from State elections of stimuli in the form of national party names has undoubtedly facilitated the realignment of voters into two groups, namely, Conservatives, maintaining the Republican Party organization, and Radicals, under the name Farmer-Labor.

3. CURRENT INDICATIONS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY

Scattered widely throughout current literature, both popular and serious, is to be found the opinion* that traditional party alignments among American voters are disintegrating. Typical of these expressions, and from a source certain to command respect, is the following:

The differences of principle which parties represent are no longer large enough or well enough defined to be of great interest to the voters; and these voters and their representatives are now concerned with pushing the claims of their several localities or classes. This leaves the field free for the block system to operate.¹

The evidence for opinions similar to that just quoted is of several sorts: First, the rapid and sweeping reversals of popular favor accorded the major parties during the period since the World War were without parallel in the preceding half century of American elections. This is indicated in the following table, which notes the quadrennial changes in percentage of total votes received by the Republican Party and by the Democratic Party, when each presidential election since 1860 is compared with the preceding one.

The unprecedented "turnover" of votes between 1916 and 1920 is clearly indicated. It has not been equalled since Lincoln, a minority choice in 1860, became a majority president in 1864 with the South disfranchised. Some of the factors that may have played a part in the recent loosening of party ties indicated in Table I are the following: (1) Habits of independence created by the insurgent revolt of 1912. It is probable that many staunch Republicans, under the sway of Theodore Roosevelt's vigorous personality, broke loose for the first time from their habitual party ties.

¹ Arthur T. Hadley, *Economic Problems of Democracy*, p. 79.

TABLE I
ARITHMETIC DIFFERENCES IN PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL VOTE POLLED
AT SUCCESSIVE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS BY REPUBLICAN
AND DEMOCRATIC PARTIES ¹

Presidential Elections Compared	Change in Percentage of vote polled by Republican Party	Change in Percentage of vote polled by Democratic Party
1856-1860	6.8	2.2 ²
1860-1864	15.2	2.6 ²
1864-1868	2.4	2.4
1868-1872	2.7	3.3
1872-1876	8.1	6.2
1876-1880	1.0	2.0
1880-18841	.6
1884-18884	.1
1888-1892	5.2	3.0
1892-1896	8.3	.6
1896-19008	.4
1900-1904	4.7	7.9
1904-1908	4.8	5.4
1908-1912	1.0 ³	1.1
1912-1916	1.0 ³	7.3
1916-1920	14.2	15.0

¹ Calculated from figures given in *Smull's Legislative Handbook* (Pennsylvania) 1921-22, pp. 720 ff. It should be noted that if there were but two parties in the field at each election, the corresponding figures in the two columns would necessarily be equal. The discrepancies between them arise from the existence of minor parties which cut in more heavily on the vote, now of one of the major parties and now of the other. For example, in 1880 the total vote for President was distributed in percentages as follows: Garfield, Republican, 48.3%; Hancock, Democrat, 48.2%; Weaver, Greenback, 3.3%; scattering, 0.1%; total, 100%. In 1884 the distribution was: Blaine, Republican, 48.2%; Cleveland, Democrat, 48.8%; Butler, Greenback, 1.3%; St. Johns, Prohibition, 1.5%; scattering, 0.1%; total, 100%. Hence the party changes in percentage of votes cast was as follows: Republican, 48.3%-48.2%, or 0.1%; Democratic, 48.8%-48.2%, or 0.6%; minor candidates, 3.4%-2.9%, or 0.5%.

² The votes for Breckinridge and for Douglas in 1860 are combined.

³ The votes for Roosevelt and Taft in 1912 are combined.

Having thereby ceased to be "regulars," it seems likely that many such individuals have never since felt themselves as definitely bound as before to a party organization. (2) A majority of the nation's women were enfranchised between 1916 and 1920. In most cases these new voters were without previous party allegiances or voting habits. (3) Situations growing out of the war have confronted many individuals and groups with a conflict between established political habits and the drive of new emotional sympathies or antagonisms. The new war-bred emotions have been strong and likely to prevail. This fact is implied in the widely-held view that President Harding's vast majority in 1920 was the result of the discontent of normally Democratic elements (for example, the Irish) with President Wilson's policies.

Party Policies Indistinguishable. A second reason advanced for the alleged breakdown of party alignment is that the Republican and Democratic parties possess no distinguishing policies with respect to important public questions. This view is expressed by the assertion that they represent, respectively, "tweedle-dee and tweedle-dum."

This criticism is not wholly accurate. Each of the parties, in state or local affairs, often stands for clean-cut policies on leading issues. But these policies vary among states or sections. In *ensemble*, whenever the issue concerned becomes a matter of nation-wide importance, they cannot be combined into a coherent national policy.

A few illustrations from current events may be cited: The Democratic Party is unmistakably "wet" in New York City, but "dry" in rural Missouri. The Republican Party, with equal certainty, is "dry" in rural New York and "wet" in St. Louis.¹ It cannot be regarded as strange

¹This assertion is based upon the writer's study of legislative roll calls on prohibition legislation in the two states *Infra*, ch. vi.

that the attitudes of both parties on the enforcement of the Volstead Act, regarded as a national issue, should be contradictory and obscure.

Again, the policies of which LaFollette is a spokesman have little in common with the policies represented by Senator Lodge. Yet the former seem equally entitled with the latter to the designation of Republican. There is little doubt as to the general character of Wisconsin Republicanism or of New England Republicanism. It is the attempted synthesis of these with various other state and local varieties which renders difficult a characterization of the whole.

With respect to outstanding questions of foreign policy, the difficulties are even more pronounced. At no time since President Wilson's return from Versailles could a safe prediction have been made regarding the attitude of a Senator toward the League of Nations merely from knowledge of his party affiliation. Both parties have pro-League and anti-League wings, just as both have conservative and progressive wings. Each wing has a legitimate and legal claim to represent its party, yet on the specific leading issues, each finds more in common with the corresponding wing of the opposing party than with the opposite wing of its own party.

Congressional "Blocs." A third type of evidence indicating the disintegration of the old parties is presented by the appearance of numerous "blocs" in Congress, indicative of corresponding divisions among the voters. These "blocs" for the most part appear to be bi-partisan. Within recent months, New York newspapers have acquainted their readers with a "Farm" bloc, a "Labor" bloc, "Progressive," "Liberal," "Radical" and "People's" blocs, "New England," "New York," "Western," "Middle Western," "Southern" and "Wisconsin" blocs, "Wet," "Dry," "Bonus" and "Mothers" blocs, "Wall Street," "Sugar" and "Oil" blocs, a "Rivers and Harbors" bloc, a "subsidy"

bloc and even a "Henry Ford" bloc. A number of these alleged blocs undoubtedly represent little if anything more than a transitory alignment upon a particular vote or issue. Such a use of the term by correspondents, however, testifies to the frequent replacement of party divisions by divisions along other lines, and to the familiarity of the public with the idea of such a replacement.

Evidence like the foregoing has led many statesmen and politicians to the belief that existing party alignments in America are artificial and that a reformation of party issues and party alignments is imminent. For example, Postmaster General New, representing President Harding unofficially, is said to have declared: "I freely admit the division in the Republican ranks but the state of our Democratic adversaries is no better. The trouble from which both parties suffer today is lack of cohesion."¹

Senator Borah is quoted as saying:

Political conditions are distressingly unsatisfactory to both political parties. The voter is alarmingly independent. Party lines are shadowy and uncertain. Party leaders seem confused. The rank and file are distrustful. And yet the people are deeply and profoundly interested in public questions and eager for information upon all political problems.²

Samuel G. Blythe, declares in the most widely-circulated periodical in America:

We have in this country a new situation in politics, which is a voting population that apparently has cast off the old allegiances and has formed no new ones; that is going somewhere, but has not found out where. We have a political condition entirely at variance with the precedents and preferences of the past two generations; that resembles a general strike against the old parties and old methods.³

¹ Quoted in *New York Times*, May 11, 1923, p. 28.

² Quoted in *New York Times*, March 22, 1923.

³ "Presidentitis," *Saturday Evening Post*, March 31, 1923, p. 4.

We should not be too ready to attribute these opinions and the conditions upon which they are based to purely American conditions, for a similar note is often heard from responsible leaders in Great Britain. Mr. Austen Chamberlain believes that "at the present time a large part—I myself believe the larger part—of the electorate belongs to no party,"¹ while Lord Morley refers to "the shattering of parties" and the "multiplication of endless political schools."²

Without regard to causes, and without regard to conditions in other countries, the evidence and opinions that have been cited with respect to the instability of parties in America are sufficient to justify the inquiry which follows. If present alignments are breaking down, as is alleged with some show of evidence, what is the probability that certain suggested realignments will supplant them? The question of new political parties is not necessarily involved in this problem. New alliances might occur as well within the existing major party organizations as by the formation of new "third" or "fourth" or "fifth" parties. The problem with which the politician and the sociologist are concerned is to determine the kind of potential alignments which now exist spontaneously among the voters, regardless of party, with respect to various types of issues.

4. PROPOSED FARMER-LABOR AND OTHER ALIGNMENTS

At least five different political alliances among major economic groups in the United States have recently been advocated, or are held on one hand or another to be in existence or in process of formation. These suggested alignments are not wholly distinct, nor are they for the most part consistent with each other. They are:

¹ Quoted in editorial, "Unattached Voters," *New York Times*, April 1, 1923.

² Quoted in editorial "Empty Party Bottles," *New York Times*, June 3, 1923.

Farmer—Labor alliance
Farmer—Manufacturer alliance
Middle Class—Farmer alliance
Middle Class—Capital alliance
Middle Class—Farmer—Labor alliance

The results of the state and congressional elections of 1922 in a number of western states were accepted by many observers as evidence of the reality of a farmer-labor alliance. "The discontented farmer and the aspiring laborer have got together," said William Allen White.¹ There seemed to be little evidence in the returns with which to challenge his assertion. The indications of such an alliance seemed strengthened by the special election in Minnesota on July 16, 1923, in which Magnus Johnson, candidate of the Farmer-Labor Party, was elected to succeed the late Senator Knute Nelson.

Some observers, however, have been willing to accept the election data as evidence of coming party realignments, without accepting the alleged farmer-labor alliance as the mold in which realignment would be cast. Col. Robert H. Montgomery, former Comptroller of the United States Shipping Board, maintained in an address a few days after the 1922 election that "both the present parties are a total loss." He asserted that "the manufacturers are a natural and economic ally of the farmers, and an alliance between the farmers and the manufacturers would form the nucleus of a new conservative party." "Alliance of the farmers and radicals," he believed, "is ridiculous, a contradiction of the character and history of the American farmer."²

¹From Mr. White's editorial page, "As I See It," *New York Sunday Tribune*, Nov. 12, 1922.

²As quoted in accounts of his address before the annual reunion of officials of the War Industries Board, contained in the *New York World* and the *New York Times*, Nov. 12, 1922.

Another interpretation of the 1922 election returns was given by Herbert C. Pell, Jr., Democratic State Chairman in New York. Holding that Democratic success was due in great measure to the support of middle class voters, Mr. Pell went on to state:

The middle class, which comprises at least one-quarter of the total population of the country, comprises also about 90 per cent of the brains of the country and it seems to me that the political party which appeals to this body of our citizenry will be successful for many years to come.¹

The relationship of the middle class, so-called, to labor, farmer and capitalist groups is not easy to comprehend in a single formula. At least two well-defined and contradictory generalizations have been drawn. To a number of writers² the middle class appears to have been caught between Capital and Labor as between upper and nether mill stones. Labor in particular has profited against the nation and hence against the middle class and the farmers. The latter groups, we infer, have more in common between them than have middle class and capitalists or middle class and Labor.

Much of the pseudo-economic literature of the Wall Street news-letter type, on the other hand, identifies the interests of professional and small business people—the middle-class brain workers—with the interests of Capital.

There are not lacking those, furthermore, who proclaim the common interests of industrial workers, farmers and middle class persons in defending themselves against the exploitation of Capitalism. Political cooperation between

¹ Letter from Herbert C. Pell, Jr., Democratic State Chairman in New York, to Cordell Hull, Democratic National Chairman, quoted by *New York Times*, Dec. 18, 1922.

² Notably John Corbin in *The Return of the Middle Class*, Scribners, 1922.

middle and working classes is by these persons regarded as a desirable and possible outcome of economic interests.¹

Complicating Factors in Proposed Alignments. An examination of any one of these proposed alliances must not overlook two factors which complicate the inquiry. First of all, each of the social groups or classes that have been named is in itself highly diverse. Each is susceptible to sub-classification to an indefinite extent, and each overlaps all of the others at a great many points. The labor world has its aristocracy of skilled tradesmen and its proletariat of unskilled, unorganized manual laborers. Farmers vary in economic status all the way from wealth and ownership of country estates to the tenancy of "croppers" who own little but their own labor. Generalizations with respect to "farmers," "labor" or "capital" must be understood as referring to certain typical situations and there is always danger that the attributes of a sub-group may be mistaken for those of the whole.

In the second place, each of the suggested class alignments is based upon a questionable premise—namely, that political behavior is a resultant of economic interest.

Rational calculation of his own economic interest may sometimes be responsible for the manner in which the individual votes. The writer believes that votes are more often determined by the accumulated background of customs, habits, ideals, judgments of right dealing—what the sociologist terms *mores*—in the mind of each individual voter. It is recognized that each class or group in society possesses *mores* which are particularly its own, as well as those which

¹For example, New York newspapers have reported efforts of labor leaders to organize the clerical forces of banks in that city into unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. Affiliation of certain teachers' organizations with organized labor is evidence of the same sort.

it shares with other groups entering with it into still larger but less intimate groupings.¹

Now it is probable that in the long run, *mores* are moulded to fit economic interests. Karl Pearson, for example, presents this probability in extreme form when he maintains: "The civil and moral laws of any given society at a particular time must appear as ultimate results of the struggle for existence between that society and its neighbors."² But regardless of this probability, *mores* show a high degree of resistance to economic change. A "lag" of years, or even of decades or centuries may occur between the development of conditions which alter the economic interests of a group, and the development of customs and prejudices that best serve it under these changed conditions.³

In examining the probability of any possible alignment among the American voters, therefore, we cannot afford to neglect indications of respective economic interests, but we should regard as still more significant any indications of traditional and habitual attitudes on the part of one group toward the other, and toward particular kinds of issues upon which both groups may be called upon to act simultaneously.

When we examine the proposed farmer-labor alliance, a special difficulty arises. We are attempting to compare groups differentiated from the rest of society along different planes. Farmers are those engaged as directors of operations in particular industry. "Labor" represents those engaged in certain occupations, or at certain economic levels, or with certain relations to employers, in a variety of industries. Farmers may be either capitalists or proletarians. The classification is vertical. Labor is made up of prole-

¹ *Folkways*, Wm. G. Sumner, sec. 46.

² *Grammar of Science*, p. 80 ff.

³ For a lucid analysis of phenomena of "lag" in social evolution, see Ogburn, *Social Change*, pp. 200-213.

tarians. The classification is horizontal. We shall attempt to avoid being meticulous and meet this special difficulty as it arises. What is sought is a comparison, of the attitudes and behaviour which characterize the "average member" of each group in political affairs, in the commonly accepted sense of the term.

CHAPTER II

THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF FARMERS AND INDUSTRIAL WORKERS

If a student of our subject were to examine the books found in the technical library of an industrial enterprise, then look over the titles listed under "agriculture" in any public library, and finally examine the book shelves in the reading-room of a labor college or trade union, he would probably be impressed by certain analogies between the first two collections. In both cases they would appear to deal with problems of production and management. The labor library, on the other hand, would seem to be composed especially of works dealing with questions of distribution and social relationships.

The experiment would tend to indicate the economic differences between farmers and industrial workers. The former are *capitalists, employers and managers of industry*. At least until recently they have been chiefly interested in technical problems of production. Industrial workers are *employees*. Their concern in the main is with the share which they receive for their part in productive processes. Superficial consideration of these outstanding facts leads to the assertion, often found in editorial columns, that two groups so opposed in economic status can have little of common interest in the field of politics, when political questions hinge so largely as at the present around economic questions.

Such assertions are not to be accepted without a more detailed examination of the status of both of these classes. Are all farmers capitalists and employers? Are they not sometimes employees? Are not laboring men sometimes

employers, and are not farmers and workingmen alike sometimes debtors and sometimes investors? What are the interests of each group when viewed as producers, and what are their interests viewed as consumers? Do both have a common cause of hostility toward middlemen? In general, if the economic interests of the two groups are sometimes opposed, do they not also sometimes coincide?

Consideration will be given to these and to similar questions in the present chapter.

5. FARMERS AND INDUSTRIAL WORKERS AS ENTREPRENEURS

By census definition, a "farmer" is "a person who directs the operation of a farm."¹ Whether he is an owner, a tenant or a manager, the farmer is always an entrepreneur. He plans and executes all of the activities of an independent industrial enterprise. When, how long and in what manner he shall labor are matters for his own decision and for no one's else. He is not merely his own boss; within the boundaries of his acres, he is *the* boss. He does not only provide a living for his family; he coordinates the activities of a family circle, every competent member of which has some share in the farm's productive activity. Even if he has no family and employs no help, there are farm animals to be cared for and directed. If he plans unwisely, the farmer has no one but himself to blame, and no one upon whom he can shift the losses. If he plans well, he secures an entrepreneur's reward in the shape of profits. While we shall see that he seldom receives more than wages for his labor plus interest on his investment (*cf. infra*, sec. 10), it is profits for which the farmer may always legitimately work and hope.

The farmer's consciousness of responsibility and authority within his own domain—the domain in which he works and lives—affects profoundly all of his mental states and pat-

¹ *Fourteenth Census*, vol. vi, part i, p. 14.

terns. It is neither an accident, nor the mere selective influence of a rural environment that has given to the farmer a reputation for individualism. Without the selective influences of which Professor Galpin has written,¹ the economic functions of his daily life and particularly the fact that he "runs his own business" would account for the greater part of the farmer's peculiar independence of character.²

The Worker Receives Orders. The industrial worker, both in his daily occupation and in his life as a citizen, is accustomed to receiving directions and orders. In his "job," he takes orders from the "boss." When the day's work is over, he finds his life regulated by public authorities in numerous ways of which the farmer has no experience. He is "broken" to "standing in line," habituated to a mass of petty rules and methods of conduct necessary where numbers of people live in the close physical contact of urban life.

It may be objected that certain individuals and groups classed as industrial workers exercise a degree of supervision over fellow workmen akin to the farmer's supervision of his farm. For example, they may be petty foremen in charge of a specific piece of work; they may be journeymen, each with an apprentice; they may, as in the case of railroad conductors and engineers, be superior in authority to a group of employes of lower grade. In no one of these various cases is the status of the employe comparable to that of the farmer, for he lacks *ultimate* authority. The power which he holds is merely delegated. He seldom can "hire and fire." The profits or losses involved in his supervision are rarely a matter of personal concern. Hence, even those

¹ Galpin, *Rural Life*, ch. i and ii, especially pp. 32-46.

² This view of the farmer's psychology is emphasized by Professor E. L. Morgan, University of Missouri, to whom the writer is indebted for it.

employees who are entrusted with the supervision of fellow workmen, have little incentive for creative planning in their work apart from their hope of promotion.

The closest parallel among wage-earners to the farmer's attitude toward his own labor probably is encountered in the case of schemes for the participation of employees in the management of business enterprises. Many labor organizations are hostile to any plan which gives the individual worker an interest in the business of his concern. It is felt that such an interest must necessarily weaken his loyalty to his own class, and its endeavor to increase wages and improve living conditions at the expense of industry. Similarly, foremen are sometimes compelled to give up their memberships in labor unions when they are elevated from the ranks.¹ If we admit some degree of validity in the type of reasoning which such rules exemplify, we are led to the opinion that the attitudes of farmers and industrial workers toward their work are inevitably dissimilar. To a man like the farmer, who "works for himself," another who toils for a wage is likely to appear lazy, inefficient and lacking in the virtues of vigor and enterprise.

6. CONTROL OF THE CAPITAL UPON WHICH THE LABOR OF FARMERS AND WORKINGMEN IS EXPENDED

The greater part of the capital used in the industry of Agriculture is in the form of Farm Property. Farm Property is classified by the United States Census Bureau as land, buildings, implements and machinery and live stock. On January 1, 1920, the value of all farm property in the United

¹"Of ninety-four national unions examined by Professor Adams . . . membership of employers, foremen, or others who would have the power to discharge workmen was prohibited in fourteen unions, while in eleven others such membership was allowed under certain conditions." Geo. G. Groat, *An Introduction to the Study of Organized Labor in America*, p. 319.

States amounted to nearly 78 billions of dollars.¹ Of this aggregate, 85 per cent or more than 66 billions was in the form of land and buildings.

Nearly 4 million men and women, 61 per cent of all farmers, owned the farms which they operated, although half a million hired additional land.² The value of the land and buildings held by these 4 million, amounted to nearly 40 billions of dollars, or 60 per cent of the value of all farm lands and buildings.³ The ownership of 2½ million farms operated by tenants,² and 68,000 farms operated by managers² is not disclosed by the census figures. It seems probable that a large percentage of both are owned by farmers who are included among the 4 million owning the land they till.

It seems safe to say, therefore, that Agriculture is an industry in which 61 per cent of all farmers are industrial proprietors, and in which between 60 per cent and 100 per cent of the capital utilized is controlled by farmers. The average value of land and buildings for the 4 million farms operated by owners was \$10,156.⁴ Putting the situation in another way, we may say that 4 million farmers are business men, each operating a concern whose average capital value on January 1, 1920, was about \$10,000. The question of encumbrances against these concerns will be considered in Sec. 7.

Workers as Owners of Working Capital. The contrast at this point between farmers and industrial workers is apparent. Workingmen in general, since the breakup of the medieval guilds, have not owned a perceptible portion of the capital in connection with which their labor has been em-

¹*Fourteenth Census*, vol. vi, Agriculture, part i, p. 18.

²*Ibid.*, Summary Table 4.

³*Ibid.*, Summary Table 5.

⁴*Ibid.*, Summary Table 6.

ployed. A few slight exceptions may be noted: Some skilled workers, such as carpenters, own the immediate tools with which they work. Some manually employed persons, such as boat builders, cigar makers, jewelry makers and others, own their own shops and equipment and purchase the materials which they fabricate. Such cases may be regarded as survivals of hand-craft industry, in which the persons concerned may combine the economic functions of capitalist, entrepreneur and laborer. Again, a few cases of cooperative industrial production exist, which again approximate the guild system.¹

To these must be added the growing number of instances in which employes have been permitted or encouraged to obtain capital stock in the enterprises employing them. Adequate data is lacking upon which to make an estimate of the aggregate capital interest of workingmen in their own occupations. Perhaps 1 per cent of the total capital involved would be a fair guess.²

Such plans are usually based upon the assumption that

¹ For example, a number of cooperative shingle and lumber mills in Western Washington.

² Bloomfield, *Financial Incentives for Employees and Executives*, vol. ii, pp. 155-175, presents a tabular analysis of some 83 plans for selling stock to employes, for which special information had been secured from American concerns. In a few cases the value of stock offered, subscribed for or distributed is stated, and in an additional number of cases, the market value, selling price or par value has been approximated or estimated by the present writer. The sum of these stated or estimated values for 33 concerns amounts to approximately \$153,000,000. At the same ratio, the aggregate capital interests of employees in the 83 concerns would amount to some \$385,000,000. Since an indefinite number of concerns with stock participation plans are not included, we may assume a total amount which is probably more than one-third of a billion dollars and less than 3 times that amount. The capital invested in manufactures in 1919 (*Statistical Abstract of the U. S.*, 1921, p. 225) plus the total railway capital of the United States in the same year (*ibid.*, p. 385) amounted to \$66,000,000,000. The assumed capital interest of employes in industry would thus fall between 0.5 per cent and 1.5 per cent of this amount.

they will provide the employe with an incentive for effort and with a degree of loyalty toward the establishment in which he works, that would otherwise be lacking.¹ Beyond this, it is often implied in the arguments on behalf of such plans that the employe will acquire an interest in social stability and the welfare of business in general, for upon these things the welfare of his own capital interest will ultimately depend.

To the extent that either farmers or industrial workers are owners of the capital employed in their respective industries, we may expect the fact of their ownership to be a conservative influence. This influence, then, may be anticipated in the case of a majority of farmers, but in the case of a very small fraction only of industrial workers.

7. FARMERS AND WORKERS AS BORROWERS AND DEBTORS

No figures are reported by the Fourteenth Census to indicate the indebtedness of farmers with respect to live stock, farm implements, or loans to cover harvesting operations. We know from reports of the Federal Reserve Bank that there is a periodic expansion of credit during the harvesting season but we do not know, for a given period, the amount of loans made directly to farmers on account of the items named.² The Fourteenth Census reports the number of mortgages and amount of mortgage debt upon

¹ See for example: Boettiger, *Employee Welfare Work*, particularly the classification of "Direct Incentives to Production"; also Bloomfield *Financial Incentives for Officers and Men*, ch. xiii.

² The *Farmers National Council* in an undated leaflet asserts: "The total indebtedness against farm values and values of farm crops is close to \$12,000,000,000." In an undated news release issued at about the same time, the organization asserts: "There are between seven and eight billions of dollars of long term mortgages against farm values." No authority is given for these assertions, which appear to have been issued during the year 1922. If they were correct, the short term indebtedness against crops would amount to between four and five billions of dollars.

farm lands and buildings held by full owners on January 1, 1920. This data is summarized in Tables II and III which follow:

TABLE II

FARMS OPERATED BY OWNERS IN THE UNITED STATES ON JANUARY 1, 1920, BY NUMBER AND PER CENT MORTGAGED ¹

<i>Item</i>	<i>Number of farms</i>	<i>Percent Distribution</i>
All farms	3,925,090	100.0
Free from mortgage	2,074,325	52.8
Mortgaged	1,461,306	37.2
No report	389,459	9.9

TABLE III

MORTGAGE DEBT ON FARMS WHOLLY OPERATED BY OWNERS
IN THE UNITED STATES ON JANUARY 1, 1920 ²

Number of farms mortgaged reporting amount of mortgage debt	1,193,047
Value of land and buildings of same	\$13,775,500,013
Amount of mortgage debt	\$4,003,767,492
Ratio of debt to value, per cent	29.1
Average value per farm	\$11,546
Average debt per farm	\$3,356
Average equity of owner per farm	\$8,191

If it is assumed that the same ratio of debt to value prevails among part owners as among the whole owners who reported their debt, and if it is assumed further that the owners who did not report whether or not their farms were mortgaged are distributed in the same manner as those who did so report, we obtain an estimated 2,327,000 farm owners who were free from debt, or 59.3 per cent of the farm owners. The estimated aggregate of mortgage debt upon all owners would amount to \$5,363,000,000, or 13.5 per cent of the value of all farm lands and buildings operated by owners. It cannot be doubted that the number and amount of farm mortgages have increased during the 3½ years intervening

¹ Adapted from Table 12, *Fourteenth Census, Agriculture*, part i.

² Adapted from Table 13, *ibid.*

between the census reports presented and the present writing.

Economic Dependence Among Farmers. The foregoing figures take no account of farms operated by tenants or managers. If we wish to obtain some index of the economic dependence of farmers, we must pay attention to tenancy and its obligations as well as to mortgage debt. Both may be expected to affect the political attitudes of farmers in very similar fashion, for both place him under the legal obligation of making specific payments of money or kind to other persons on account of the land he tills.¹

Data presented below (pp. 53-54) indicates that a high tenancy rate and a high percentage of farm mortgages are either unassociated or are negatively correlated. It appears that the poorer class of farmers in the South, who are predominantly colored, work rented land. The corresponding economic class of poorer farmers in the North and West operate their own farms, but are compelled to borrow on farm mortgages. The data respecting farm mortgages, therefore, is based in the Southern states upon a selected group of prosperous farmers, and presents by itself an inaccurate measure of economic dependence. Similarly, the best farms in some northern areas are operated by tenants, so that tenancy, by itself, is an equally unsatisfactory measure.

In view of such considerations, it seems permissible to combine the data for tenancy and mortgages, to ascertain the number of farmers who are dependent and independent in the sense here employed. This is done in Table IV.

¹"The farm mortgage and tenancy systems arise from the same economic conditions. The mortgage is an advanced step from tenancy. Rent is paid for land because it yields more than costs of production; a price is paid for land for the same reason. The bridge between tenancy and ownership is the farm mortgage." Ivan Wright, *Farm Mortgage Financing*, p. 1.

TABLE IV

AMERICAN FARMERS ON JANUARY 1, 1920, WHO WERE OBLIGATED TO
MAKE PAYMENTS TO OTHER PERSONS ON ACCOUNT OF
THE LAND THEY TILLED AND FARMERS WHO
WERE FREE OF SUCH OBLIGATIONS¹

<i>Item</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
Total farmers in the United States	6,448,343	100.0
Number of Owners reporting mortgages ...	1,461,306	• •
Estimated number of owners with mortgages of those not reporting (41.3% of 389,459)	160,918	
Number of "Share" tenants	1,678,912	
Number of other tenants	775,992	
Estimated number of farmers under obligations of payment on account of land tilled	4,077,028	63.2
Estimated number of farmers free from such obligations	2,371,315	36.8
Managers	68,449	1.1
Number of farmers operating for themselves and free from obligations of rent or interest on mortgage	2,302,866	35.7

Only one-third of the farmers of America on January 1, 1920, appear to have been entire "masters of their own domain." All farmers, moreover, tend to become borrowers at certain periods of the year. Planting, cultivating, harvesting and marketing expenses must be met for each year's crop before it produces any income in return. It follows from these facts that farmers as a class have an economic interest in any public policy designed to bring about favorable borrowing conditions and a cheapening of the value of money.

Workers are Likewise Debtors. Industrial workers are generally lacking both the incentive and the opportunity to go in debt to the same extent as are farmers. The incentive is lacking because, except during periods of unemployment, income is received regularly at short intervals, rather than

¹ Adapted from *Fourteenth Census, Agriculture*, Summary Tables 4, 12 and 13.

seasonally. The opportunity does not exist because, as a class, labor is without collateral to pledge for extensive loans. Notwithstanding these differences of degree, the worker is usually to be found in the debtor rather than in the creditor class. He is sensitive to the possibilities of credit for the improvement of his standards of living, as for example in the purchase of a dwelling or a Ford car, and he makes use of credit within his borrowing capacity to the same extent, it is probable, as other classes in society.

As debtors, then, both farmers and workingmen appear to have interests that are much alike, and that are opposed to the interests of bankers and creditors. Both may be expected to favor "cheap money" and easy credit.

8. THE RELATIONSHIP OF TENANCY AND FARM MORTGAGES TO POLITICAL UNREST

In the preceding sections, generalizations have been based upon data for tenancy and farm mortgages in the United States. With respect to both, wide variations occur among individual states, and it is relevant to inquire whether an association can be discovered between either and political tendencies whose presence is regarded as evidence of "insurgency" or "political unrest." Where agriculture is a minor economic factor as in a number of industrial states, changes in political behavior are not likely to be closely associated with variations in the rate of tenancy or in the percentage of farm mortgages. Attention will be confined, therefore, to 33 states which in 1920 were 50 per cent or more rural.

Which States are "Insurgent"? There is no exact method known to the writer by which the political character of states can be determined and designated. Nevertheless, a number have given repeated evidences of tendencies customarily regarded as "progressive," "radical" or "insur-

gent." In Table V. an effort has been made to segregate these states by the application to all of a number of criteria, to each of which a fixed value has been arbitrarily assigned. The criteria used, with the value assigned to each are as follows:

- (1) If carried by Populist Party, 1892, 1 point.
- (2) If carried by Progressive Party, 1912, 1 point.
- (3) If a state not in the "Solid South" (*i. e.*, by an arbitrary definition, not carried by the Democratic Party in each of 9 preceding quadrennial elections) and if carried by Woodrow Wilson, 1916, 1 point.
- (4) For each U. S. Senator a member of the Farm Bloc (as listed by Capper, *The Agricultural Bloc*, pp. 8-10), 1 point.
- (5) For each U. S. senator or governor elected 1922 with support of the American Federation of Labor (as given in report of the A. F. of L. National Non-Partisan Political Campaign Committee, dated Nov. 22, 1922, printed under the title, *Non Partisan Successes*), 1 point.
- (6) For each state-wide election result, 1922, regarded by the Committee of 48 as a victory for liberal principles (as per comment in *The Liberal*, No. 12, December, 1922, page 2, column 1, and in leaflet entitled *The Next Step*, both issued by the Committee of 48, 15 East 40th St., New York), 1 point.
- (7) For each state in which the Committee of 48 supported a senatorial, congressional or state ticket in 1922 (as per announcement of the Committee), 1 point.
- (8) For each state listed by *Labor*, official newspaper of the 16 associated railroad labor organizations, as showing "outstanding results of the progressive tidal wave" in the 1922 election (*Labor*, Nov. 18, 1922, p. 3, column 7, article by Donald Ramsey), 1 point.
- (9) For each U. S. senator or governor, attending or invited to a "conference of progressives and radicals of

all political parties " in Washington, Dec. 1 and 2, 1922, called by the People's Legislative Service (as reported in the *New York Times*, November 20 and Dec. 3, 1922), 1 point.

- (10) If the combined votes for Borah, Ford, Johnson and LaFollette exceeded 50 per cent of all votes cast for the 13 leading candidates in a nation-wide straw ballot among its readers, conducted by *Collier's*, *The National Weekly*, in 1923, except for certain modifications,¹ 1 point.

These ten criteria are regarded as ear marks of "insurgency" in Table V. They are indications of some degree of sympathy on the part of voters, past or present, for the

¹The partial results as published in the issue of June 30, 1923 are employed, comprising 198,724 votes. The leading candidates, whose votes by states are reported, were Borah, Cox, Davis, Ford, Harding, Hoover, Hughes, Johnson, LaFollette, McAdoo, Smith, Underwood and Wood. Of these Borah, Cox, Davis, Ford, Johnson, LaFollette, Smith and Underwood may be classed as "favorite sons." That is, the vote received by each in his own state may be regarded as partially due to local prominence or popularity. We have therefore "corrected" the corresponding state totals in the case of the eight candidates named, by deducting all votes for the "favorite son" above the average percentage of the total received in the nation at large. This process has reduced the percentages of votes received in the aggregate by Borah, Ford, Johnson and LaFollette in the states of Idaho, Michigan, California and Wisconsin. Similarly, it has increased the percentage for these four candidates in Ohio, West Virginia, New York and Alabama. While Borah, Johnson and LaFollette are all Republicans, the vote for Ford exceeds their combined strength in the ratio of about three to one, and it is believed that the aggregate vote for the four will represent the strength of "insurgent" sentiment in Democratic as well as in Republican states. This is indicated by the inclusion of 3 Southern states among the 16 which score under Criterion (10). It may be objected that the readers of *Collier's* represent a selected group of persons who are in sympathy with the editorial policy of that publication. This is undoubtedly the case. There is no reason to suppose, however, that the basis of selection differs among the states, and thus the state comparison that is used seems valid, except that the farmer vote is inadequately represented and hence the city and village preferences are given undue prominence where the farmer vote is large.

views of discontented farmers, the American Federation of Labor, the railroad unions, the liberal Committee of 48, the People's Legislative Service (of which Senator LaFollette is Chairman), the Progressive Party of 1912, "Wilsonian Democracy," and four supposedly radical or irregular presidential possibilities. Undue weight has been given, unavoidably, to the results of the 1922 election. This fact has tended to discriminate in the scoring against Illinois, Kentucky, North Carolina and Louisiana, which held no elections for either governor or United States senator in that year. It is not probable, however, that this fact involves any changes in the selection of "insurgent" states. If a full score had been possible to Illinois, Kentucky and Louisiana, under Criteria (5), (6) and (7), no one of them would be classed as "insurgent" unless it secured all of the four possible points, while North Carolina would not be so classified even with the four points.¹

¹ In selecting these criteria it has been impossible wholly to escape from subjectivity, and no pretense is made of doing so. The terms "progressive" or "insurgent", as applied to states, are necessarily inexact and their meanings will vary with the individuals employing them. A set of objective criteria for the selection of states measuring up to a subjective standard is chiefly of value, therefore, for the illumination which it casts upon the latter. In choosing his criteria the writer has proceeded experimentally. He has added one criterion after another until the combined result of their application to the 48 states was a selection of the latter closely approximating the list which he would have drawn upon the basis of his own opinion of their general reputation.

The 18 insurgent states culled out by this process will probably impress the informed reader as well-selected, except for the inclusion of Delaware and perhaps Michigan and Nevada. The first two of these do not enter the computations which follow, since they are not included among the rural states to which attention is confined. In an article by Louis Seibold, "The Outlook for the Old Parties," *World's Work*, June 1924, a similar classification is presented, the states being grouped as (1) Conservative, Republican or Democratic; (2) Democratic; (3) More or less influenced by radical propaganda. The 10 states which Mr. Seibold places in the third group are all included among the 18 "insurgent" states obtained from Table v by the present writer, who feels that Mr. Seibold's third group is in several respects too restricted. Oklahoma and Arizona are among the states omitted from his list in spite of strong claims for inclusion.

TABLE V
SCORE OF AMERICAN STATES ON TEN CRITERIA OF "PROGRESSIVISM"
OR "INSURGENCY"

Name of State	Criteria employed with score under each										Total Score	Possible Score
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)		
Maine											0	15
New Hampshire			I		I					I	3	13
Vermont										I	1	15
Massachusetts						I			I		2	15
Rhode Island					2			I			3	14
Connecticut											0	15
New York					2	I		I			4	15
New Jersey					I	I		I			3	15
Pennsylvania ...	I						I	I			3	15
Ohio			I		I	I		I			4	15
Indiana					I	I		I			3	13
Illinois										I	1	9
*Michigan		I			I	I		I		I	5	15
*Wisconsin				I	2	I	I	I	2	I	9	15
*Minnesota		I		I	I	I		I	I		6	15
*Iowa				2	I	I		I	I	I	7	15
Missouri			I					I			2	13
*North Dakota ..	I		I	I	I	I	I	I	2	I	10	13
*South Dakota ..		I		I		I	I			I	5	13
*Nebraska			I	I		I	I	I	2	I	8	15
*Kansas	I		I	I	I			I			5	13
*Delaware					2	I	I	I			5	13
Maryland			I		I				I		3	13
Virginia				I	I						2	11
West Virginia ..					I	I					2	13
North Carolina ..											0	9
South Carolina ..				I							1	12
Georgia				I						I	2	12
Florida				I							1	12
Kentucky			I								1	11
Tennessee					I			I			2	13
Alabama				I						I	2	14
Mississippi				I	I						2	12
Arkansas										I	1	12
Louisiana				I							1	9
*Oklahoma			I	I	I	I		I			5	12
*Texas				I		I		I	I		4	12

TABLE V—*Concluded*

Name of State	Criteria employed with score under each										Total Score	Possible Score
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)		
*Montana	I	I	I	I	I	I	6	13
*Idaho	I	I	I	I	I	I	6	13
*Wyoming	I	I	I	I	I	5	13
*Colorado	I	I	I	I	5	13
New Mexico	I	I	I	3	14
*Arizona	I	I	I	I	I	5	12
Utah	I	I	2	13
*Nevada	I	I	2	I	5	14
*Washington	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	8	13
Oregon	2	I	3	12
California	I	I	I	3	15

* Total score equals or exceeds one-third of possible score.

An attempt to rank the states according to their degree of insurgency by employing the scores appearing in Table V. would be a highly questionable undertaking. The chances of error are not so great if we merely attempt to segregate those which are found in the upper half of the distribution of scores.

The maximum number of points attainable to single states varies from 9 to 15. The highest ratio of actual to possible points is obtained by North Dakota, receiving 10 of a possible 13, or a percentage score of 77. Four states only receive one half or more of their possible score, while 6 states score 0. Those states receiving one-third or more of the points possible to them may be regarded as falling roughly in the upper half of the range of scores. Employing this basis of selection, we obtain a group of 18 commonwealths which may be termed "Insurgent." These states have been indicated by an asterisk in Table V.

All of these 18 states except 3, Washington, Michigan and Delaware, are among the 33 whose population at the last

census enumeration was 50 per cent or more rural. The probability that one of the 33 rural states, selected at random, would fall among the 18 "insurgent" states may thus be expressed $15/33$.¹

"*Insurgency*," and *Farm Tenancy in Rural States*. Let us now examine the census data for tenancy arranged according to states. The percentage of farms operated by tenants varies from a maximum of 66.6 per cent in Georgia to a minimum of 4.2 per cent in Maine.² Thirteen states were more than 50 per cent rural in 1920 and at the same time above the average for the United States in the percentage of all farms operated by tenants. These states, in the order of tenancy, were as follows: Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Oklahoma, North Carolina, Nebraska, Iowa, Tennessee and Kansas. The probability that one of the 33 rural states selected at random would fall among the 13 with a high degree of tenancy may be expressed by the ratio $13/33$.

What is the chance of coincidence, i. e. the probability that one of the 33 rural states will be found upon both lists—will possess tenancy above the average and at the same time be found upon the list of "insurgent" states in Table V? The answer is to be found in the product of the separate probabilities, namely $15/33 \times 13/33$. The aggregate probabilities of appearing on both lists possessed by all 33 states taken together would again be $33 \times$ this product, or approximately the number 6. Thus the appearance of 6 states on both lists would be expected, provided there were *no relationship* between the factors of tenancy and of political progressivism or insurgency.

If we now compare the states enumerated in Table V and those which are named in the paragraph next but one above,

¹ See any elementary treatise of the subject of probability.

² *Fourteenth Census, Agriculture*, summary table 46.

it is seen that only 5, namely, Oklahoma, Texas, Nebraska, Iowa and Kansas appear simultaneously on both lists. Moreover, the latter 3 are comparatively low among the high-tenancy states. Thus the *chance* of coincidence is 6 while the actual coincidence is 5.

The conclusion is unavoidable, that if tenancy is a cause of political unrest, no evidence for such a relationship is obtainable from the census data with respect thereto.

"Insurgency" and Farm Mortgages in Rural States. Turning in similar manner to the question of farm mortgages, we find a somewhat different result. Nine states which are more than 50 per cent rural at the same time have mortgages upon more than 50 per cent of the farms operated by their owners. These states, arranged in order of high percentage of mortgages are as follows: North Dakota, Montana, Wisconsin, Idaho, South Dakota, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oklahoma. All of these are among those "insurgent" states derived from Table V. Calculating the chance of coincidence in the same manner as before, we find that absence of association between high percentage of farm mortgages and "insurgency" would give an expected appearance on both lists of 4 states. We actually have 9.

If we extend the list of states with a high percentage of mortgages to include all those above the average for the United States, 8 additional will be obtained, as follows: Vermont, Colorado, Missouri, Kansas, Oregon, Utah, Arizona, Wyoming. The expected number of coincidences on this enlarged list and that of Table V will be less than 8 while the actual number is 13.

If we compare the list of high-tenancy states with the smaller list of high-percentage-of-mortgage states, the expected number of coincidences is $3\frac{1}{2}$ and the actual number is 3. If instead the longer list of high-percentage-of-mortgage states is used, the expected number on both lists

is 8 and the actual number 4. If the 48 states of the Union are graded first, according to percentage of all farms operated by tenants, and second, according to percentage of "owned" farms under mortgage, we find the correlation between the two series to be: $r = -.27$. If we confine the two graded series to the 33 states which are 50 per cent or more rural, we find the correlation to be: $r = -.22$.¹

"*Insurgency*" and "*Economic Dependence*" in *Rural States*. It has already been noted from these results (page 44) that neither the rate of tenancy nor the percentage of farm mortgages is alone an adequate indication of economic dependence. In Table IV, the number of tenant farmers was combined with the estimated number of farm "owners" whose land was mortgaged, to secure an indication of economic dependence on account of land tilled in the nation as a whole. If we attempt to relate variations among states in the extent of "economic dependence" among farmers with variations among states in political "insurgency," we are confronted with the fact that a high proportion of the tenancy (and hence of the "economic dependence") in the Southern states is to be found among colored farmers, who are substantially without influence upon the political character of their states.

¹The method used in these two calculations and at a number of other points in the pages which follow is known as *Pearson's method by "grades,"* and is taken from Rugg's *Statistical Methods Applied to Education*, p. 287. The formula as presented by Rugg is:—

$$(a) \quad r = 2 \sin \left(\frac{\pi}{6} \rho \right)$$

where

$$(b) \quad \rho = 1 - \frac{6 S D^2}{N(N^2 - 1)}$$

and D represents the arithmetic difference between the two grades for each item in the two series. The formula presupposes a "normal" type of distribution, and normality has been ascertained wherever it is used. In each case, the value of r for calculated values of ρ has been obtained from table vii in Rugg's appendix. No *probable error* is calculated by this method.

To meet this difficulty, we have calculated the percentage of white farmers in each of the Southern states who are either tenants or "owners" having lands mortgaged. This has involved the highly conservative estimate that no more than one in three of the farms owned and operated by a colored farmer was mortgaged, and that mortgaged farms above such a ratio were held by white "owners." An estimate at this point was necessary, inasmuch as separate figures for "owned" farms under mortgage are not given for the two races by the *Fourteenth Census*. This calculation is impossible in states other than the South, where alone data respecting tenure is segregated racially.¹ The resulting percentages, therefore, have been regarded as comparable for the purpose in hand with percentages similarly derived for the remaining states with respect to all farmers.² That is, we have calculated for each of the 48 states the percentage of all farmers who were reported as either tenants or mortgaged, except that in the Southern states the percentages are of white farmers only, and are partially estimates.

On the basis of this calculation, 14 states are found in which more than 60 per cent of all farmers (in the South of all white farmers) are economically "dependent" in the sense that they must pay rent or mortgage interest on their lands. These 14 in the order of their "dependence" are: North Dakota, Oklahoma, Iowa, Nebraska, South Dakota, Kansas, Texas, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Idaho, Montana, Georgia, Missouri. Thirteen of these states, or all but Illinois, were 50 per cent or more rural in 1920. Making our calculation in the same manner as before, we should "expect" that 6 of these states would also appear among the "insurgent" states derived from Table V. The dupli-

¹ Calculation is based upon tables 10 and 18 of the separate state reports on Agriculture for each of the Southern states, *Fourteenth Census*.

² Derived in this case from *Fourteenth Census*, vol. vi, part i, tables 46 and 57.

cations on the two lists actually number 10. This result corresponds closely with the comparison between "insurgency" and high percentage of farm mortgages alone, where the expectation was 7 states and the actual coincidence was 13.

"Insurgency" and Farm Mortgage Increases. The proportion of "owned" farms which were mortgaged increased by 4 per cent during the decade from 1910 to 1920 for the United States taken as a whole. That marked sectional differences are concealed in this increase, however, is evidenced by the fact that 9 states showed decreases in the percentage of farm mortgages, of which 6 were in the South. All of the Mountain and Pacific Coast states, together with North Dakota, South Dakota and Nebraska, showed increases exceeding 10 per cent. The range of percentage variation in this condition during the 10 years is from a decline of 6.0 per cent in Mississippi to an increase of 38.9 per cent in Montana.

The "expected" appearance of "rural" and "insurgent" states among the list of 14 in which farm mortgages increased by 10 per cent or more, would be $5\frac{1}{2}$. The actual appearance is 9.

We may conclude from the foregoing evidence, that a condition which makes necessary the mortgaging of a high percentage of the farms in a state which is largely rural, is usually accompanied by political behavior which gives the state a reputation for "insurgency."

9. INCOMES AMONG FARMERS AND INDUSTRIAL WORKERS

The income of farmers has been calculated by the National Bureau of Economic Research, whose two-volume report on *Income in the United States* is authoritative. This report likewise contains data from which, within limits of error, a notion of the incomes of industrial workers may be obtained. Figures regarding the latter are necessarily

less exact because of the difficulty of defining the "labor" group, to which attention has already been called (p. 34). We can do no better at this point than to summarize briefly some of the data in the report which relates to our problem.

"As a class" says the National Bureau of Economic Research, "farmers belong among the small-business men with average incomes not much in excess of the average earnings of adult male wage earners."¹ The estimates of their income include that which evades the federal income tax, also "the large items of their own produce consumed by farmers' families."²

That farmers increased their income more rapidly between 1910 and 1919 than other classes in society, is indicated by a table showing the relative fluctuations in the items included in the estimates.³ Assigning the value of 100 to these items in the year 1913 as a base, the income of farmers increased steadily from 95 in 1910 and 88 in 1911 to 260 in 1919. Non-farmers' incomes of less than \$2,000 per year increased steadily from 89 in 1910 and 94 in 1911 to 191 in 1919. The increase would be more marked, but for the fact that many persons below the \$2,000 mark in the earlier years, subsequently passed it and in the later years were no longer included in the group receiving less than that amount. The incomes of non-farmers above \$2,000 per year varied irregularly from 98 in 1910 to 194 in 1919.

Like most classes of men doing business on their own account, farmers profited by the war-time rise of prices at the expense of employees, landlords and lenders. Agricultural wages, rents and interest on mortgage loans rose during 1917 and 1918 at a rapid rate, but not at a rate so rapid as that of the increase in the selling prices of agricultural products.⁴

¹*Income in the United States*, ii, 299.

²*Ibid.*, p. III.

³*Ibid.*, table 6, p. 38.

⁴*Ibid.*, i, 33.

In 1911, some 79,000 farmers only among more than six and one-third million received incomes in excess of \$2,000 per year. In 1919, more than two million farmers, or nearly one-third of the total number received incomes in excess of that amount.¹ In 1920, the number had dropped to some 804,000, leaving approximately five and two-third million farmers with incomes of less than \$2,000 per year, *including the value of rent, fuel and food consumed*.² It must be noted, moreover, that these are in large part *family* incomes, and may represent the joint efforts of a number of members of the farmer's household.

Farmers' Incomes, 1920-1923. No estimate of farmers' incomes comparable in accuracy to those of the National Bureau of Economic Research and covering years since 1920 has been made at the time of this writing. The general tendency during these years, however, is well known. Says the Secretary of Agriculture:

The crops of the year 1920 were produced at the greatest costs ever known. . . . But before the crops were harvested prices had so decreased that at market time the crops sold for far less than the cost of production, considering the country as a whole. Hundreds of thousands produced at heavy financial loss. . . .

They borrowed more money to keep themselves going, and in the face of a continuing decline in prices of almost all of their crops they put out ample acreage in the spring of 1921. At that time prices of farm products were much below the cost of production and far lower relatively than the prices of other commodities.

The purchasing power of the principal farm crops of the year 1921, at the present time is lower than ever before known. In times past some of these crops have sold at lower prices per

¹ *Income in the United States*, ii, table 22.

² *Ibid.*, ii, table 24 k.

sale unit expressed in dollars and cents, but probably never before have our farmers generally been compelled to exchange their crops per sale unit for such small amounts of the things they need. The purchasing power of our major grain crops is little more than half what it was on an average for the five pre-war years of 1910-1914 inclusive.¹

Nearly a year later, the farmers' situation was again summed up as follows by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics of the Department of Agriculture:²

When deflation overtook the country in 1920, agriculture fell first, hardest and farthest. . . . This is the third successive year of big crops. . . . For all his hard work, however, the farmer's world stays out of joint. His purchasing power has lately dropped to just about its lowest point since the war—the quantity of farm products that would buy \$100 worth of other things in 1913 will now buy \$64 worth. Industrial labor demands, and stops at nothing to maintain, war-time wages. Freight rates are high. Taxes are a burden. The weakness of the European market is a drag on his wheat, cotton and pork. . . .

All the evidence indicates that in trying to catch up with its deflation losses, agriculture has maintained its pace these three years only at the expense of its living standards and of its productive plant—buildings, fences, drains, soil fertility.

Following a marked improvement in the prices of some of the major agricultural products, prices at the time of this writing (July and August, 1923) have again declined. A dramatic touch was given to this decline when the price of wheat on the Chicago market sank below \$1.00 per bushel in the month of July, 1923, at the very time that the eyes of

¹ "Report of the Secretary of Agriculture, Nov. 15, 1921" in *Year Book, Department of Agriculture*, 1921, pp. 4-7.

² *Bulletin for October*, quoted by the National City Bank in its monthly review of Economic Conditions, etc., Oct., 1922.

the nation were focused on the special election through which the grievances of Minnesota farmers found an outlet. Authorities agree that dollar wheat brings a return to the farmer that is less than the cost of production.¹ It is evident, therefore, that the income of many farmers during the period from 1920 to the closing months of 1923 has entirely vanished.

Incomes of Industrial Workers. Two sets of data in the report on *Income in the United States* throw light upon the incomes of industrial workers: First, there are estimates of the annual earnings of persons other than farmers who have incomes under \$2,000. These estimates necessarily include the incomes of many persons who would not be regarded as industrial workers in the ordinary sense. They likewise exclude, in all probability, the earnings of some industrial workers with incomes above the \$2,000 figure. Second, there are estimates of the earnings of employed persons normally engaged in various industries. While not excluding any persons of the labor group, the latter estimates contain a proportion of income received in the form of salaries and profits, by persons other than workingmen. On the whole, the estimates for non-farmers having incomes of less than \$2,000 per year appear to be the more representative gauge of the incomes of industrial workers. These estimates have been made for each of the years from 1909 to 1920, and for each of the major occupational divisions of the country.²

For each of the divisions in which industrial workers are mainly employed, the average earnings of persons with less than \$2,000 incomes in the pre-war year, 1913, and in 1920

¹The average cost of producing winter wheat in 1919, as reported by the Department of Agriculture, based upon records from 284 farms, was \$1.87 per bushel. See *Yearbook of the Department of Agriculture*, 1921, p. 113.

²*Income in the United States*, ii, table 23 g.

are respectively as follows: Extraction of Minerals, \$700 and \$1300; Manufacturing and Mechanical Industries, \$570 and \$1360; Transportation, \$700 and \$1500; Trade, \$637 and \$1321; Personal and Domestic Service, \$525 and \$1,000. It is estimated that the average income (as distinct from earnings) would be obtained in each of the above cases by multiplying the sums given by 1.095.¹

To compare with these figures we may derive, first, the average income of farmers in the same income level (below \$2,000) and second, the average income of all farmers. For the first, we obtain in 1913, \$624 and in the peak income year 1919, \$1,038. The latter figure represents the average income of nearly 4½ million farm families in the year of their maximum prosperity. For all farmers we derive an average income in 1913 of \$657 and in 1919 of \$1,692.² To be exactly comparable with the average earnings of the industrial occupation divisions named above, the averages for farmers would have to be reduced in the estimated ratio of 1.095:1.

The strenuous efforts of organized labor to prevent a deflation of wages in the period beginning with 1920, are a matter of common knowledge. They led to the coal strike, railroad strike and other industrial conflicts of 1922. Nor can there be doubt that in the main, wages for all classes of labor declined from war-year levels far less than did prices of agricultural products in the same period.

Farmers' and Workers' Incomes Compared. We may draw the following conclusions from the evidence that has been summarized in this section: first, the incomes of farmers during the years immediately preceding the war compared favorably with the incomes of workers in manufacturing

¹ *Income in the United States*, ii, ch. 23; see also by the same authors: *Income by States*, footnote to table ii.

² Derived from *Income in the United States*, i, table 22.

and mechanical industries and in domestic and personal service, but were slightly below the incomes of workers in transportation, extraction of minerals and trade; second, during the war years culminating in 1919, farmers made greater gains in income, on the whole, than any of the major divisions of industrial workers, and exceeded all of these in 1919 in the average income received; third, it is probable that during the years 1920 to 1923 inclusive, farmers as a whole have again dropped behind the various divisions of industrial workers in the amount of their incomes, with the possible exception of groups among the latter which have undergone severe unemployment; fourth, neither farmers nor industrial workers, on the whole, are recipients of incomes that can be regarded as excessive. However they may differ in economic functions, or habits of thought, they are alike in receiving incomes below the minimum amount which federal lawmakers have deemed it proper to tax.

The development of political unrest among farmers might reasonably be predicted on the basis of conclusions such as these. Political resistance to reduction of wages might likewise be anticipated from industrial workers. What is not so apparent is the probable response of each class in its attitudes toward the other. Will farmers, taking the attitude freely expressed in the National Agricultural Conference of 1922, regard the workmen's wages as the principal barrier to the farmer's prosperity? Or will they believe that in the process of deflation, both farmers and workers are a prey to the exploitation of capital? Inferences regarding this problem will be deferred until after a comparison of the employer and employe status of the two groups.

10. INTEREST, WAGES AND PROFITS IN THE PRODUCTS
OF AGRICULTURE

No economic problem is involved in distributing among the factors of production, the values which are paid to labor in the form of wages. What the laborer receives in his pay envelope is not interest nor profits nor rent, but is wages solely. In the case of the farmer, the question is not so simple. When he receives payment for his crop, he obtains in one undivided amount, interest on his investment, wages on his labor and profits from his enterprise. Can the joint income from these several factors be divided and apportioned among them?

The National Bureau of Economic Research holds that the task is theoretically impossible. It involves "some hypothetical division of a sum that is really not divisible."¹ For example, are we to say of the average farmer with a low income that he receives the current rate of interest, but very low wages, or, on the other hand, that he receives wages but no return on his investment? Either interpretation is equally valid. There are nevertheless some grounds for regarding interest as a first charge on the farmer's income. If he wished he might turn his land into cash and invest in securities yielding a fixed rate of return. If this view be accepted, how do the rewards received by farmers from their labor and management compare with the rewards received by industrial workers from their labor?

The question is answered in the study of *Income in the United States*. The rewards ascribable to farm property are calculated at the interest rate of 5 per cent for each year from 1909 to 1918, at 5½ per cent for 1919 and at 6½ per cent for 1920. Deducting the interest charge so calculated from the total net returns to farm property owners, the bal-

¹ *Income in the United States*, i, 90.

ance is ascribed to the farmer's labor and management. The average amount of this balance per farmer ranged from \$311 in 1909 to \$1456 in 1919. In 1920 it dropped to \$465. In the 12 years from 1909 to 1920, the average exceeds \$500 in the 4 years 1916 to 1919 only.¹

On the basis of unpublished data collected by the Bureau of Farm Economics from 11,000 widely scattered farmers, the National Bureau of Economic Research has estimated the annual labor income of farmers between 1910 and 1915.² In this estimate, labor income is regarded as the amount remaining after deducting all expenses including 5 per cent return on the estimated invested capital. Nearly two million farmers, 30.8 per cent of the total, showed *deficits* ranging from 0 to more than \$1500 by this method of reckoning. Two and one-third million, 36.5 per cent of the total, received labor incomes between 0 and \$500. Thus nearly 4½ millions or 67.3 per cent of all farmers in the United States between 1910 and 1915, either received no labor incomes or labor incomes of less than \$500 per annum.

Comparison of Wage and Profit Factors in Incomes of Farmers and Workers. If we compare the average wage and profit income of the farmers, estimated in this manner, with the average annual earnings of employes normally engaged in various industries, both being reduced to their value at prices of 1913, it is seen that the farmer possessed an advantage over the industrial worker in the year 1918.³ The advantage undoubtedly continued in 1919, although the estimates for employes in the latter years have not been made. From 1909 to 1916, and again in 1920, however, the wages of the industrial worker were decidedly in excess of those of the farmer. In 1920, the average reward per

¹ *Ibid.*, ii, table 3 s, in conjunction with *ibid.*, i, table 20.

² *Ibid.*, ii, table 24 g.

³ *Ibid.*, i, table 20. Estimates for employes cover the period 1909-1918.

farmer ascribable to his labor, measured at the prices of 1913, was \$219.00—\$89.00 per year less than the lowest average earnings of agricultural labor during the same period,¹ and almost exactly one-third of the lowest annual average for employees in all industries combined between 1909 and 1918. During 8 of the 12 years covered by the estimates for farmers, the average reward for his labor per farmer was less than the lowest average earnings for any major group of employees (other than agricultural labor) in any of the 10 years covered by the estimates for employees.

Except in the two abnormally prosperous years, 1918 and 1919, the rewards per farmer for his own labor and management, considering him to have received current rates of interest on his investment, were but little more than the corresponding average earnings of his own employees. It will be shown (page 70) that the average earnings of the latter amount to approximately half of the average earnings of industrial employees.

The analysis can scarcely be carried farther, in the effort to determine whether farmers on the whole are in receipt of profits above a reasonable charge for interest *and* wages. The assumption that the farmer is entitled to a return for labor no larger than that of the average earnings of agricultural laborers would, it is true, have left him a small margin of profits, except in 1918 and 1919, when the margin would have been large and in 1920 when he would have been confronted with a deficit.²

It seems probable that if the farmer had charged himself interest on his investment at current rates, and charged for his own labor and that of his family at wage scales no

¹ *Income in the United States*, ii, table 3m.

² The margin in money would be as follows, based on *Income in the United States*, ii, tables 3m and 3s; 1909, \$9.00; 1910, \$161.00; 1911, \$75.00; 1912, \$53.00; 1913, \$116.00; 1914, \$138.00; 1915, \$165.00; 1916, \$229.00; 1917, \$440.00; 1918, \$668.00; 1919, \$781.00; 1920 — \$271.00.

higher than those prevailing for agricultural labor of the same degree of skill, that his balance sheet would have shown a deficit during at least 9 of the 12 years from 1909 to 1920.¹ If any of the 6½ million American farmers have analyzed their income and their losses in a manner similar to that which is here employed, jealousy of industrial workers with their higher and more secure remuneration for shorter hours of toil, might seem to be a quite natural response.

II. FARMERS AND INDUSTRIAL WORKERS AS INVESTORS AND SPECULATORS

It is difficult to estimate accurately the amount of income received by farmers and workers from investments. The National Bureau of Economic Research, reviewing the data, says:

The most, therefore, that can be said, is that less than 13 percent, . . . and probably not over 10 percent of the incomes below \$2,000 are due to investments of one kind or another . . . 3½ to 4 percent may safely be regarded as a minimum figure. . . . It is believed that no great error can be involved in adding 6 percent to personal earnings in order to arrive at the total income of persons of the group under \$2,000.²

This estimate applies to the majority of farmers and wage-earners. It appears to involve an assumption that the average invested savings of individuals in the lower income group is roughly equivalent (the capitalization of 6 per cent) to the average year's earnings of persons in the group.

¹ Representative Sydney Anderson, chairman of the Joint Congressional Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, makes this flat assertion: "Prices of agricultural products have at no time in the last twenty years returned the farmer a profit upon investment plus a reward for labor, risk and management equal to the average wages received by the persons employed in other industries." *Report of the National Agricultural Conference*, 67th Cong., 2nd Sess., Doc., no. 195, p. 21.

² *Income in the United States*, ii, 295-6.

While a large part of these assumed investments are undoubtedly in government securities, a proportion are in industrial and commercial enterprises. The latter, especially, might be expected to give to many farmers and workers an interest in the financial prosperity of business that would be opposed to radical political innovations.

If many farmers and workers have a moderate interest in political stability because of investment, a majority of farmers have a speculative interest in mounting land values that is not shared generally by the workers of industry. To the extent that farm land values are reflected in food costs, and to the additional extent that trends in the value of farm land correspond to trends in the value of city realty, the economic interests of the two classes are not merely indifferent but are opposed. The importance to the farmer of this speculative interest in land values may be gauged by the estimate that from 1900 to 1910, there was an average annual increase in the value of each American farm of \$323.¹ In the following decade the increase is believed to have been still larger. "Indeed," says the National Bureau of Economic Research, "it is rather upon the increase in the value of his land than upon the sale of his produce that the farmer rests whatever hope he cherishes of growing rich."

In still another sense, the farmer is a speculator. He must gamble on innumerable hazards of weather, insect enemies and markets.² Whatever inclinations he may have to "take a chance" are likely to be satisfied in the course of his yearly struggle for a living. The industrial worker, on the contrary, incurs no corresponding hazards in the course

¹ *Income in the United States*, ii, 298.

² "B. is secretary of an association of apple growers. This year was to be the big result of all the investment of money and labor extending over five or six years. All their apples are unmarketable because of worms."—Letter to the writer from a farmer's wife.

of his work, apart from the possibilities of unemployment. The latter is often regarded as a function of despotic impulse, or human pique, against which he lacks a sporting chance. The prospect of unemployment is likely to provoke fear, bitterness and sometimes a truckling attitude toward employers,¹ where the farmers' unending games of chance with nature provoke a grim determination to beat her on her own ground.² When the farmer, as sometimes happens, becomes convinced that his failures are the result of control of his fortunes by human agencies rather than by natural causes, he is much more likely to adopt the laborer's peculiar mixture of bellicosity and fear.

12. THE FACTOR OF FARM LABOR

Approximately 2,880,000 farmers, or 44.7 per cent of all farmers in the United States, made some expenditure for labor during 1919.³ The number varied from 15.9 per cent of all farmers in Mississippi to 71.3 per cent in Kansas. The average expenditure for labor per farm varied from \$26 per annum in Mississippi to \$1,836 per annum in Nevada. The general average for the United States amounted to \$210.00.

Both the total amounts of expenditure for labor and the proportion of farmers making such expenditures were relatively low in the Southern states. If we consider the Northern and Western states alone, omitting the 16 Southern

¹For other effects upon the worker see the writer's ch. vii, "The Effect of Unemployment upon the Worker and his Family," in *Business Cycles and Unemployment*, by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

²The workingman frequently seeks compensation in forms of gambling which the farmer condemns. The psycho-analyst might discern in the nature of his occupation an explanation for the farmer's "moral" standard in this respect.

³*Fourteenth Census, Agriculture*, compiled from the several state reports, table 21 in each case.

states with their high proportion of negro farmers, we find that 1,866,158 farmers or 57.6 per cent of all farmers in this area made some expenditure for labor in 1919. When it is recalled that the year 1919 was one of high wages and comparative labor shortage, it seems likely that this ratio was not unusually high. It appears safe to say that a majority of American white farmers are normally employers of labor at some time during the year.

The Farmer's Labor Bill. During 1909, farmers paid out in wages some \$652,000,000 to approximately 2,037,000 farm hands, who were "working out." In 1920, wages paid had increased to some \$1,583,000,000, though the number of farm hands receiving this sum in the aggregate was about 7,000 less.¹ The proportion of the net value product of agriculture received by employes declined from 15.3 per cent in 1909 to 9.9 per cent in 1918.² This decline may be regarded as either cause or effect of the fact that the farmers' income increased more rapidly during this period than that of other classes (*supra*, p. 57). Mr. Gray Silver, Director of the Legislative Department of the American Farm Bureau Federation, and a director of the National Bureau of Economic Research, advances the former explanation. He holds that when help is scarce, as it was in 1918, 1919 and 1920, members of the farmer's own family constitute an unpaid labor reserve that is drawn upon, increasing his income in comparison with his wage bill.³

Of the 1½ billions of dollars expended for farm labor in 1919, 81 per cent represented cash payments and 19 per cent the value of rent and board furnished.⁴ The aggregate was

¹ *Income in the United States*, ii, table 3 m. Data respecting farm laborers working on their "home farm" are not included in the figure.

² *Income in the United States*, i, table 17.

³ *Income in the United States*, i, 38, footnote.

⁴ Based on *Fourteenth Census*, vol. vi, pt. i, Summary, table 14.

more than double the amounts paid in 1910 to wage earners in any one of the 14 "generic groups of manufacturing industries"¹ and exceeded the amounts paid in 1919 to all employes of mines, quarries and wells.²

The Farm-hand's Wage. Wage scales for agricultural labor are considerably below those for the majority of industrial employes.

The agricultural laborer receives a very low money wage for his services. This is accounted for, presumably, by the larger number of perquisites not accounted for in the records, by the lower price of commodities in the rural regions, by the small degree of skill required, and by the fact that the negro population forms some 30 per cent of the entire number of agricultural laborers.³

The average annual earnings of employes normally engaged in various industries in the period 1909-1918, converted into their value at the prices of 1913, are estimated as follows: ⁴

	<i>Earnings in Highest Year</i>	<i>Earnings in Lowest Year</i>	<i>Earnings in 1918</i>
All industries	\$755	\$666	\$682
Production of Minerals	812	627	812
Manufacturing: Factories ..	794	597	726
Hand Trades	763	634	756
All transportation	814	688	814
Railways, etc.	882	682	882
Street Railways, etc. ..	678	556	556
AGRICULTURE	373	308	373

¹ *Thirteenth Census*, vol. viii, chap. xv, tables 1, 46, 110, 159, 188, 205, 238, 244, 297, 319, 356, 361, 375 and 380.

² *Fourteenth Census*, vol. xi, Summary, table 1.

³ Wilford I. King, *Wealth and Income of the People of the United States*, pp. 195-7.

⁴ *Income in the United States*, i, table 20.

The estimates for agriculture include amounts for subsistence, where received, while the estimates for other industries include appropriate allowances for pensions, compensation for injuries, and payments for work done by contract.

At the most favorable comparison, farm laborers receive wages but little more than half in amount those which are received in other industries.

Nevertheless, the wages of employes in agriculture have been increasing during the past 30 years at a rate relatively faster than that of wages in other industries. The Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, using the period from 1890-1899 as a base, found that from the low levels of that period to the period 1912-14, the wage of agricultural labor increased approximately 60 per cent as compared with an increase in industrial wages of 45 per cent. In 1919 agricultural wages had advanced 223 per cent over the base period as compared with 167 per cent for other industries, while in 1920 the respective advances stood at 275 per cent and 240 per cent.¹ The more rapid advance of farm wages is due, in the Commission's opinion, "in part to the necessity of meeting industrial competition and in part to the fact that permanent agricultural labor now must be of a skilled character, consequently demands a higher wage than formerly."²

Farm Labor Highly Seasonal. Thus at least half of the American white farmers have a labor problem—a problem of increasing wage scales—that is fairly comparable, even if on a smaller scale, with that of the industrial employer. The problem is aggravated, however, by the highly seasonal character of the farmer's business.

Generally speaking, the demand for agricultural labor extends through spring, summer and fall, according to the par-

¹ *Report of Joint Congressional Commission of Agricultural Inquiry*, i, 182, table 1-3.

² *Ibid.*, p. 182.

ticular requirements for planting, cultivating, harvesting and preparation of the soil. Moreover, winter employment for labor does not exist close at hand in other industries.¹ The result is that a labor supply must be *imported seasonally*. The extent of the annual fluctuation in number of farm laborers is difficult to determine but some indication is afforded by comparison between the Census reports on Occupations in 1910 and 1920.²

The number of dairy farmers, farmers of general farms and stock raisers increased in each case from 1910 to 1920. The National Bureau of Economic Research estimates that the number of farm hands and the total number of employes attached to the agricultural industry were both at approximately the same amount in the two years.³ Nevertheless, the census reports indicate a decrease in the number of farm, dairy farm, and stock farm laborers from 6,069,321 in 1910 to 4,041,627 in 1920. The Census Bureau holds that the decrease of more than 2,000,000 laborers is "probably due mainly to change of census date from April 15 in 1910 to January 1, in 1920." In other words it is estimated that some two million farm laborers among approximately six million employed on farms on April 15 are not so employed on January 1st. The apparent seasonal increase in labor supply to April 15 is thus 50 per cent of the January 1st figure.

The decrease between April 15, 1910 and January 1, 1920

¹ "Lumbering and ice cutting are the only kinds of outdoor work that employ large numbers of men during the winter months, and they can absorb only a portion of the seasonal laborers who work in our construction, railroad, agricultural and other outdoor industries during the summer months. Winter is likewise the dull season in many manufacturing lines." Don D. Lescohier, "Harvester and Hoboes in the Wheat Fields," *The Survey*, Aug. 1, 1923.

² *Fourteenth Census, Abstract of Occupation Statistics*, table 4.

³ *Income in the United States*, ii, table 3 m.

was greater in the case of *Farm Laborers (home farm)* than in the case of *Farm Laborers (working out)*. The 1,850,119 persons included in the former class on January 1, 1920, are equivalent to 55.9 per cent of those in the same class on April 15, 1910. The 2,055,276 farm laborers who were reported "working out" in the 1920 enumeration are the equivalent of 77.9 per cent of the corresponding number in 1910. From these figures it appears that the "slack" between summer activity and winter inactivity in agriculture is taken up more largely by the farmer's own family than by hired help. We must suppose that some 1½ million members of farmers' families who work at home in the spring and summer are either at home unemployed, are at schools and colleges or are engaged in industrial labor in other communities during the winter months. On the other hand, some three-fifths of a million "hired hands" must be presumed to reenter the industry in the spring.

It is probable that the seasonal fluctuations in demand for labor in agriculture are actually greater than the figures we have quoted would indicate. The National Bureau of Economic Research says:

The best conjecture available is that about one-fourth million laborers are hired by the year, some one and one-half million by the month for a period of 3-7 months, and about a million more are employed by the day. . . . These numbers are given only as rough approximations. The month and day laborers ordinarily find some other occupation during the winter to supplement their wages from the farm.¹

If crops are diversified, the period of employment for

¹*Income in the United States*, ii, 289. But many of these laborers of the migratory worker type merely "winter" in idleness in the cheap lodging-house sections of the nearby cities. The annual fluctuations of the "census" of the New York Municipal Lodging House provide an excellent index of this tendency. See, by the writer, "The Failure of the Municipal Lodging House," *National Municipal Review*, No 7. 1922.

labor may be spread over a large part of the year. In sections devoted to a single crop, on the other hand, demand for labor and the problem of securing it during the harvesting period become acute.

In the single crop areas, for example the winter-wheat country centering in Kansas and the spring-wheat country centering in North and South Dakota, the harvesting period is marked by an influx of transient workers.¹ Many of these "follow the harvest" from south to north, keeping pace with the ripening season in each of a number of crop districts in turn.² Don D. Lescohier, an investigator for the Department of Agriculture, reports that the "more than 100,000 individuals (who) find work in the wheat harvest" are divided approximately into thirds. One third is composed of Farm Workers, including farmers, migratory farm hands and farm boys working in their own community, whose regular employment in each case is on the farm; a second third is made up of urban and migratory laborers; a final third is composed of skilled city men.³

Migratory Labor as an Irritant to the Farmer. Mr. Lescohier finds that between 8 per cent and 12 per cent of

¹ "In both sections, the demand for harvest labor is ordinarily intense while it lasts, but uncertain and fluctuating. It is intense because the wheat belt cannot provide from its own population more than two-thirds of the labor needed for the harvest . . . Wheat farms require, on the average, twice as much labor during the harvest as during the balance of the year." Don D. Lescohier, "Hands and Tools of the Wheat Harvest," *The Survey*, July 1, 1923.

² "From fifteen to thirty thousand men migrate into the Dakotas each year for the harvest and threshing. In late July thousands from the Kansas-Nebraska harvest pour into Sioux City, Iowa, to get the Milwaukee and the Northwestern (railroads) northwest through South Dakota. About the same time contingents of men begin leaving Chicago, Minneapolis, Duluth and hundreds of smaller towns west of the Great Lakes for Dakota. Throughout the month of August and the first half of September the inflow continues." Don D. Lescohier, "Harvesters and Hoboes in the Wheat Fields," *The Survey*, Aug. 1, 1923.

the entire number of harvest hands are migratory laborers.¹ The "larger number . . . who take part in the harvest are there to work." "In general, labor relations in the winter wheat harvest are characterized by good will on both sides."¹ But "the least industrious among the hoboes . . . give the migratory laborer a bad reputation. Ever to be seen by the casual passer-by, their very presence becomes a nuisance to the townspeople. The farmers who drive into town in search of men find them a constant irritation."²

Intermittent and seasonal employment have long been recognized by students of labor problems as a fruitful source of breakdown in established habits of industry. Mr. Lescohier himself observes: "It is impossible, in my judgment, for the average man to work for a number of years as a seasonal laborer without having his ability and his desire to work steadily disintegrate." Harvest workers, as a class, not only represent the results of certain selective influences such as restlessness of temperament,³ but they are subject to the disintegrating tendencies involved in "following the harvest" as well. "Three-fourths of them (are) single." Men without family ties are usually men of roving and unstable habits.

The point is that such men are among all types of industrial labor the most difficult to deal with, the most unreliable, and the possessors of habits most in contrast with the farmer's own. They seem likely to provide the farmer with his concepts of labor in general, and frequently to prejudice him against labor as a class.⁴

¹ "Hands and Tools of the Wheat Harvest."

² "Harvesters and Hoboes in the Wheat Fields."

³ Mr. Lescohier, names "the desire for adventure and experience" as one of the three prominent motives which take men to the small grain harvest.

⁴ In the fall of 1920, the writer "shipped" from an employment office

Farm Labor and "Insurgency" in Rural States. If substantiation for this conclusion be sought in the relationship existing between the farm labor factor and that of "insurgency" or political unrest, we must discard for this purpose the Southern states. The high proportion of negro farmers, who spend little in the aggregate for farm labor, and who are substantially without political influence, renders data for the South non-comparable with that for states in the North and West.

Of the 19 Northern and Western states which are 50 per cent or more rural, Wyoming, Arizona and Nevada only expended an average amount per farm for labor in 1919¹ sufficient to employ one man for 8 months at the average farm wages of 1919.² In addition, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Montana, Idaho, Colorado and Oregon expended sufficient to employ one laborer per farm for periods of between 6 and 8 months. All of these but Oregon were classed in Table V as "insurgent" states.

Within the same 19 rural states in the North and West, 50 per cent or more of all farmers made expenditures for labor during 1919 except in Missouri, Montana, Wyoming and New Mexico. Two of these 4 only were found to be "insurgent." In Vermont, Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas and Nevada, 60 per cent or more of all farmers made expenditures for labor in 1919. All of these but Vermont were classed as "insurgent."

in Chicago, together with about 120 other men, to work on an extra gang of the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway in western South Dakota. Most of his fellow passengers were young city-bred workers who were frankly bound for the harvests. By the time the "shipment" left Aberdeen, South Dakota, the writer appeared to be the only member of the party that remained. Most of the men in the party "followed the harvests" as a regular thing each summer.

¹Based on *Income in the United States*, ii, table 3 m.

²Based on *Fourteenth Census*, Agriculture, Summary, tables 59 and 60.

It would seem reasonable to expect that rural areas in which the proportion of farmers who hire labor is high and in which the average expenditures for labor per farm are high, would show evidence of conservative political tendencies. When the political complexion of counties within certain states is examined, some evidence of such a relationship is found (*cf. infra*, pp. 173-74). The data just presented give no evidence of such a relationship between states, however, and on the contrary, rural states in which farmers find it necessary to employ much help seem to be on the whole *more* "insurgent" than those in which the employment of farm labor is less of a factor in the farmer's activities.

13. FARMERS AND INDUSTRIAL WORKERS AS EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES

We have seen that more than half of the American farmers in whom we are interested—those with a voice in politics—may be classed as full-time or part-time employers. Many farmers are also employes—seasonally, or upon occasion. The opportunity to add money wages to his income, when farm work permits, is not to be despised by the average farmer. Slack seasons on the farm frequently offer work in the form of construction, repairs or clearing for other farmers; harvesting in other crop areas;¹ road work for town or county; or industrial labor in nearby workshops. It is probable that the vast majority of farmers have at some time in their lives worked for wages.

The industrial workers, likewise, may occasionally change their economic status. Many own dwellings or other property upon which the labor of others is sometimes required.

¹Between 5 and 8 per cent of the 32,000 employed wheat harvesters (varying from year to year) interviewed by agents of the U. S. Dept. of Agriculture were themselves farmers. *Cf.* "Hands and Tools of the Wheat Harvest," *op. cit.*

At such times, the workman becomes an employer.¹ In some sections of the country, many industrial employes own land upon which, at slack seasons in their trade, they effect improvements and otherwise assume the status of farmers.²

With reference to the income received by farmers in the capacity of employes, the National Bureau of Economic Research says: "The money they make by doing work for others . . . can be calculated only in the roughest manner. The few small samples of farmers' incomes which cover this point indicate outside earnings varying between \$48 and \$117 per year per farmer."³ This estimate gives an aggregate income of between one-fourth and three-fourths of a billion dollars, or from three and one-half per cent to 11 per cent of the estimated net total value of their production received by farmers in 1920.⁴

Farmers' Criticisms of the Worker. Whether judged on the basis of wages which he pays as an employer, or on the basis of wages which he receives as an employe, the farmer frequently finds cause for criticism against the city worker in industry. In comparison with the general scales of agricultural wages, the wages received by industrial workers are

¹ Something similar occurs when the worker pays for a haircut, gets a shine, is measured for a suit of clothes or engages music lessons for his daughter. The barber, shoe-black, tailor and musician may all be members in good standing of organized labor.

² An official of a local carpenters union in Seattle estimated for the writer that several hundred members of his craft in the cities of the state of Washington retired when building operations were slack to small "ranches" or farms which they owned. The manager of the Public Employment Office in Portland Oregon explained the absence of severe unemployment following the close of the shipyards in that city after the war in the same manner. A very high proportion of the shipyard workers, he said, owned farm property which "absorbed" them when the yards closed.

³ *Income in the United States*, ii, 299.

⁴ Based on *ibid.*, table 24 d.

high. To the farmer, with his modest income, the wages which he must pay to agricultural labor appear ample, if not disproportionately large. Hence, by contrast, industrial workers receive "too much," that is more than the farmer pays, or than he could by any possibility afford to pay permanently. The occasional necessity of paying "monopoly prices" for inefficient help during a harvest season can only confirm this opinion.

Nor will the farmer's experiences as an employe himself—either currently or in past recollection—modify his attitude as much as might be supposed. His earnings as an employe are likely to come for the most part from labor rendered near his own home. The rate of wages according to which he is paid, consequently, will be determined in considerable measure by the prevailing rates for farm labor. Just as the wage for unskilled labor in the city seems fabulously large to the newly arrived immigrant, so the wage for industrial labor seems large to the farmer who is unacquainted with the conditions under which it is received.

If the farmer's experience as a wage-earner is a matter of distant recollection, his opinion of industrial wages will tend to be even more severe. As will be shown in Chapter III, farmers are predominantly older than workers in industry. The wages received by the farmer in his youth proved sufficient for him then. Forgetful of trends in the cost of living, he is likely to regard complaints of the higher wage scales of the present as evidences of decline in sturdiness and reliability of the younger generation.

A very similar response is to be anticipated from the farmer with respect to the movement for shorter hours. Whether from the standpoint of his present summer hours on the farm, or from his boyhood memories of labor from dawn until dark, the eight-hour day seems to many farmers a clear result of laziness and a desire to malingering.

Workers' Criticisms of Farmers. An equally unfavorable opinion of the farmer is often obtained from laborers who have been employed on farms. Farm labor is to no small degree recruited from the reservoir of seasonally or casually unemployed men who congregate between jobs in our large cities. Inspection of the "Labor Office" bulletin boards on the Bowery in New York, West Madison and Canal Streets in Chicago, or the employment-office districts in Seattle, Minneapolis, and other large cities, will show many advertisements for farm help, according to the season. Many workers in mills, mines and camps have sampled jobs among the fields and flocks. Tales of long hours, hard work, low pay, insufficient food and inadequate accommodations received from "stingy" farmers, are frequent among such men.

Urban wage-earners who have never been employed upon a farm are frequently found to possess a certain envy, amounting sometimes to resentment, against the farmer's superior economic position in certain respects. If the farmer complains of the workingman for receiving exorbitant wages, the workingman points to the farmer's security against unemployment, his (assumed) neverfailing abundance of food and his freedom from worry about loss of his job.

The causes of mutual hostility arising out of differences in the employer status or the employe status, tend to disappear to the extent that there is opportunity for farmers to work occasionally at urban wages or for urban workers to acquire small farm tracts. These opportunities, no less than better acquaintance with each other and each other's views, seem to break down the traditional distinctions between farmers and urban workers wherever farming is conducted on a small-tract basis, and cities are accessible.¹

¹For example, the farms of Western Washington for physiographical

14. THE RELATION OF TAXES TO THE POLITICAL ATTITUDES
OF FARMERS AND INDUSTRIAL WORKERS

A large share of the farmer's income is in the form of rent, and of fuel and produce consumed by himself and his family. These items are legally exempt from the federal income tax. Moreover, the farmer's money income is not easily calculated. His income-tax payments are more easily evaded than in the case, for example, of a salaried worker whose income is more or less a matter of record. The farmer is under-taxed by the national government in comparison with other members of society at the same income level.

The reverse is true with respect to state and local governments, which are supported very largely by general property taxes. It is notoriously a fact, that personalty escapes almost entirely from general property taxation. The latter falls mainly upon realty. The bulk of the farmer's wealth is "tangible and conspicuous" and hence bears a larger proportionate share of the burdens of state and local taxation than do other classes at the same income level.

It is for these reasons, says a report of the National Industrial Conference Board,¹ that "the burden of state and local taxes is higher in agricultural and mining states and that federal taxes fall more heavily on manufacturing states."

reasons (*cf.* sec. 34) are small. Nearly two-thirds (64.4%) are less than 50 acres in extent. The average value per farm is \$9,090. The farms of Eastern Washington are large. Less than one-third (32.2%) are below 50 acres in extent and the average value per farm is \$21,952. The Eastern Washington farmers are relatively conservative, and live remote from urban life and industrial influences. The western Washington farmers live in close proximity to industrial cities and towns and are relatively radical or progressive.

¹ *Taxation and National Income, Research Report* no. 55, Oct. 1922. This report is largely based on the report of the National Bureau of Economic Research on *Income by States*, and presents data for the year 1919.

This assertion may be tested by employing the method of "correlation by grades" that has already been utilized.¹ If the 48 states be graded according to the proportion which state and local taxation bears to total taxation in each, the percentage will be found to vary from 71.7 in North Dakota to 26.1 in Rhode Island (Table VI). Relating the rank of each state in this distribution to its rank when the states are arranged according to the proportion of total state income going to farmers, we obtain

$$r = .28$$

This coefficient of correlation would be much higher, but for the circumstance that the Southern states, while paying relatively low proportions of their incomes in federal taxes, pay relatively still less in state and local taxes. Of 16 states paying less than 10 per cent of their incomes in *all* forms of taxation, 8 or $\frac{1}{2}$ are in the South. But of the 18 states paying a lower percentage of their incomes in *state or local* taxes than is paid by the nation at large, 13 or nearly $\frac{3}{4}$ are in the South. If then we eliminate the Southern states, and calculate the correlation as before, but for the northern and western states only, we obtain

$$r = .66$$

The Southern states, by the same method of calculation applied to themselves alone, show

$$r = .06$$

If attention is turned to the states in which tax payments for federal purposes are high as compared with taxes for state and local purposes, two distinct groups are found. States in which two-thirds or more of all taxes are federal comprise, on the one hand, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island; on the other, Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia.

¹ *Supra*, 54, footnote. Data for correlation is obtained or derived from *Taxation and National Income*, table 17, and *Income by States*, table 7.

A Classification of States According to Tax Burdens. It is evident from the foregoing data that American states fall roughly into three classes with respect to the burden of taxation. In the first class we have the South. The citizens of the Southern states pay the federal taxes which are levied upon them but they add as little as possible thereto for the expenses of their own state and local governments. Their tax payments in proportion to income are relatively low. In the second class we have the Northern and Eastern manufacturing states, in which the bulk of the nation's wage-earners reside. These states are like the South in paying relatively more for federal taxes than for state and local taxes, but payments in proportion to income are relatively high. In the third class we have the Western agricultural states. Like the manufacturing states, their payments in proportion to income are large, but unlike both of the first two classes, tax payments for state and local purposes are high in proportion to those for federal purposes.

The question arises whether the interests of voters are distributed similarly to the distribution of their tax payments, as is often asserted. If this should be the case, we might expect farmers in the West to be more concerned with state and local than with national political problems, and to be insistent on the expenditure of state revenues in a manner advantageous to their group; we might expect industrial workers in Eastern states to be more concerned with national than with state affairs; finally, we might expect farmers in the South to be comparatively apathetic toward all forms of governmental activity, both national and local.

As an index of interest in national political problems, we present in Column I of Table VI, the percentage of the citizens of each state, 21 years of age and over, who voted at the presidential election of 1920. In an adjoining column, we present the corresponding percentage who voted for gov-

TABLE VI

COMPARISON OF VOTE CAST FOR PRESIDENT AND FOR GOVERNOR AND PER CENT STATE AND LOCAL OF TOTAL TAXATION, BY STATES, 1919-1922 ¹

State ³	I. Per cent of population 21 years of age and over voting for President 1920	II. III. Per cent of population 21 years of age and over voting for Governor		IV. Ratio vote for Governor to vote ² for President in terms of unity	V. Percent state and local of total taxes 1919
		Per cent	Year		
Maine	41.6	37.7	1922	.91	44.3
New Hampshire.	56.6	55.7	1920	.98	49.1
Vermont	41.4	39.9	1920	.96	56.0
Massachusetts...	41.1	36.9	1922	.90	33.3
Rhode Island...	45.4	45.8	1920	1.01	26.1
Connecticut	43.4	43.5	1920	1.00	38.2
New York.....	44.4	43.9	1920	.99	27.3
New Jersey.....	47.9	42.7	1922	.89	40.9
Pennsylvania ...	36.7	29.1	1922	.79	28.4
Ohio	56.8	56.3	1920	.99	36.8
Indiana	70.9	49.2	1920	.69	45.7
Illinois	53.0	31.7	1920	.60	35.0
Michigan	47.2	47.8	1920	1.01	30.0
Wisconsin.....	46.2	45.2	1920	.98	53.4
Minnesota.....	52.9	56.8	1920	1.07	55.4
Iowa	62.6	61.2	1920	.98	57.3
Missouri	65.3	65.3	1920	1.00	38.1
North Dakota ..	63.7	71.1	1920	1.12	71.7
South Dakota...	52.6	53.0	1920	1.01	67.0
Nebraska	51.8	53.5	1922	1.03	58.5
Kansas	55.7	53.4	1920	.96	50.0

(*) Figures not available, or no opposition in the election.

¹ Calculated from the following sources: Column i: *Statistical Abstract of the U. S.*, 1921, p. 821 and *Fourteenth Census*, vol. iii, "United States," table 9; columns ii and iii, *World Almanac*, 1923, pp. 841-878, and *Fourteenth Census*, *Ibid.*; column iv. *Taxation and National Income*, *Ibid.*

² I. e. the per cent which the vote for governor constitutes of the vote for President. The ratios are not comparable as between states except when the vote for President and for governor were cast (a) in each case at the same election, (b) in each case at a different election.

³ States are grouped by geographic sections, as in U. S. Census practice.

TABLE VI—*Continued*

State	I. Per cent of population 21 years of age and over voting for President 1920	II III		IV Ratio vote for Governor to 70% ² for President in terms of unity	V Per cent state and local of total taxes 1919
		Per cent	Year		
Delaware	69.5	68.1	1920	.98	27.2
Maryland	49.5	26.0	1919	.53	34.3
Virginia	19.1	17.7	1921	.93	32.0
West Virginia ..	67.8	67.9	1920	1.00	43.0
North Carolina..	44.5	44.5	1920	1.00	29.6
South Carolina..	8.5	(*)			28.2
Georgia	10.8	(*)			30.2
Florida	27.1	24.7	1920	.91	48.6
Kentucky	71.2	(*)			40.4
Tennessee	35.3	20.1	1922	.57	36.5
Alabama	21.1	14.0	1922	.66	31.6
Mississippi	9.4	(*)			45.7
Arkansas	21.2	14.8	1922	.70	39.0
Louisiana	13.6	(*)			37.0
Oklahoma	47.6	50.4	1922	1.06	47.6
Texas	16.9	19.8	1920	1.17	34.2
Montana	55.8	58.0	1920	1.04	68.4
Idaho	59.1	48.8	1920	.83	65.3
Wyoming	48.6	53.7	1922	1.10	56.0
Colorado	51.7	51.9	1920	1.00	48.0
New Mexico	56.9	56.5	1920	.99	60.4
Arizona	35.5	36.7	1920	1.03	61.5
Utah	63.8	62.8	1920	.98	56.0
Nevada	52.1	54.9	1922	1.05	68.7
Washington	46.4	47.0	1920	1.01	52.3
Oregon	47.9	47.0	1922	.98	45.1
California	40.7	41.4	1922	1.02	41.7

error in the same year, or in the gubernatorial election nearest thereto, as an index of interest in state politics. The indices chosen are not as satisfactory as might be wished for the following reasons: (a) The political interests of the Southern states find expression at primaries rather than at general elections; (b) The colored population of the South is largely disfranchised, and thereby reduces the number of citizens normally eligible to vote in these states; (c) the

number of eligible voters is reduced in some states by admixtures of unnaturalized foreigners of voting age. Where no opposing ticket for governor was presented in the general election, as in several Southern states, no figures in Columns II, III and IV are presented.

If the ratios between the vote for governor and the vote for president be extended to additional decimal places, the states may be graded with respect to this ratio and their respective positions correlated with their rank in the percentage of state and local to total taxes. The following coefficients of correlation are then obtained:¹ For 15 states not electing a governor in 1920

$$r = .775$$

For 28 states electing a governor in a competitive election November, 1920

$$r = .09$$

For 23 northern, eastern and western states electing a governor in a competitive election, November, 1920

$$r = .27$$

For 13 western states electing a governor in a competitive election, November, 1920

$$r = .33$$

"Insurgency" and the Distribution of Taxes. These coefficients of correlation appear to have but little statistical significance. The evidence is not convincing that a high ratio of state and local taxation results in greater interest in state than in national elections. However, it is evident that some association exists between the distribution of taxation and the political behavior which has been called "progressive" or "insurgent." In the following 15 states, arranged in order, 50 per cent or more of all taxes paid were for state or local purposes: North Dakota, Nevada, Montana, South Dakota, Idaho, Arizona, New Mexico, Nebraska, Iowa, Utah, Wyoming, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Washington

¹ By method of "correlation by grades" (*supra*, p. 54, footnote).

and Kansas. It will be observed that 13 of these 15 states were found to be "insurgent" by the standards applied in Table V (p. 50), although the expectation, based on non-association between the two factors would be but 5.¹

It would appear that "progressivism" and "insurgency," are phenomena associated largely with state and local questions and that they tend to appear in those localities in which the taxpayer's payments are utilized in largest ratio for state and local ends.

Political Apathy in the South. Table VI likewise seems to support the expectation that the southern states are comparatively little interested in politics generally. Notwithstanding the considerations pointed out above (page 85) the vote polled for president in South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas seems strikingly low, when we consider the small number of aliens among their populations. The fact that the result of the election in each of these states is a foregone conclusion is merely another evidence of the political apathy for signs of which we are seeking.

Agriculture, Labor, and the Tariff. The tariff, as a form of taxation, should be mentioned in this section. Protective duties serve their purpose as they permit prices to be raised to consumers and thereby secure a larger return to the producers of commodities protected. Thus, high protective duties on manufactured articles, if successful, will raise the costs of living to farmers. Conversely, an agricultural tariff will meet the hopes of its framers if it raises the prices of agricultural products, and thereby increases the costs of living of the industrial population. Thus neither a low tariff nor a high tariff as such affect the relationships between farmers and industrial workers, provided both receive an equitable return in the form of higher prices on the one hand and higher wages on the other.

¹ The calculation of this expectancy is made in the same manner as in pp. 52-53.

The belief is widely prevalent, however, that capitalist and middleman secure a disproportionate share of the benefits from protective duties. This is equivalent to saying that both farmers and workingmen receive higher incomes in money but lower incomes in terms of what money will buy as a result of protection. The writer does not wish to engage in an analysis of this highly controversial question, but merely to point out that if the contention be true, both classes would have a common interest in keeping the tariff low, in opposition to commercial and manufacturing groups who would have an interest in high duties. The Agricultural Bloc in the 67th Congress did not oppose high duties in general, but instead devoted itself to procuring high protection for agricultural products in the Fordney-McCumber Bill.¹ It is significant, however, that Governor J. A. O. Preus of Minnesota, in his 1923 campaign for the United States Senate as the regular Republican nominee, repudiated the Fordney-McCumber tariff and maintained that its rates had not benefited the farmers of the Northwest. The American Federation of Labor condemned high tariff measures as opposed to the interests of American labor. It is asserted by some economists that tariffs on agricultural products will have little effect in raising their prices, as long as large surpluses are available for export.

15. PRODUCERS, CONSUMERS AND MIDDLEMEN

Industrial workers are ultimate consumers of foodstuffs which farmers produce. Conversely, farmers are ultimate consumers of manufactured articles in the cost of which the wages of labor constitute the largest item. Either group may be regarded as a class of producers or a class of consumers, but in either case it occupies an opposing relationship to the other group in the producer-consumer antithesis.

This fundamental contrast in economic function has been the starting point of most of the theories regarding the relations of farmers and workingmen. The classical political economy held that the interests of the two groups are always opposed. On the other hand, because of the "toll" taken by agencies of fabrication, transportation or exchange while goods are on their way from producers to consumers, it is often held that farmers and workingmen have a common cause against middle-men.

Opposing Views Concerning the Producer-Consumer Antithesis. Illustrations of both points of view are not difficult to find in current economic literature. The National City Bank of New York says:

The chief cause of agricultural distress today is not low prices for agricultural products, most of which are above the pre-war level, but the arbitrary and short sighted action of labor organizations in maintaining the cost of the goods and services which the farmer must buy far above the pre-war level, and in unfair relations to the prices of his products.¹

Another economic and business summary declares: "If the farmer is to get more, labor and not capital will get less."²

On the other hand, the Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor asserted at its 1922 convention:

The interests of Labor and the farmers are so intertwined that when one suffers from bad legislation the other also is affected. It was this knowledge that prompted the representatives of the American Federation of Labor to carefully scan every piece of legislation introduced in the interests of the farmers. Every opportunity was used to urge upon Congress the necessity for legislation that would encourage the farming industry.³

¹ *Monthly Bulletin, National City Bank*, July, 1923, p. 106.

² *The Bache Review*, Nov. 18, 1922, published by J. S. Bache & Co., 42 Broadway, New York.

³ *Report of the Proceedings of the Forty Second Annual Convention, "Executive Council's Report,"* p. 112.

"What is your reply to the argument that Labor and the farmers have opposing interests because one consumes what the other produces?" This question was recently presented to Mr. Frank Morrison, Secretary of the American Federation of Labor.¹ He replied:

My view of the matter is that Labor and the farmers both have their pockets picked by the same interests. The farmer receives far too little for what he sells, and the workman pays far too much for what he buys. Neither can blame the other, for the farmer's selling prices and the worker's buying prices never get within striking distance of each other. All kinds of middlemen receive the difference.

The Farmer and the Commission House. Mr. Morrison's contention appears to find substantiation in the experiences of many farmers, especially of those who have sought a market through the various commission houses. To the average small farmer, middlemen in general are personified by the commission merchant. The sub-committee of the National Agricultural Conference of 1922 which reported on costs, prices and readjustments in fruit and vegetable production asserted: "Much complaint was made to the committee of numerous instances of fraud and fraudulent returns for produce shipped on consignment to commission firms in various cities. Small shippers are at the mercy of the commission merchant."²

The following excerpt is from a letter written in 1922 by a farmer's wife residing in a fruit-growing section of the Pacific Coast. The incident which it tells has probably been repeated in its essentials in every farming community in the United States:

¹ In a conversation with the writer.

² *Report of the National Agricultural Conference*, Jan. 23-27, 1922, 67th Cong., 2nd Sess., Doc., no. 195, p. 162.

Mrs. S. has been attending to the ranch with all the utmost energy—neglecting nothing. She has driven the teams with two men to manage the sprayer, and has farmed according to Hoyle in the most up-to-date method. She had magnificent peaches. Shipped two car-loads to New York and her total receipts were a freight bill for \$500. She is worse off than we with our crop littering up the ground and not a pig within two miles.

For this and similar experiences the commission man is blamed. The writer does not wish to be understood as endorsing the view that commission men as a class are inefficient, tricky or fraudulent in their business methods. The relevant point is that many farmers have formed this opinion of them and that they often represent the farmer's notion of middlemen in general.

The Farmers' Case Against Labor and the Middlemen. Thus the farmer is being told, on the one hand, that his interest lies with capital in combating the exorbitant wages of labor; and on the other hand, that his interest lies with labor in combating the extortions of the middlemen. There are some indications that he is believing both.

In January, 1922, a national agricultural conference was called by the Secretary of Agriculture at the request of President Harding. Its report, to which reference has already been made, undoubtedly provided encouragement to those who are seeking to limit the middleman's activities and profits, no less than it provided satisfaction to those who were seeking a reduction of wages on the railroads and in other industries.¹

¹ Mr. Samuel Gompers, who was a member of the Conference, is unwilling to regard its resolutions and reports as representative of the opinions of American farmers. In the *American Federationist*, vol. 29 p. 177, he states: "There was but one representative to speak for all of the wage earners of the country and but a small minority to speak for all of the actual farmers of the country. Control was absolutely in the hands of a group of sixty railroad presidents, trust magnates, bankers

The Committee on Costs, Prices and Adjustments asserted:

There can be no restoration of national prosperity until *both wages and capital* which enter into the production of the commodities which the farmer buys bear their mutual and just share in the general process of readjustment.¹

And again:

Probably the chief source of relief which the farmer may rightfully expect and demand is in the form of readjustment between prices of products which he buys and those which he sells. This is prevented at the present time by *distributor's spreads* far in excess of any income which the farmer is able to receive, and by *high industrial wages and freight rates*. It is imperative that the farmer have reduced transportation costs.²

The sub-committee on Costs, Prices and Readjustments in the Cotton Belt protested against "any increase in rates through any proposed readjustment of rates" for transportation. It asserted "without fear of contradiction:"

and anti-trade union employers." Mr Gompers' figures appear to be approximately correct. Of the 336 delegates whose names are listed in the report, (pp. 187-195) 59 are bankers, railway officials, or men who would usually be on the opposing side of the actual farmer in a price bargain. On the other hand, no less than 122 of the names listed are those of farmers, stockmen, and officials of farmer's organizations such as the Grange, Farmers Union, Farm Bureau, Society of Equity and various cooperative organizations. In addition, no less than 78 delegates were editors of agricultural publications, state commissioners of agriculture, directors of experiment stations, members of the faculty of agricultural colleges or holders of similar positions which would tend to give them sympathy for the farmer's situation. This leaves a balance of 77 delegates made up of other public officials and of persons whose economic relationships to agriculture were not clearly indicated by the titles given.

¹ *National Agricultural Conference*, op. cit., p. 149. (Italics ours).

² *Ibid.*, p. 150 (Italics ours).

No price received, even at the peak prices, will give the actual producer of farm products a wage comparable in any way with that normally received by all classes of union labor and even by most classes of farm labor elsewhere in the United States.¹

The sub-committee further maintained:

A very high return for labor in the railroad, coal mining, building trades, and other industries has a very definite effect in the cost of production for cotton and is a factor in keeping wages and returns in the cotton industry at the present scandalously low level.²

The corresponding sub-committee for the wheat regions asked that industries from whom the farmer must buy should follow his example in pocketing losses "in order that his (the farmer's) losses may cease, his profits be restored, and his purchasing power return to normal." Particularly:

(a) There should be an immediate and substantial reduction in railroad rates, the present high cost of which is one of the most grievous burdens of the agricultural industry. The chief item in the cost of transportation doubtless is railway labor wages, which should be reduced proportionately as railroad rates are reduced.

(b) There should be an immediate and proportionate reduction in the cost of manufactured articles which farmers must purchase.³

The sub-committee on costs, prices and readjustments in the corn belt urged the repeal of the Adamson law, regarded by organized labor as one of its greatest legislative achievements, but also recommended the repeal of the guaranty

¹ *National Agricultural Conference, op. cit.*, pp. 152-3.

² *Ibid.*, p. 153.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

clause of the Esch-Cummins law, a repeal in which labor would vigorously concur.¹ The Committee on Transportation made the same recommendation with respect to the Esch-Cummins law² and urged that "the railroad corporations and railroad labor should share in the deflation in charges now affecting all industries."³ The sub-committee dealing with costs in the range country demanded "reduction of live-stock freight rates by removal of advances" and further "that railroads be allowed by the Labor Board the opportunity to employ labor at reasonable wages and with reasonable rules."⁴ The corresponding sub-committee for the dairy regions asserted:

The cost of labor, of machinery, of equipment, and the fixed charges on investments are still high and must be reduced, as they are large factors in preventing serious loss to dairying.⁵

Other committees or sub-committees urged cooperative marketing to "eliminate unnecessary costs, undue speculation, and waste" in the distribution of farm products "so that these products may be distributed at prices which are fair and reasonable both to the producers and the consumers,"⁶ urged "prompt reduction of existing yardage, live-stock commission charges, and schedules to reasonable levels,"⁷ and urged "a national system of licensing warehousemen and commission merchants dealing in food products to secure to the growers a guarantee of better service and price."⁸

¹ *National Agricultural Conference, op. cit.*, p. 156.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 141-2.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

With respect to taxation, five recommendations were made by the committee on this subject, as follows: (a) economy; (b) prohibiting the issuance of tax-free securities except Federal Farm Loan Act securities; (c) reenact an excess-profits tax on corporations; (d) no consumption or sales or manufacturers' tax, "or any other tax which shifts the burden onto those least able to pay, onto the necessities of life;" (e) "That agriculture receive the same just and equitable consideration as industry in framing the tariff."¹

It seems probable that the third and fourth of these recommendations would be heartily supported by organized labor, and that none of the five would be opposed by labor.

The following recommendation of the sub-committee on Costs, Prices and Readjustments in the Corn Belt, is entirely consistent with the position taken by Mr. Morrison and expressed by other spokesmen for labor:

Believing that the retail dealer, who exists in numbers entirely out of proportion to the customers he serves, with resulting unnecessarily high costs of operation, is the worst offender in the chain between producer and customer, we urge on Federal authorities the importance of a more effective enforcement of existing laws concerning profiteering, not only in food products but in all commodities. We favor the enactment of laws providing for Federal licensing of all retail dealers, with a limitation of selling prices to a moderate increase over costs, to the end that retail establishments may be reduced to the number which will serve both consumer and producer most economically.²

Commenting on the attitude of hostility toward labor that appeared so frequently in the agricultural conference, Mr. Gompers asserts: "But the workers have always stood with the farmers in every struggle for justice. They are not

¹ *National Agricultural Conference, op. cit.*, p. 141.

² *Ibid.*, p. 156.

to be deceived. They understand fully the great need for understanding and cooperating with the great producers of the farms."¹

The Triangularity of Economic Interest. To sum up, it seems correct to say that the National Agricultural Conference defended the claims of agriculture against *both* labor and the middleman. It did not so much fail to take sides in the struggle between capital and labor over wage deflations; it rather took either side against the other, and aired its own grievances against both. It recognized agriculture as an independent participant in a three-cornered conflict of economic interests—and at that, the most aggrieved party of the three.

Urban consumers of agricultural products, among whom we must number the majority of industrial workers, have many occasions to recognize the existence of this triangularity of economic interest. The workingman's wife is familiar with fluctuations in the retail prices of butter, eggs and milk, and knows that they are based upon similar fluctuations in the prices received by farmers for the same commodities. The overstocked vegetable or fruit market, which may spell catastrophe to many farmers, represents a direct and tangible saving to the worker's household. On the other hand, consumers constantly recognize the existence of a middleman's margin in the prices of things they buy. This is demonstrated in the constant shifting of patronage from retailer to retailer in the effort to reduce this margin, and in the alacrity with which consumers are ready to take advantage of "bankrupt" and "no-profit" sales, in which some of the middleman's margin has been eliminated.

The Federal Trade Commission has stated the consumer's position with respect to producers and middlemen in the following words:

¹*American Federationist*, vol. 29, p. 184.

The consumer . . . as consumer, knows no distinction between production and distribution. Purely as a price consideration, it is a matter of indifference to him whether price is three-fourths production costs and one-fourth distribution, or *vice versa*. . . .

It is, therefore, quite as important from the consumer's standpoint that costs of technical production be lowered as that costs of so-called distribution be reduced.¹

The Commission believes it to be quite true that "marketing conditions (for food stuffs) are fundamentally bad," that "the costs of distribution . . . together with attending wastes of foods, . . . are unnecessarily high;" and that "their elimination would in no small measure act as a counteragent in checking disparity between food prices and money incomes."¹

The Commission views these conditions as an evolutionary outgrowth of more simple marketing arrangements, and holds that producers, consumers and middlemen alike have an interest in "improved marketing facilities." "Dealers generally recognize this need. Producers are a unit in pressing for such improvement. Consumers, through organization and press, have demanded that the system of food distribution be simplified and the movement of food be made most direct from field to factory to table."²

The Middleman's Function and the Interest of Labor. The crux of the argument that farmers and city workers are in a similar position of hostility to middlemen lies in the two assumptions, first, that the functions of the latter are largely uneconomic and superfluous; second, that their "tribute" is composed primarily of profits rather than of necessary expenditures. To the extent that these assumptions

¹ *Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Wholesale Marketing of Food*, June 30, 1919, p. 15.

² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

are correct, the argument appears to be sound. By eliminating the middleman's profits, the farmer's sale price might be raised on the one side, and the laborer's purchasing price lowered on the other. Similarly, the worker's wages might be increased at the same time that the prices of manufactured articles were marked down to the farmer.

Thus we must deal with a question of fact: Is the "spread" in costs between producers and consumers attributable mainly to the profits of capitalists and entrepreneurs who have interposed themselves along the highways of distribution? Or is this spread absorbed mainly by wages and other legitimate expenses involved in adding utility to goods which have left the hands of original producers? If the latter turns out to be the case, then a demand for the elimination of any substantial part of the returns to middlemen becomes, as the Agricultural Conference assumed, a demand for the reduction of labor's own share in the productive process.

Findings of the Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry. The "most extensive inquiry ever conducted" into the spread in costs between producers and consumers¹ was that of this Commission, reporting in 1922.²

An exhaustive collection of data regarding the distribution of costs is summarized in the case of a wide variety of consumer's goods. It is difficult to generalize with respect to this aspect of the findings, although this has been done by some commentators on the report.³ Some con-

¹ So characterized by the *National City Bank Bulletin*, May, 1923.

² *Report of the Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry*, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., Rep., no. 408, pt. iv, "Marketing and Distribution."

³ *The Nation's Business*, January, 1923, contained an article by Representative Sydney Anderson, the Commission's Chairman, entitled "The Case as to Distribution." Accompanying the article was a chart showing the "distribution dollar" divided as follows: Producer 20 per cent, Manufacturer 17 per cent, Profits of retailer, wholesaler and manu-

solidation of items is attempted by the Commission, however, which presents tables giving the manufacturer's distribution of the dollar received by the wholesaler in the case of 8 groups of trade-marked food commodities,¹ the wholesaler's distribution of the dollar the retailer pays for merchandise in the case of groceries,² and the retailer's distribution of the dollar received by the consumer in the case of dry goods, groceries, shoes, clothing and hardware combined.³

It is apparent that these three tables are not convertible and the Commission does not attempt to arrive at a general distribution of the consumer's dollar among the various costs interposed between the original producer and the ultimate consumer, except in the case of a few selected commodities. If it could be assumed that the distribution of costs for all commodities was the same as that shown in the three tables mentioned, the distribution for the year 1921 would be as follows: Producer, 29.4 cents; manufacturer, 12.0 cents; profits of retailer, wholesaler and manufacturer, 6.6 cents; selling and distribution, 52.0 cents.

"The tendency," says the Commission, "has been toward a constantly increasing cost of distribution, until the

facturer 14 per cent, Cost of selling and distribution, 49 per cent. Nothing in the article itself, or in the report of the Commission, appeared to substantiate these figures. In its Bulletin for May, 1923, the *National City Bank* makes this statement (p. 71): "The startling fact is brought out (by the Commission) that on the average of every dollar spent by the consumer, 49 cents represents the cost of selling and distribution, while 20 cents goes to the primary producer, 17 cents to the manufacturer and 14 cents in profits to the retailer, wholesaler and manufacturer, profits in this case including interest in invested capital." Inquiry developed that the source for this statement was the chart accompanying the Anderson article.

¹ *Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, op. cit.* p. 129. The table presents the "combined average figures of manufacturers."

² *Ibid.*, p. 158. All groceries appear to be included.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 169. Table gives "combined average figures."

public now pays more for package, convenience and service than it pays for the commodity contained in the package.”¹

The Commission does not find any single factor in the distributive process to be primarily responsible for this wide gap in prices between producers and consumers, nor does it find that any single group of middlemen have profited exorbitantly.² Its explanation in part is as follows:

During the period of development of new commodities and new services, the American standard of living rose to a higher plane than that of any nation on earth, and the cost of living advanced in proportion to the public demands for or acceptance of comfort, convenience, and superlative service. More and more people entered the fields of industry and distribution, and competition became increasingly severe. A constantly increasing proportion of the population found employment in the activities of handling, transporting, storing, converting and distributing commodities and meeting new demands for supplemental services. *Out of the spread between the producer and the consumer, compensation for all of these people must be found*, and this brings the American public face to face with the problem of devising a less expensive and more efficient system of distributing the absolute essentials—food, clothing, shelter and fuel. . . .

There is no single factor in this complex price structure which can be said to be primarily or principally responsible for the spread between producer's and consumer's prices. The elements which compose this spread must be attacked at every point in the chain of producing, manufacturing, and distributing processes. Legislative panaceas cannot be effective in improving a situation brought about by the interplay of so many varied and complex factors.²

Again the Commission says:

¹*Ibid.*, p. 8.

²*Ibid.*, pp. 8-9. (Italics ours).

The distributive situation will be better appreciated when consumers realize that *out of 41,614,248 people engaged in gainful occupation, 29,570,867 are engaged in manufacturing, transportation, distribution and allied activities*, and that the people thus engaged are contributing the comforts, conveniences, services, and operations that make the present standard of living possible.¹

The Commission's conclusions confirm the triangularity of interests involved in our discussion. Farmers sell to middlemen at the highest rates they can obtain. If consumers can be persuaded to pay higher prices for what the farmer produces, he will benefit. Middlemen buy as cheaply and sell as dearly as they are able. Industrial workers find both the farmer's selling price and the middleman's margin reflected in their costs of living. A reduction of either is a gain. Moreover, any wholesale simplification of distributive processes would involve much more than the elimination of middlemen's profits,—it would involve the reduction of working forces and perhaps of wages, either of which would certainly be opposed vigorously by labor itself. The situation is analogous to that of three marbles in the bottom of a bowl.² Each of the three maintains its position against the weight of the other two. Any two may be regarded with equal validity as allies against the third. So with the proposed alliances of farmers and labor against middlemen, or of farmers and manufacturers against labor. Either alliance has an equally secure foundation in the triangular conflicts of economic interests that are involved.

16. "INS" AND "OUTS"

It is easier to secure common action by dissatisfied but otherwise disunited groups against those who are in power,

¹ *Commission of Agricultural Inquiry*, op. cit., p. 13 (Italics ours).

² A favorite class-room illustration of Professor Wesley C. Mitchell.

than it is to secure cooperation among the same elements when they themselves assume control. The first requires agreement upon the object of criticism, the second, agreement in constructive policies. If middlemen are in *control* of the economic processes of distribution, or of the political agencies concerned with these processes, or even if middlemen are merely believed by farmers and workingmen to be in control, they are likely to sustain the common attacks of these two classes regardless of the ultimate triangularity of interests involved. There is no reason to suppose that it ~~would~~ be otherwise if either of the latter groups instead of middlemen were believed to dictate to the other two. We have seen something of the tendency for farmers to unite with capital against labor,¹ founded upon the belief that labor was in control of the nation's wage scales. It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which workingmen might unite with their employers against the farmers, provided the latter were believed to be organized for the purpose of securing unreasonable return from their commodities.

Thus the question which of the three groups in the triangle will be arrayed against the other two at any one time and place, becomes largely the question: Which group is regarded as the "ins" and which as the "outs"? For two of the groups to be simultaneously in actual power and to remain so during any length of time seems improbable, for the responsibility of power seems certain to emphasize the opposition of interests between these two, and to return one of them to the ranks of the "outs."² In a number of the Middle Western states many farmers and workingmen have become convinced by various events that their common enemy, the *middleman*, is in control. Hence they tend to

¹ *Supra*, pp. 91-94.

² A. Lawrence Lowell, in *Public Opinion in War and Peace* maintains that there must always be a division into two opposed groups upon a single formulation of a question. See also our discussion in ch. i.

unite against him. In Southern and Eastern states, events have occurred to convince many employers and farmers that their common enemy, the *trade unionist*, is in control. Hence, they tend to unite against him.¹

17. THE RIGHTS OF ORGANIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

The rights of collective bargaining desired by Labor concern the *wage bargain*. The corresponding rights desired by farmers have as their aim greater control over the prices of agricultural products; that is, they concern the *price bargain*. Organizations formed to secure the greater measure of control desired by each group have from time to time come into conflict with the Sherman Anti-Trust law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, and with vestiges of the common law against conspiracies in restraint of trade. The ends sought through organization in either case may involve the mutual opposition of interests inherent in the producer-consumer relationship, or, on the other hand, may lead to joint action looking toward the assumption of middlemen's functions by a direct exchange of products.²

¹ In both cases, behavior follows an opinion regarding interests rather than the actual interests themselves, whatever they may be. Thus it must be reiterated that a study of economic interests alone is insufficient for a prediction of the political relationships of farmers and industrial workers.

² The possibility of cooperation of the latter sort led to a conference in Chicago on February 12, 1920 having as its object "a straight business and financial alliance between the organized farmers and organized labor for the solution of their common problems as producers and consumers." (Robert W. Bruere, "The New Alliance—Farm and Factory," *The New Republic*, vol. 22, p. 53.) This was known as the "All-American Farmer-Labor Cooperative Congress." Its moving spirits were Mr. C. H. Gustafson, President of the Farmers Union of Nebraska, and Mr. Warren S. Stone, Grand Chief of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. According to Mr. Bruere, "the attention of the delegates was focused upon the direct control of the country's economic system by groups of producers and consumers operating as cooperative societies or unions."

The rights of organization and collective bargaining have presumably been secured to labor by the provision in the Clayton Act exempting labor organizations from outlawry under the Sherman anti-trust law.¹ Similarly, the Capper-Volstead cooperative marketing bill² is believed, in the words of the secretary of the American Farm Bureau Federation, to have removed "the menace of misinterpretation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law" for farmers' organizations.³ Nevertheless, the rights which these laws assume to secure do not appear in either case to have been placed beyond the possibility of legislative modification or judicial overturn.

So long as the right of organization for either class remains in any doubt, it will be regarded as an end in itself. The interest in protecting that right is likely to affect the attitudes of the groups concerned toward each other even more than will reflection upon the ultimate purposes for which the right will be used. Neither can feel certain of its own legal position with respect to collective bargaining, so long as the legal position of the other remains obscure. This is perhaps one reason why the American Federation of Labor extended its efforts on behalf of the Capper-Volstead Act legalizing cooperative marketing by farmers (*Cf. infra*, p. 138).⁴

¹ *U. S. Laws, 1913-1914 C. 323*. Commons and Andrews, *Principles of Labor Legislation*, p. 113 state: "Yet those in charge of this legislation pointed out that it did not modify the law of conspiracy. . . . Hence, the Clayton Act seems to make no material modifications in the substantive rights of employers and employees. Certainly it does not affect cases in the state courts, which far outnumber those in the federal courts."

² 67th Cong., H. R. 2373.

³ *Report of the Executive Secretary to the Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Farm Bureau Federation*, Chicago, Dec. 11 to 14, 1922, p. 78.

⁴ The American Farm Bureau Federation has not been equally sympathetic toward collective bargaining by labor. If it has been im-

18. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The interests of farmers and of industrial workers have been compared in this chapter from the standpoint of each of a number of economic functions. The two classes have been found to overlap in each case. That is, the interests of a majority of the members of one group, in a given instance, appear to be the interests likewise of a proportion, varying from a minority to a majority, of the members of the other group. We are compelled to compare preponderances of interest rather than clear-cut differences and similarities.

At two points the predominant interests of the two classes were found to agree, and to that extent to create a tendency toward cooperation; at other points, although not coinciding the majority interests appear to be similar, and thus to provide a potential like-mindedness; at a larger number of points, the predominant interests appear to be dissimilar or

pressed with the similarity of the farmer's and the worker's interests in obtaining the *right* of collective bargaining, its printed literature does not indicate it. On the contrary, it seems to have sensed the opposition of interests between the two groups in the ends which their collective bargaining seeks to attain. This is indicated in the following resolutions adopted at an organization meeting of the Farm Bureau Federation in Chicago on November 14, 1919:

"4 . . . While recognizing the right of any and every class of our people to associate themselves for material benefit, we just as strongly assert the right of every American citizen to the free and unhampered privilege of disposing of his labor or products thereof as he may individually desire.

"5. We desire to point out that a large factor in the high cost of living is the curtailment of production through short hours, lessened efficiency of labor and strikes."

On the other hand, the Federation begins a list of its legislative activities on behalf of farmers with the statement: "It has been working during the past year to establish, without question, the legality of collective bargaining." (*What Is It?*, pamphlet no. 1 revised, of the American Farm Bureau Federation, p. 6).

opposed, and thus to provide an economic basis for unlike-mindedness or antagonism in the political sphere.

In their common cause of complaint against the inefficiencies, high costs and occasional malpractices intervening between producers and consumers, the interests of farmers and industrial workers appear to agree. The agreement is none the less real because of the equal and coincident opposition of interest between the two groups in their producer-consumer relation. A similar triangularity of interest appears to exist among farmers, industrial workers, and the capitalist and commercial classes with respect to the tariff. As debtor classes, farmers and industrial workers have a corresponding interest in favorable credit facilities and in a progressive cheapening of the value of money in terms of purchasing power. To the extent that both groups are in debt to the same creditor classes, they have a common occasion of discontent. Both classes have comparatively low incomes,—the vast majority of persons in each case being exempt from income taxation—and to this extent there are present a potential “consciousness of kind” and potentially like-minded attitudes toward persons with higher incomes. Similarly, in upholding their rights to organize and bargain collectively, the one for higher wages and the other for higher prices, industrial workers and farmers occupy comparable positions and are likely to regard each other’s efforts sympathetically. So far as both groups have small investments in government or industrial securities, both have a moderate and similar interest in business stability. To this we may add that both share in the common interest of all classes of the population in economic prosperity, upon which the welfare of all depends.

To the extent that they are entrepreneurs, capitalists, payers of general property taxes and gamblers on the weather and on markets, the interests of farmers differ

greatly from those of industrial workers, although they are not necessarily or even probably opposed to the latter. These economic functions merely provide the farmer with a different set of problems from those which the industrial worker has to experience. They may be expected to result in unlike attitudes of mind, which in turn may lead to antagonism from failure to understand the other's difficulties and points of view. In similar manner, the share of the farmer's income attributable to his labor is so low, except in abnormal years, as to furnish a basis for jealousy of the better-paid industrial workers, and hostility toward his efforts to procure still higher wages. This jealousy and hostility are not likely to develop except as the farmer consciously compares the value of the workingman's services with his own.

When farmers are regarded as employers of labor, on the other hand, they have interests which are not merely dissimilar but opposed to those of labor. Finally, as producers and consumers, respectively, of the goods produced by the other's toil, the farmer and industrial worker have interests which are mutually opposed as concerns each other, just as these same interests coincide with reference to the middleman.

The balance of these various bases for cooperation or opposition is clearly on the side of the latter. Nevertheless, so far as the attitudes of farmers and workers toward each other are determined by economic interests, they will not reflect the balance of the aggregate economic relationships of the two groups, but rather that particular relationship to which circumstances have given particular weight. Thus, it is quite possible for the two groups to remain in opposition in certain Eastern states where nothing has intervened to alter traditional attitudes based upon the employer-employee relationship, while in Western areas more recently developed, a common relationship to Eastern creditors may

have driven both groups into alliance. Similarly, a period of deflation and hardship, causing discontent among the ranks of both farmers and workingmen, coupled with belief that the middleman is in control, is likely to focus the attention of each upon the middleman's share of the consumer's dollar. For the time being, that is, both groups have their attention fixed upon one of the interests which they share in common, and hence are drawn together. At another time, circumstances may emphasize one of the points upon which the economic interests of farmers and laborers ~~differ~~, and tend to pull them apart. Lastly, economic interests are effective in directing political attitudes only as they affect *belief* regarding interests; consequently they do not provide an adequate foundation for prediction.

CHAPTER III

CULTURAL AND BIOLOGICAL FACTORS

IN the preceding chapter we have examined from a variety of view points the comparative economic status of farmers and industrial workers. In the present chapter we will review in a similar manner the status of farmers and industrial workers from a number of cultural and biological aspects.

19. THE URBAN AND RURAL CONTRAST

It may seem scarcely necessary to point out that farmers are residents of rural areas and that industrial workers reside for the most part in urban environments. The exceptions to this rule are negligible. The 1910 Census of Occupations classifies under "Agriculture, Forestry and Animal Husbandry," 74,565 men and women residing in cities of 100,000 or more population, or 0.6 per cent of the occupied persons in these cities.¹ These are mostly farm, agricultural and greenhouse laborers.

A few are farmers. In smaller urban communities the proportionate numbers would be larger. This is indicated by the fact that 1.4 per cent of the occupied persons in 36 cities between 25,000 and 100,000 population, selected at random, are engaged in "Agriculture, Forestry and Animal Husbandry." It is probable that the number of industrial workers employed in these same cities, but residing in rural areas would be considerably larger. The advent of paved highways in conjunction with high wages, high urban rents

¹ The writer's summation of data presented in General Table III of the *Census Report on Occupations, 1910*.

and cheapened cost of motor vehicles has led many thousands of workmen to live in the country and to travel to and from their work in their own cars.¹ Thus, we find a certain degree of overlapping in the matter of residence. Some industrial workers live under *rural* conditions, and a few farmers live under *urban* conditions.

These exceptions do not affect the general conclusion that one of the most striking differences between the two groups is this one of urban *vs.* rural residence. People who live in the country in close contact with nature and comparatively removed from human associations are subjected in common to types of stimuli which are absent in the life of city dwellers. The latter are on their part subjected in common to many stimuli which are not found in the lives of farmers. Among these are all of the various sights and sounds of city life; the daily newspapers, read by people of all classes of urban society, and the constant interstimulation resulting from close contact in city streets and work places. To the extent that these stimuli are pressing they tend to mold city dwellers into an urban type as such, regardless of economic or social status. Worker and capitalist alike are affected by this urban impress.

Dwellers in the country in the same manner tend to conform to a single rural type in contrast to city dwellers. These contrasts are alleged by some writers to affect the very development of the nervous system itself. Thus Galpin asserts that the employment of heavy muscles by the farmer leads to slow and methodical movements in contrast to the quick and active movements of the city dweller.²

¹ Far from being a sign of extravagance, this expedient has probably proved to be an economy in many cases. During the war, the roads leading from shipbuilding centers were congested with motor cars carrying mechanics and laborers to their homes at the close of working hours.

² Charles Josiah Galpin, *Rural Life*, pp. 3-11 and 32-34.

It is probable that many of the differences between the political behavior of farmers and working men, discussed in Chapter V are in reality differences which exist as a result of the fact that the one carries an urban and the other a rural impress.

20. GEOGRAPHICAL CONCENTRATION

Agriculture and industry are specialized geographically as well as by urban and rural districts within the same geographical area. The Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry has presented a table illustrating this concentration in the case of the eastern portion of the United States.¹ The area designated is 12.4 per cent of that of the United States, and contains 47.9 per cent of its population. Its highly industrial character is indicated by the fact that 70.6 per cent of the value of American manufactures originates in this area, but only 26.9 per cent of the value of agricultural products not manufactured. The tons of traffic and the revenue ton-miles on the "class one" railroads for approximately the same area bear to the respective totals for these items approximately the same ratios as that of the population of the area described.

The significance of this concentration of industry (and industrial workers) in the East and the corresponding concentration of agriculture (and farmers) in the West and South will be readily perceived. Just as a city tends to make a common impress upon all of its inhabitants, so a geographical section tends to place a certain stamp of character upon all persons, whether urban or rural, within that section. From this common character develop certain ideas, opinions, and political attitudes. For example, the "solid

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. iii, Table 1A, p. 10. The states included in the "East" are those of New England with New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan and Illinois.

South" is but slightly less "solid" in Mobile or Atlanta than in rural Alabama or Georgia. The Westerner tends to be "western" in his views, whether he reside in Omaha or the heart of rural Nebraska. These differences may even be observed within the boundaries of certain states. Spokane, Washington, the financial capital of the "Inland Empire," partakes of the general conservative political character of that area. Tacoma, a city of the same size in the sharply differentiated Western section of Washington, partakes of the generally "advanced" political character of that section.¹

To the differences expected in the political attitudes of farmers and industrial workers resulting from their contrasted rural and urban environments we must add the sectional differences resulting from the fact that farmers are concentrated in the West and South and partake of Southern and Western character, while industrial workers are concentrated in the North and East and partake of the general character of these regions.

21. RACIAL DIFFERENCES

According to the 1920 census, 93.2 per cent of all dwellers in urban territory are of the white race, while only 86.0 per cent of rural dwellers are white.² The higher percentage of white persons in urban territory is due to the concentration of colored population in the rural areas of the South. As has been noted, this population is practically without political influence in the South and may, therefore, be disregarded for the purpose of this section.

We have no summary figures showing the proportion of

¹ *Cf. infra.*, sec. 34.

² *Fourteenth Census*, vol. iii, U. S. table i. The Census classification "Urban" comprises incorporated places of 2,500 or more population. "Rural" territory is defined as all territory outside of such places.

white to colored farmers in the northern and western states. It is a well known fact, however, that the colored population in the North is almost wholly urban. The colored man moves North to take advantage of high wages in the industrial centers. He seldom moves upon a Northern farm. This fact may be illustrated in the case of two states taken at random, Minnesota and Illinois. The number of negro farmers in Minnesota amounts to 0.02 per cent of all farmers in the state. The negro population of Minneapolis and St. Paul amounts to 1.0 per cent and 1.4 per cent respectively of the total population of these cities. In Illinois the percentage of negro farmers is 0.4 per cent whereas 4.1 per cent of the population of the city of Chicago is made up of colored residents.¹

We may conclude, first, that so far as the colored population of the United States has a voice in politics, it is a factor in urban and not in rural political opinion; second, that the farm population in the North and West is homogeneous as to race in comparison with the industrial labor population.

The discussion has not taken into account the Oriental population in the Pacific Coast states, but voters of Oriental descent are wholly negligible.

22. NATIONALITY DIFFERENCES

National traditions and sympathies tend to persist among a people, and to a lesser extent among their descendants, notwithstanding their emigration to foreign soil. This tendency is a commonplace in political calculations. Everyone is accustomed to hear of the German vote, the Irish vote or the Italian vote. The influence of nationality or national descent upon political sympathies may persist for several generations.

In ascertaining the effect of nationality differences on the

¹ Calculated from *Fourteenth Census*, reports on Agriculture and Population.

political attitudes of farmers and industrial workers, we may regard as significant the census figures for *native-born white* population and *foreign-born white* population and also the figures for *native white of native parentage* as contrasted with white population of foreign birth, foreign parentage or mixed parentage. It is impossible to discover the ratios of these various nationality classes among farmers and industrial workers segregated as such. We are able, however, to obtain comparisons between urban and rural territory. The small towns included in a rural area are as likely to contain foreign stock as is the strictly farming area.¹ The working population in urban territory will contain a higher proportion of foreign stock than the professional, commercial and employing groups. The differences between farmers and industrial workers with regard to nationality are in all probability greater, therefore, than is indicated by the urban-rural differences that are here presented.

For the United States as a whole, 45.2 per cent of the urban population was classed as *native white of native parentage*. Of the rural population 65.9 per cent fell into the same group. This means that out of 100 average dwellers in cities and a similar number from the country, 21 more of the latter than of the former are likely to have received from both parents Anglo-Saxon traditions. The difference is probably less than it would be in the North and West alone, because of the fact that the southern states are not only highly rural but contain a high proportion of colored population in rural areas. Turning our figures about and excluding the colored population, we find that the total num-

¹ There appear to be exceptions, as in Michigan where 75.1 per cent of the farmers are native white as compared with 84.9 per cent native white in all "rural" territory, including of course, towns of less than 2500 population.

ber of persons of *foreign* or *mixed parentage* or *foreign birth* in urban communities amounts to 48.0 per cent of the total urban population. The similar figure for rural territory is 20.0 per cent.¹

Native and North-European Descent Higher Among Farmers. We may compare the proportion of *native white* farmers among all white farmers in the United States with the proportion of *native white* urban dwellers among all white urban dwellers. These proportions are respectively 89.4 per cent and 79.5 per cent.² This difference is not impressive until we examine the differences in racial origin of the *foreign-born white* population. Of the 581,068 *foreign-born white* farm operators, 414,972 or 71.4 per cent came from Great Britain, Scandinavia, Holland, Switzerland, France, Germany or Canada; that is, from countries whose national traditions are supposed most nearly to resemble those of the United States. That the *foreign-born white* members of the industrial population are less predominantly from the same nations is indicated by the fact that of the total *foreign-born* residents of the United States, 48.4 per cent only come from the nations named. Of all *foreign-born white* residents of the United States, 41.0 per cent came from Poland, Austria, Hungary, Finland, Roumania, Greece, Italy and Portugal, that is, from Southern and Eastern Europe, while 21.7 per cent only of the *foreign-born white* farmers came from the same countries.³

In Table VII, Column 2, a comparison is presented between the leading agricultural occupations and important groups of industrial employes, in the percentage of persons who in

¹ *Fourteenth Census*, vol. iii, Continental United States, table i.

² *Fourteenth Census*, Agriculture, vol. vi, part i, Summary, table viii and Population, vol. iii, Summary, table i.

³ *Ibid.*, Agriculture, table ix and Population, table vi. Percentages computed by the writer.

1910 were *native-white of native parentage*.¹ It would be idle to attempt a summary average of this data for industrial employes, for it is impossible to say in many cases whether groups of employed persons should or should not be classed as industrial workers. For farmers, on the other hand, the summary figures presented are accurate and concise. Among 61 groups of employed persons enumerated in Table VII, farmers are equalled or exceeded in the per cent who are *native-born of native parents* by the following: male agricultural laborers (home farm); stock raisers; brakemen, conductors, engineers and firemen on steam railroads; telegraph operators and mail carriers. Of the 46 groups of employes in occupational divisions other than "Agriculture, Forestry and Animal Husbandry," on the other hand, 12 have less than half the farmers' proportion of *native-white of native parentage* among the individuals composing them. Of $3\frac{1}{4}$ millions of workers classed as "laborers," the proportion of *native-white of native parentage* is less than one in 3 of the total. For farmers, the proportion is nearly 2 in 3.

In Nationality Farmers Homogeneous, Workers Heterogeneous. While the industry of agriculture as a whole is fairly homogeneous with respect to nationality, if we may judge from this table, there is a wide variation between groups of industrial workers in the proportion of persons in each having both native birth and native parentage and consequently native traditions from both parents. The range is all the way from 73.4 per cent in the case of the strongly unionized telegraph operators to 8.4 per cent of the tailors and 9.1 per cent of the longshoremen. Speaking broadly, it is the more highly skilled workers who show the higher ratios of native birth and descent.

With respect to nationality, therefore, we find a higher degree of similarity between farmers and some groups of

¹ Corresponding data for the *Fourteenth Census* not available at time of writing.

skilled industrial workers than between these industrial workers and certain others who are on the whole less skilled. We may expect farmers to be imbued with many traditions and attitudes indigenous to American soil which are shared with those industrial workers who are likewise of older American stock. While other important groups of industrial workers remain imbued to a large degree with national traditions and *mores* brought with them from foreign lands, it is not to be expected that they will have the sympathy for them and the understanding of them either of farmers or workers of older native stock.

Where there has been geographical rather than occupational concentration of a foreign-born population, as of Scandinavians in Minnesota and Germans in Wisconsin, the fact of foreign birth will prove to be on the whole a bond between farmers and workers. In such a case, voters are likely to feel their kinship as nationals first and their occupational divergencies second. It will be seen in the following pages that farmer-labor coalitions have attained a state of reality in those states which contain a homogeneous foreign-born population.

23. AGE DIFFERENCES

The evidence is convincing that farmers are predominantly *older* than persons engaged in industrial occupations.

The significance of a difference of age between farmers and industrial workers is dependent upon the relation that may exist between age and political attitudes. People customarily grow more conservative as they grow older.¹

¹ A. Lawrence Lowell, *Public Opinion in War and Peace*, p. 279 cites Rohmer in his *Lehre von den Politischen Parteien*: "Youths, he thought were by nature radical; men in younger middle life liberal; those in older middle life conservative and old men reactionary." Lowell himself says: "Perhaps the most marked, or at least the most common tendency as men grow older is to become less sanguine," and again (p. 282): "Another common tendency as men grow older is to become more contented." The first of these tendencies, according to Lowell's analysis, changes the liberal into a conservative. The second changes the radical into the liberal.

TABLE VII ¹

TOTAL NUMBERS AND PROPORTIONS NATIVE-WHITE OF NATIVE PARENTAGE
IN SELECTED OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS OF EMPLOYED PERSONS, 1910
(COLUMNS 2 AND 3); ALSO PROPORTIONS OF PERSONS 45
YEARS OF AGE AND OVER TO TOTAL PERSONS IN THE
SAME OCCUPATIONS (COLUMN 4)

(Includes all employees in non-supervisory and non-clerical occupations
in which 50,000 or more persons were engaged in a single industry in
the divisions of Agriculture, Forestry and Animal Husbandry; Extraction
of Minerals; Manufacturing and Mechanical Industries; and Trans-
portation; with selected groups from other divisions.)

1. Occupational Division and Group	2. Total Number Employed	3. Per cent Native White of Native Parentage	4. Per cent 45 years of age and over
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY			
<i>Agriculture</i>	12,285,579	56.9	30.0
Dairy farmers, male	59,240	56.6	50.0
Farmers, male	5,606,789	63.0 [*]	43.8
Farmers, female	257,703	51.6	63.1
Gardeners, male	75,481	53.0	60.8
Farm laborers (home farm), male	2,133,949	63.0	2.1
Farm laborers (home farm), female	1,176,585	34.9	9.1
Farm laborers (working out), male	2,299,444	55.2	17.1
Farm laborers (working out), female	337,552	17.4	14.2
Garden laborers, male	76,173	26.5	41.9
<i>Forestry</i>			
Other lumbermen, male	82,799	43.8	17.0
<i>Animal Husbandry</i>			
Fishermen and oystermen, male	67,799	54.8	30.0
Stock herders, drovers and feeders, male	58,376	57.2	16.4
Stock raisers, male	50,847	64.1	46.8
ALL OTHER OCCUPATIONAL DIVISIONS			
All employed male persons classed as "laborer" ..	3,230,756	32.3	22.2
<i>Extraction of Minerals</i>			
<i>Coal Mines</i>			
Miners, male	425,798	28.9	18.3
<i>Manufacturing and Mechanical Industries</i>			
<i>Building and Hand Trades</i>			
Blacksmiths (including 29 females)	163,103	52.7	38.5
Carpenters and joiners (including 37 females) ..	682,490	55.3	39.5
Masons (including 15 females)	160,151	36.0	36.5
Painters, glaziers and varnishers (including 381 females)	273,441	51.4	29.2
Plumbers, male ²	119,596	42.0	13.1
Shoemakers (not in factory) (including 782 females) ²	69,570	21.4	51.1

¹ Compiled and calculated from *Thirteenth Census*, vol. iv; General table vi.

² Probably includes persons who are not employees.

TABLE VII—Continued

1 Occupational Division and Group	2 Total Number Employed	3 Per cent Native White of Native Parentage	4 Per cent 45 years of age and over
<i>Clothing Factories</i> (two categories combined)			
Sewers and sewing-machine operators, female.	107,199	19.8	5.4
Tailors, male	163,795	8.4	24.4
<i>Bakeries</i>			
Bakers, male	84,752	22.4	19.4
<i>Iron and Steel Industries</i>			
Machinists (eight industries combined), male..	220,010	40.2	16.9
Molders (eight industries combined), male....	69,179	34.2	19.9
Blast furnaces and steel rolling mills			
Laborers ¹	194,329	14.9	13.6
Seventeen skilled trades ²	43,223	43.6	20.8
<i>Printing and Publishing Establishments</i>			
Compositors and typesetters, male	111,489	50.9	16.9
<i>Textile Industries</i>			
Spinners (twelve industries combined), male..	27,777	32.7	12.3
Spinners (twelve industries combined), female.	46,264	44.8	1.8
Weavers (twelve industries combined), male..	101,582	31.1	15.5
Weavers (twelve industries combined), female.	87,573	29.4	8.8
<i>Cigar and Tobacco Factories</i>			
Cigar makers (not specified), male	58,725	30.7	25.4
Cigar makers (not specified), female.....	28,767	36.7	7.1
<i>Other Not Specified Industries</i>			
Engineers (stationary), male.....	68,696	53.2	34.2
<i>Not Specified Metal Industries</i>			
Machinists, male.....	88,272	41.6	18.5
<i>Transportation</i>			
<i>Water Transportation</i>			
Longshoremen, male	51,800	9.1	22.5
<i>Electric and Street Railways</i>			
Conductors, male	56,932	55.8	9.1
Motormen, male.....	56,218	52.1	15.5
<i>Livery Stables</i>			
Hostlers and stable hands, male	63,382	45.6	24.8
<i>Steam Railroads</i>			
Clerks (general), male ³	115,095	61.9	11.7
Brakemen, male	92,111	67.1	5.8
Conductors, male.....	65,604	67.9	22.3
Engineers (locomotive), male	96,229	65.1	29.9
Firemen (locomotive), male.....	76,381	65.0	4.6
Section hands, male	81,395	32.4	17.0
Switchmen, flagmen and gatemen, male	73,367	54.7	29.7

¹ Total here given is also included in item above: "All employed persons classed as 'laborer'."

² This item does not fall within the criteria of selection employed, but is inserted because of its interest.

³ Included because strongly organized in a well-recognized labor organization.

TABLE VII—*Concluded*

1 Occupational Division and Group	2 Total Number Employed	3 Per cent Native White of Native Parentage	4 Per cent 45 years of age and over
<i>Post</i>			
Mail carriers, male	79,667	65.1	27.8
<i>Telephone and Telegraph</i>			
Telegraph operators, male	61,334	73.4	9.7
Telephone operators, female	88,262	60.4	1.5
<i>Truck, Transfer, Cab and Hack Companies</i>			
Draymen, teamsters and expressmen, male....	271,999	46.8	25.3
<i>Trade</i>			
<i>Wholesale and Retail Trade</i>			
Deliverymen, male	205,457	40.6	14.6
Salesmen	624,742	56.8	17.7
Saleswomen	250,438	49.1	5.7
<i>Domestic and Personal Service</i>			
Domestic and personal service except laundries	3,639,406	28.0	23.7
Barbers and hairdressers, male	172,946	41.7	17.8
Bartenders, male	100,984	31.6	15.0
Cooks, male	107,416	23.2	24.1
Janitors, male	75,188	30.0	52.1

It will be seen from Column 3 of Table VII that 43.8 per cent of all male farmers were 45 years of age and over at the time of the 1910 census. For the industry of agriculture as a whole, the corresponding percentage is 30.0, being low because of the inclusion of nearly 3½ million persons, largely boys and girls, who are classed as *farm laborers (home farm)*.

Among other agricultural occupation groups, the proportions of male dairy farmers, female farmers, male gardeners, and male stock raisers, who have passed the 45-year mark are greater than among male farmers. Among the industrial occupations included in the table, *two only* show a higher ratio than farmers among the higher age group. These are shoemakers and janitors. Coal miners, plumbers, bakers,

skilled and unskilled operatives in the iron and steel industries, compositors and typesetters, workers in textiles, machinists, street-car conductors and motormen, railway clerks, brakemen, firemen and section hands, telegraph operators, deliverymen and salesmen in trade, barbers, bartenders and various groups of women employes—all show *less than half* the farmer's proportion of persons who have reached the age of 45 years.

The explanation of this difference may be found to some extent in the greater hazards to life and health that exist in some industries, such as iron and steel. A more important explanation is to be found in a tendency for the sons and daughters of farmers to take up industrial occupations in their youth, and subsequently to return to farms in older age.

Table VII indicates that those industrial occupations, whose followers are frequently alleged among labor groups to be somewhat conservative, are very largely the occupations in which the proportion of men 45 years of age or over is highest. Such, for example, are carpenters, masons, shoemakers and locomotive engineers. Granting the truth of the supposition that increasing age makes for conservatism, the age difference between farmers and industrial workers will count for conservatism in the former and radicalism in the latter.

24. FAMILIES AND HOMES

For a number of decades, a movement of young men and women from farms to industrial centers has been in progress.¹

¹ L. D. H. Weld, *Social and Economic Survey of a Community in the Red River Valley* (Research Publications of the University of Minnesota, quoted in Sims, *The Rural Community*, p. 604) maintains that the employment opportunities for young people on the farms are greater than in the nearby villages. Hence "There is a much more noticeable movement of young people from the village to the city than from the farm to the city."

The movement is reflected in the higher average age levels of the farming population, indicated in Table VII and by the evidence for higher fecundity among the rural population when taken in conjunction with the relatively greater increase of urban population.¹

Whatever factors tend to disturb the natural balance between the sexes in numbers or ages may be expected to limit, in turn, the opportunities for normal sex relationships. If it be true, as a Freudian trend in modern thought tends to maintain, that social or economic discontent is a resultant of repressed sex impulses² we might expect differences in political attitudes between two groups corresponding to the comparative sex balance within each.

At the time of the 1920 census the number of males to 100 females among the urban white population was 100.5. In the rural population the number was 109.0. The difference was more marked among the *foreign-born white* than among the native white. In rural areas, there were 141.8 *foreign-born white* males to 100 females, but in the urban population 115.9 *foreign-born white* males to 100 females. Of the population *native-white of native parentage*, there were 106.3 males in rural and 98.6 in urban areas to each 100 females. Superficially, it would appear that the balance between the sexes was more nearly attained in urban than in rural life and that the probability of sex repression, leading to political expressions of discontent, would be greater in the country than in the city. The conclusion is under suspicion, however, because of the fact that a floating labor population, made up almost exclusively of single men, is to

¹ The population of the United States in 1910 was 45.8 per cent urban. In 1920 it was 51.4 per cent urban.

² Cf. A. B. Wolfe, "The Motivation of Radicalism," *Psychological Review*, July, 1921; Stuart A. Rice, "Motives in Radicalism and Social Reform," *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1923; Stewart Paton, "The Psychology of the Radical," *Yale Review*, Oct., 1921.

be found in the lumber camps, mines, construction camps and seasonal agriculture, where they have been to great extent included in the rural population. Moreover, our inquiry deals with *farmers* and hence is not concerned with agricultural laborers, among whom the percentage of single men must be very high.

Marriage More General Among Farmers. In the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, we feel justified in assuming that the proportion of married farmers is as high or higher than that of industrial workers in urban communities. The assumption is based not merely on common observation, but upon the comparative economic utility of the marriage relationship in the two cases. Many eligible workers cannot afford to marry, while on the other hand rooming houses, restaurants and laundries remove many of the penalties that would otherwise be imposed upon them for not doing so. The farmer, confronted himself with the many tasks which usually fall to the share of women-folk on a farmstead, is frequently in a position where he cannot afford *not* to marry if an opportunity arises.

Children More Numerous in Rural Areas. This conclusion tends to be borne out by the *Fourteenth Census* which indicates that the proportion of children in the population *native-white of native parentage* is higher in rural areas than in the cities. The proportion of persons of working age, on the contrary, is higher in the latter than in the former. Of the urban population, *native-white of native parentage*, 11.4 per cent was under 5 years of age as compared with 13.5 per cent in the case of the rural population. These percentages mean that the proportion of children of native stock under 5 years of age in rural areas is 18.4 per cent greater than the similar proportion of children under 5 in urban areas. Similarly the proportion of children between 5 and 9 is 23.0 per cent greater in rural than in urban areas,

while all children under 15 are proportionately 23.1 per cent more numerous in rural than in urban areas.¹

With regard to persons between 20 and 44 years of age, the proportion living in urban areas is found to be 25.6 per cent greater than the proportion living in rural areas.

Either or both of two explanations may be made for these differences. First, a proportionately higher number of children may be born in the country than in the city. Second, a larger proportion of adults without children may remove from the country to the city. Either of these explanations substantiates the view that home life tends to be more "normal" among farmers than among industrial workers, so far as normalcy may be indicated by marriage and the birth of children.

Home-ownership Affects Attitudes. With regard to the question of home ownership a similar situation is found. As has been seen in Chapter II, 61 per cent of all farmers own the farms which they operate and consequently the homes in which they live; 39 per cent presumably live in homes which they do not own but for the current upkeep of which they are largely responsible in person. A list of 36 of the larger American cities indicates that the percentage of homes which are rented varies from 50.1 per cent in the case of Toledo to 86.5 per cent in New York. It is safe to assume that the laboring population in these cities is composed of renters to a greater degree than the commercial, professional and employing classes. In fact, in some of the industrial centers the number of industrial workers who are owners of homes is probably negligible.

Regard for the property of others is probably associated with ownership of the material things which one uses. Residence in rented tenements does not produce respect for property. The larger number of material things which the

¹ Calculated from *Fourteenth Census*, vol. iii, Continental U. S., table iii.

city laborer or mechanic uses, whether at home or at work, belong to others, frequently to intangible corporations. Their injury or destruction involves no personal loss and frequently no personal reprobation. The material things which the owning farmer most frequently uses belongs to himself and their careful preservation is a matter of constant concern and interest. The difference between tenant farmers and owning farmers in this respect is proverbial, and the same differences are to be expected between farmers and industrial workers as major groups. Attitudes spontaneously developed toward material things of immediate daily concern will tend to persist among both farmers and industrial workers in their attitudes toward material wealth and property in general.

Further distinctions between the living conditions of farmers and industrial workers could probably be drawn, were the data available, with respect to the crowded condition of their homes. Very little of the cost of a farm house is chargeable to ground rent. In a congested city, on the contrary, the cost of ground may exceed that of the dwelling which is erected upon it. This factor makes for a degree of over-crowding in urban dwellings that is not encountered in the farm house. Moreover, the farmer's family has an indefinite amount of outdoor space and storage space in other farm buildings to fall back upon. This factor of comparative over-crowding seems likely to contribute to the general difference in attitude toward property discussed in the preceding paragraph.¹ On the other hand, the number

¹ Wm. F. Ogburn in "A Study of Rent in Various Cities," *Monthly Labor Review*, Sept., 1919, table xxvi, p. 28, shows that in 92 cities the number of rooms per person, based on families of the same size (husband, wife and three children, aged two, five and eleven) with the same total annual expenditure of \$1300, vary from 1.4 in Astoria, Oregon and Everett, Washington to .8 in Pittsburg and the colored section of New Orleans. This data was obtained in the Cost of Living Survey con-

of industrial workers who are accustomed to the "modern conveniences" of electric lighting, plumbing, etc., is perhaps greater than the number of farmers.¹

25. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In the present chapter it was found that farmers and industrial workers present important biological and cultural differences. Attention was called to differences between city dwellers and country dwellers as such and to the fact that the cleavage between farmers and industrial workers corresponds closely to the rural-urban cleavage. Moreover, it was found that to a high degree, the farm population and the industrial population coincide in each case with one or more of the larger sectional divisions of the United States, and that each of the latter presents typical characteristics and political attitudes distinct from each of the others.

If the negro farmer, who is without political influence, be eliminated, it was found that farmers are more homogeneous in race and nationality than are industrial workers, although the latter vary greatly in these respects, according to occupation and industry.

In age, likewise, farmers are more homogeneous. The proportion 45 years or older is larger than in nearly all industrial occupations. As in the case of nationality wide variations exist among the latter with respect to ages.

Finally, the conditions of family and home life to be found among farmers seem likely to be more conducive to "normal living," and to respect for material goods and prop-

ducted by the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics in the fall and winter of 1918. No corresponding data for farm families are known to the writer.

¹ Some cultural contrasts of this character between farmers and near-by villages are contained in a table on page 603 of Sims, *The Rural Community*, taken from Weld, *Social and Economic Survey of a Community in the Red River Valley*.

erty in general, than are the corresponding domestic influences surrounding the life of the industrial worker.

The comparisons may be summed up in parallel columns as follows:

<i>White Farmers are relatively</i>	<i>Industrial Workers are relatively</i>
Rural	Urban
Western and Southern	Eastern and Northern
Homogeneous in race and nationality	Diverse in race and nationality
Of native birth and parentage	In some occupations of foreign birth or descent
Of North European stock among the foreign born	More numerous of Southern and Eastern European stock among foreign born
Older	Younger
More "normal" in living conditions and home life	Less "normal" in living conditions and home life

So far as their respective cultural and biological backgrounds tend to influence their responses to political questions, therefore, farmers and industrial workers may be expected to exhibit *dissimilar* rather than *like* political behavior.

CHAPTER IV

FARMER-LABOR CLEAVAGES IN CONGRESS

IN Chapters II and III a variety of data has been presented from which inferences might be drawn as to the *probable* attitudes of farmers and industrial workers toward each other. In the chapters which follow, we shall attempt to ascertain whether *as a matter of fact* during the period from 1919 to the time of writing in 1923, the two groups have been in political opposition or in political accord. In other words, we shall turn from a deductive to an inductive analysis.

26. REFLECTION OF POPULAR ATTITUDES IN THE BEHAVIOR OF LEGISLATORS

Notwithstanding much assertion to the contrary, the American people tend to select legislators who represent the policies, on the whole, which dominant groups in the electorate desire to have adopted. Those who maintain that the popular will is habitually thwarted are usually deluded by their own desires.

Belief in the foregoing statements of opinion does not necessitate a high estimate of the political rectitude of elected representatives. The characteristics which commend a popular candidate to an electorate are usually those which a majority either possess or would like to possess. They may themselves be incapable of his speech and manner, and may understand but vaguely the intellectual formulation of his ideas, but if he reflects their own little-understood aspirations and impulses, he *speaks their language* and is elected when opposed by a less representative candidate. Once in

office, his chances of continued popularity and reelection are dependent upon his ability to make a majority of the voters see in him not only the instrument but the realization of their own desires and ambitions.

The writer is not blind to the part played by bosses and political leaders of all descriptions in the selection and election of candidates. "Boss rule" does not consist so much in compelling voters to mark their ballots for certain men, as the movie scenario might have it, as it consists in a careful estimate of the popular will, and the selection of candidates for whom the voters will *want to vote*. Where masses of ignorant or foreign-born persons are in the electorate, the "boss" himself, rather than the candidate, may be the individual who "speaks the language" of the voters, actually and figuratively. But since the bosses select the candidate, the latter in turn is not likely to be cast in a mold distasteful to the electorate.

The practical result in "boss ruled" communities no less than in those in which "reform" has prevailed, is that voters tend to prefer, and therefore elect to office men of their own *kind*. Moreover, to the extent that the elected office-holder is guided by political considerations, the agreement between his political behavior and the desires of his constituents will be even greater than the agreement between his personal attitudes and preferences and theirs. The "temper of the times" and the peculiar prevailing impulses of particular constituencies are both exhibited in the behavior of representative legislative bodies. Thus the political behavior of an individual representative may be regarded as something like a common denominator, or better, as a *resultant* of the political impulses of dominant groups in his constituency.

If farmers and industrial workers in general are found among the supporters of the same senator, representative or state legislator, or if the latter is regarded as a supporter of

both agricultural and labor legislation, the fact may be accepted as an indication that the political impulses of the two groups tend to be compatible and even similar. If, on the other hand, the member of a legislative body is identified with measures favorable to one of the groups but not with measures favorable to the other, this may be taken as an indication of political impulses that are either hostile or indifferent.

In both houses of Congress there are certain men known to be favorable to the interests of farmers. Certain men likewise are known to be favorable to the interests of labor. Allowing for the coincidences due to chance, are the same men generally speaking, favorable to the interests of both? Have the measures favored by representative spokesmen for labor been also favored by representative spokesmen for farmers? Data contributing to an answer to these questions are presented in sections 27, 28, and 29 within the present chapter.

27. THE SENATE "BLOCS"

Of the various blocs, real and alleged, that were enumerated on page 28, the Farm or Agricultural Bloc appears to have reached the most advanced stage of organization. Its meetings approach formality, and it has in each House a recognized leader and recognized committees. A number of lists of its members have at different times been made public. Even so, the Farm Bloc in both Senate and House has a membership that is constantly in flux.¹ When we look for a "labor bloc," it is still more difficult to find any semblance of a formal membership or organization, apart from the so-

¹ "It (the Senate Bloc) has had as many as 30 Senators as members. Its membership, however, is not a fixed affair and fluctuates at different times and on various measures." John K. Barnes, "The Man Who Runs the Farm Bloc," *World's Work*, Nov., 1922.

called "progressive bloc" or "LaFollette group," which is generally sympathetic to the aspirations of labor, but which does not represent them in the same specific sense that the farm bloc represents the interests of the farmers. Moreover, no roll calls were taken on distinctly "labor" measures during the 67th Congress, from which the attitudes of members could be inferred.

The nearest approach to a partial list of "labor sympathizers" among senators in the 67th Congress is provided, in the writer's opinion, by the list of candidates for the Senate who were successfully supported and opposed by the Non-Partisan campaign committees of the American Federation of Labor, in the election of 1922.¹ Senators who did not come before the voters for reelection in that year are necessarily omitted from the list, but among the names which do appear, those of senators who were reelected with labor support may be compared with the names of Senate Farm Bloc members who were running for reelection.

A list of 24 senators is given by Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas, the present leader of the Senate Farm Bloc, as having joined that group.² Six of these only are among the 26 senators running for reelection in November, 1922. Ten of the 26 were among those supported by the American Fed-

¹ Report of the American Federation of Labor, National Non-Partisan Campaign Committee, dated November 22, 1922, published under title *Non-Partisan Successes*. It should be noted that these lists represent the wishes of the local rather than the National A. F. of L. organization. In a letter to the writer, dated May 26, 1923, Mr. Frank Morrison, Secretary of the American Federation of Labor states: "the Federation officials only furnish the records of the men to our central bodies, state bodies and non-partisan committees, and on that record they decide whether their records are favorable enough to give them their support. It must not be forgotten that the officers of the Federation do not direct or decide who should or should not be voted for; we furnish the information and allow the voters to decide for themselves."

² Capper, *The Agricultural Bloc*, pp. 8-10.

eration of Labor. If we assume complete absence of relationship between the factors of labor support and membership in the Farm Bloc, it would be probable that either 2 or 3 senators (arithmetically $27/13$) who were members of the Farm Bloc would likewise have been supported by the American Federation of Labor.¹ We actually find 5 who appear on both lists, or double the expectation.²

In view of the small numbers involved, no great significance can be attached to these figures, although they tend to indicate that a number of senators, larger than the expectation based on chance, are supporters of measures deemed favorable to their interests by both farmers and industrial workers.

28. THE HOUSE BLOCS

The Farm Bloc in the House of Representatives is less definitely organized than is the similar bloc in the Senate. Mr. O. M. Kile, former Assistant Washington Representative of the American Farm Bureau Federation, gives a list of 30 members, which he states comprised the "full agricultural bloc in the House" on May 1, 1921.³ In order to obtain a basis of comparison with an authentic list of Congressmen deemed favorable to organized labor, those among this list of 30 who were reelected in November, 1922 must be

¹ For method of calculation, cf. pp. 52-53, *supra*.

² The following senators were both members of the Farm Bloc and supported by the American Federation of Labor: Ashurst, Arizona; Jones, New Mexico; Swanson, Virginia; LaFollette, Wisconsin; Kendrick, Wyoming. The following were supported by the American Federation of Labor but are not members of the Farm Bloc: Johnson, California; Pitman, Nevada; Gerry, Rhode Island; McKeller, Tennessee; King, Utah. Senator Kellogg of Minnesota, member of the Farm Bloc was opposed by the American Federation of Labor.

³ O. M. Kile, *The Farm Bureau Movement*, with introduction by J. R. Howard, President of the American Farm Bureau Federation, pp. 189-90, footnote.

compared with the list of Congressmen elected at that time with the support of the American Federation of Labor "or by reason of its opposition to their opponents."¹ Of the 303 congressmen reelected in November, 1922, 21 were members of the Farm Bloc as given by Mr. Kile. Of the same 303 members, 91 had the support of the American Federation of Labor. On the basis of chance alone the appearance simultaneously of 6 or 7 representatives on both lists would be expected. Actually but 5 members appeared on both.

A better list of supporters of agriculture for comparison with the list of labor members is to be obtained by an analysis of the votes on 4 measures deemed favorable to agriculture by the American Farm Bureau Federation. The votes of 95 members were in each case favorable to agricultural interests in the test roll-calls taken. Of these 95 members, 77 were reelected in November, 1922. Thus of the 303 members reelected, 77 were favorable to agriculture and 91 were supported by organized labor. Forty-three of the 303 are in both of these categories; 49 were supported by labor but were not among those favorable to agriculture; 35 were favorable to agriculture but were not supported by labor. The chance of coincidence under the two categories is approximately 23. The actual coincidence is 42. While this result does not bear out that which is obtained from using the Farm Bloc members, the larger numbers involved in the present calculation give it a higher degree of reliability.

It is interesting to note the chance and the actual coincidences in the 9 geographical areas of the United States: These are presented in Table VIII.

¹ Cf. footnote *supra*, p. 131.

TABLE VIII

SECTIONAL COINCIDENCES BETWEEN AGRICULTURAL SYMPATHY AND
LABOR SUPPORT

Number of representatives reelected 1922, number of these who were favorable to agriculture and number supported by the American Federation of Labor, with chance and actual coincidence, by geographical areas.

Census Division.	Total Number Reelected	Members reelected who were favorable to agriculture		Members reelected with support of A. F. of L.		Chance of Coinci- dences	Actual Coinci- dences
		Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent		
New England	26	0	0.0	4	15.4	0	0
Middle Atlantic...	49	1	2.0	8	16.3	0	1
East North Central	56	19	33.9	23	41.1	8	14
West North Central	37	25	67.6	15	40.5	10	12
South Atlantic....	45	8	17.8	12	26.7	2	2
East South Central	31	8	25.8	10	32.3	3	4
West South Central	33	9	27.3	12	36.4	3	5
Mountain	9	1	11.1	2	22.2	0	1
Pacific	17	6	35.3	5	29.4	2	3
United States	303	77	25.4	91	30.0	28	42

It will be seen from this table that farmer influence and labor influence are both low in New England, Middle Atlantic and Mountain states,¹ so far as the criteria employed are indicative. Both are high in the two North Central divisions, and it is in one of these, the East North Central,² in which the ratio of actual to chance coincidence is highest.

There were 16 representatives in the 67th Congress hold-

¹ If the 9 divisions be graded according to the percentage of members reelected who belong to the Farm Bloc, and according to the percentage supported by the American Federation of Labor, respectively, the coefficient of correlation between the two series is found to be $r = .89$.

² Comprising the states of Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and Wisconsin.

ing membership in labor organizations.¹ Not all of these men are regarded as progressives or labor sympathizers among the rank and file members of labor organizations in their own districts. If these 16 "card men" be compared with the list of supporters of agricultural interests derived from 4 indicative roll calls, the chance of coincidence is found to be 0.22 or for practical purposes 0, as compared with an actual coincidence of 6.

We may conclude that in the 67th Congress, a tendency existed for the wishes of farmers and of industrial workers to find expression through the same members of the House of Representatives.

29. FARMER AND LABOR LEGISLATION IN CONGRESS

Whatever the criticisms of its opponents within and without the labor movement, the American Federation of Labor is admittedly the only organization qualified by numbers and prestige to speak authoritatively for American workingmen in matters of legislation.

No single organization of farmers occupies a corresponding position. The *Minnesota Daily Star*,²

challenges anyone to say with any degree of certainty who speaks for the farmers of the country in national councils—the representatives of the Farmers National Council, the spokesmen for the Farm Bureau, the officers of the Farmers Union, or anyone of the other "57 varieties" of the only true and simon-pure, name-blown-in-the-bottle brand of farmers' friends.

¹ According to a list supplied the writer by Frank Morrison, Secretary of the American Federation of Labor, dated March 16, 1921.

² Organ of the Farmer-Labor political movement in Minnesota, chief newspaper supporter of Henrik Shipstead and Magnus Johnson in their successful campaigns for the United States Senate, and official publication of the City of Minneapolis, whose City Council is controlled by organized labor. Present citation is from an editorial, "Covering Too Much Territory," July 12, 1923.

Farmers' Organizations. Of the various national farmers' organizations, three maintain offices in Washington and have been conspicuous in their promotion of legislation. The American Farm Bureau Federation, the more prominent of the three, was responsible for the formation of the Farm Bloc. It is generally regarded as "conservative," and is vigorously assailed by the "radical" Farmers National Council. The latter organization says of the former: "The American farmer is much safer in labor's hands than in the hands of the Farm Bureau, which is controlled by bankers and other speculators."¹ The comparative strength of the two organizations is indicated, in a measure, by their budgets. The disbursements of the American Farm Bureau Federation for the year ended October 31, 1922, amounted in round numbers to \$247,000.² The Farmers National Council, according to its statement, "needs a budget of at least \$12,000 a year."³

The third of the farmers' organizations referred to is the National Board of Farm Organizations, "a conference body to act on all matters wherein member organizations are unanimously agreed as to a policy." Included in its membership are the National Farmers Union, with 28 state units, and the National Milk Producers' Federation, "the largest national federation of cooperatives in America."⁴ The secretary states that relations with labor "are exceedingly friendly, but we have no intimate understandings either with the organized labor groups or the organized employing

¹ From an undated news release issued by the Farmers National Council, Bliss Building, Washington, D. C.

² Report of the Executive Secretary, December 1, 1922, p. 39.

³ From a four-page leaflet bearing the caption "The Farmers National Council," issued by the Council at its national office.

⁴ Quotations from a letter to the writer by Mr. Chas. W. Holman, Secretary, dated July 5, 1923.

groups." It is to be noted that the union label is omitted from the stationery of the organization, as well as from that of the American Farm Bureau Federation—a small matter but one very closely related to the sympathies of organized labor. The label appears on the printed matter issued by the Farmers National Council.

If the sympathy of the Farmers National Council for policies desired by the more radical wing of organized labor is outspoken, the hostility displayed by the American Farm Bureau Federation toward a number of the policies of the American Federation of Labor is but thinly concealed. Resolutions adopted by one of the organization meetings of the Farm Bureau Federation denounced attempts "of the self-styled 'Farmers' National Council' to ally the agriculturists of America with the radical element of the industrial world;" viewed "with grave concern the growing tendency to shorten the hours of labor;" condemned "any system or practice which tends to set up the mediocre man as a standard in any class or group;" urged that every citizen "should receive remuneration for his services in proportion to his energy, efficiency and responsibility;" and asserted the strike to be "unjustifiable, and no longer to be tolerated."¹

Measures Favored by Farm Bureaus and Organized Labor. In view of the hostility apparent between the leading farmers' organization and the leading labor organization, a comparison of the legislation favored by each will at least not be biased in the direction of showing too close an identity of interest. We are fortunate in having comparable statements available.

At its convention held in Cincinnati in June, 1922, the American Federation of Labor through its Executive Council listed 17 laws enacted by the 67th Congress prior to May 1

¹ Meeting of March 4, 1920, held in Chicago. From resolutions printed in pamphlet form.

of that year that were deemed "favorable to labor."¹ Four of these "laws" are as a matter of fact specific provisions of the Immigration Restriction Law of May 19, 1921, so that the list of 17 may be reduced to 14. The period covered is approximately that of the first session and two-thirds of the second session of the 67th Congress, although but 40 per cent of the public bills enacted in the second session had been approved within the period named.²

The Executive Secretary of the American Farm Bureau Federation in his report of December 1, 1922, lists 18 bills "in which the Farm Bureau was directly interested" which had passed Congress and had been approved by the President during 1921 and prior to October 31, 1922. This period is approximately that of the first and second sessions of the 67th Congress, complete, and is therefore longer than the period covered by the report to the Cincinnati convention of organized labor.

Five of the 14 bills deemed "favorable to labor" by the Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor are among the 18 bills "in which the Farm Bureau was directly interested." These are as follows: The Johnson ("3 per cent") Immigration Bill;³ the McCumber Bill appropriating funds for the purchase of seed and grain in crop-failure areas of the Northwest;⁴ the Capper-Volstead Bill legalizing co-operative marketing by farmers;⁵ the Dunn Bill authorizing appropriation for Federal highway construction for the next

¹ *Proceedings of the Forty-Second Annual Convention*, pp. 92-3.

² Out of 300 public bills and resolutions enacted in the second session, 120 were approved by the president prior to May 1, 1922.

³ *Statutes of the U. S.*, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 8.

⁴ *Statutes of the U. S.*, 67th Cong., 2nd Sess., ch. 109. The bill carries an appropriation of \$1,500,000. The American Federation of Labor report gives the appropriation as \$5,000,000 and does not cite the introducer's name, but the McCumber Bill is clearly the measure referred to.

⁵ *Statutes of the U. S.*, 67th Cong., 2nd Sess., ch. 57.

three years;¹ and the Kinkaid Bill, extending the time of payment of installments due on irrigated land.² Moreover, the Dunn Bill may be regarded as a corollary of the Phipps-Dowell Bill, another one of the 18 measures supported by the Farm Bureau, and which the American Federation of Labor must therefore be presumed to have favored.³

"Chance of Coincidence" In Support of Farmer and Labor Bills. It is difficult to estimate the arithmetic "chance of coincidence"⁴ between measures on the lists of the Farm Bureau and the Federation of Labor. The public bills passed by Congress differ widely in importance. The two lists of measures under comparison are probably confined in each case to those which are deemed of major significance. They undoubtedly omit bills which might be favored but which are regarded as relatively inconsequential. There is no method whereby we may separate relatively important from relatively unimportant legislation. Public bills and resolutions passed by both houses of Congress and approved by the President during the period of the 67th Congress covered by both of the reports under discussion numbered 255.⁵ If these were all of equal importance, the "chance of coincidence" between the 14 laws approved by labor and the 18 laws approved by the Farm Bureau would amount to slightly less than one. But we cannot compute the chance of coincidence among the more important laws without a means of segregating the latter.

¹ *Statutes of the U. S.*, 67th Con., 1st Sess., ch. 119.

² *Statutes of the U. S.*, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 7.

³ The Phipps-Dowell Bill merely provided the scheme of cooperation between federal and state governments in highway construction. The Dunn Bill appropriated the funds necessary to carry out the obligations of the federal government under the scheme.

⁴ *Cf. supra*, pp. 52-53.

⁵ Bills and resolutions enacted and approved are classified as "public" and as "private." The number of public bills was obtained by deducting the number of private bills as counted from the total number of chapters in the respective sessions.

One is inclined to suspect, moreover, that the Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor, in view of the paucity of legislative enactments directly favorable to labor during the period in question, has taken credit for efforts expended on behalf of measures in the interests of farmers in order to curry favor with the latter and to make a good showing with its own membership. The Council comes very near to an admission that its list of "favorable laws" is *padded* when it asserts in the same section of its report that of 400 bills introduced in the 67th Congress directly or indirectly affecting labor, "90 per cent are inimical to the interests of labor and the people," that "99 per cent of the work done by labor in Congress has been to defeat pernicious legislation" and that "remedial legislation had no chance for consideration."

In spite of this tendency, the coincidence of 5 (and by inference 6) among 14 laws supported by the American Federation of Labor and 18 supported by the American Farm Bureau Federation appears significant. The coincidence is that which would be expected to occur among 42 laws if there were entire absence of association between the factors governing the selection of measures on the two lists. Out of the 255 public laws enacted during the period common to the two, it seems reasonable to suppose that a much larger number than 42 were of sufficient importance to have been included on one or the other list if they had been regarded as favorable.

Measures Opposed by Farm Bureaus and by Labor. No list of specific measures regarded as contrary to the interests of farmers was issued by the American Farm Bureau Federation during the 67th Congress. A list of 18 "hostile bills opposed or defeated" was presented by the Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor at the Cincinnati convention. Among these are three which were opposed by the

Farm Bureau or which are clearly in opposition to the farmers' interests. They are: first, the sales tax;¹ second, "loading the soldiers' bonus bill with the sales tax for the purpose of defeating that measure;"² third, "prohibiting the use of money appropriated for the Department of Justice to prosecute organizations of farmers or Labor for alleged violations of the anti-trust act."

Measures Favored by Other Farm Organizations and by Labor. The secretary of the National Board of Farm Organizations has provided the writer with a list of 8 "important bills which originated either in the National Board of Farm Organizations, or with its constituent members, and which passed the Congress."³ This list does not of course include all bills which that body or its constituent members may have favored. One of these 8, namely, the Capper-Volstead cooperative marketing bill, is among those reported upon favorably by the American Federation of Labor.

The Farmers' National Council lists in 11 paragraphs "some things the Council has done for farmers" and in 12 paragraphs "some things the Council is doing for Farmers now." These "things" are legislative in character, but not sufficiently specific in a number of cases to make an exact comparison with the list of laws "favorable to labor." However, in its efforts for drastic control of the meat packers, its opposition to the Esch-Cummins law, its opposition to the Jones shipping bill and the ship-subsidy bills, its opposition to the sales tax, its advocacy of excess profits taxes, higher

¹ "We are opposed to the principle of a General Sales Tax"—Resolutions of Third Annual Meeting, American Farm Bureau Federation, sec. v, par. v. See *Report of the Executive Secretary*, Dec. 1, 1922, p. 24.

² *Ibid.*, p. 80: "This department (Taxation) has been active on two major projects in national taxation: (1) The defeat of the sales tax as a means of raising revenue for Soldiers' Bonus, and (2) the pronouncement of a proper method for the taxation of National Banks."

³ From letter, *supra*, p. 136, footnote 4.

surtaxes on incomes, and heavy taxes on large inheritances, its advocacy of government ownership of railroads and of natural resources and government ownership and operation of Shipping Board vessels, and in a number of other policies, it undoubtedly is in accord with the policies of the American Federation of Labor. With regard to the plan which the Council advocates for relief to Agriculture—"a government farm products export corporation," embodied in the Sinclair-Ladd bill (House Reports 9461—Senate Reports 2964)—the Council states that it "laid the conditions before labor leaders and enlisted their support."¹

30. SUMMARY

The data presented in this chapter have indicated that the number of senators and congressmen who are at the same time supporters of measures deemed favorable to the farmers' interests and whose records have given them the support of organized labor, is higher than would be expected on the basis of chance. An examination of measures in the 67th Congress supported by the American Federation of Labor and by three representative farmers' organizations, according to the statements of each, produces a similar conclusion. The number of bills found at the same time among farmer-supported and labor-supported measures is higher than would be expected on the basis of chance.

It was evident from the review of economic factors presented in Chapter II that the interests of farmers and workers coincide, or at least avoid conflict, at a number of points. The legislative proposals which have received the support of both fall within this general region of common interest. The evidence of the present chapter, then, clearly supports the contention that farmers and industrial workers may, and with respect to certain matters do, cooperate politically.

¹ From leaflet, *supra*, p. 136, footnote 3.

CHAPTER V

FARMER-LABOR CLEAVAGES IN NATIONAL AND STATE ELECTIONS

31. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1920

It is popularly supposed that the strength of the Democratic Party is in the South, and in the *cities* of the North. The Republican Party, on the contrary, is presumed to be strongest among the rural voters of the North. According to this supposition, farmers and industrial workers, at least in the Northern states, are by habit and tradition arrayed against each other in opposing party organizations.

There appears to be considerable truth in this alleged alignment with respect to state politics. In New York, for example, the evidence seems clear (*Cf. infra*, Sec. 32, *passim*) that the Republican vote for governor in 1920 was greatest in the election districts which were most completely made up of a farming population. Similarly, the Democratic vote was proportionate to the strength of urban influences. The backbone of the Democratic state organization in Massachusetts is in the city of Boston; in New Jersey it is found in Newark; in Ohio it is found in Cleveland.

Whether or not the Democratic Party finds its support among the urban voters in state elections, it does not of necessity follow that same alignment in national elections.¹ In Table IX, which follows, the evidence seems to point toward a different interpretation. For the purpose of this table,

¹ Mr. Edward Corse, a leader in the Italian-American colony of New York City, informs the writer that the so-called Italian vote of New York is Democratic in local politics and Republican in national politics. In both cases, the voter is actuated by a desire, says Mr. Corse, to do the accepted or respectable thing, like other Americans.

we have segregated within each of the 48 states the vote for president in 1920 in one or more counties which were wholly or predominantly urban, and likewise the vote in one or more counties which were wholly or predominantly rural. Within both areas the percentages cast for Cox of the combined Republican and Democratic vote have been calculated. By comparing the two percentages an indication is obtained of the relative distribution of party strength among urban and among rural voters.

Republican Strength Greatest in the Larger Cities, Except in New England. Two inferences may at once be drawn from Table IX: In all of the New England states, the Democratic vote was a city vote. This seems particularly clear in the case of Massachusetts and Vermont. For every Democratic voter in the least populous counties of these states there were proportionately more than two Democratic voters in the counties which include Boston and Burlington. Second, outside of New England the larger cities of the country were *more strongly Republican* than the rural counties in their respective states. Among 11 counties in as many states, each of which contained a city of 400,000 or more population, all but Suffolk County, Massachusetts, polled fewer Democratic votes, relatively, than the counties which have been selected as representative of rural sentiment in the same states.

Arranging the urban counties in Table IX in the order determined by the population of the cities which they contain, and likewise ranking them according to the degree of Republican strength which they exhibit relative to the rural counties in their respective states, we may correlate the two series. For 28 counties containing cities of 100,000 or more population, the coefficient of correlation ¹ is found to be

$$r = .49$$

¹ By method of correlation by grades. *Supra*, p. 54, footnote. No probable error is calculated by this method.

If the two New England counties containing Boston and Providence be omitted from this list, the coefficient of correlation becomes

$$r = .59$$

Republican Strength in the South is Rural. Conclusions regarding the comparative strength of the two parties in urban and rural regions of the South are precarious, because of the very low proportion of eligible voters going to the polls in the Southern states. In 3 strictly Southern states, namely Arkansas, Alabama, and Georgia, Harding carried a substantial number of counties. In the aggregate these numbered 38, of which 31 or 82 per cent were wholly rural. In the same states, the number of wholly rural counties is 120 in a total of 297, or 56 per cent. This seems to indicate that patches of Republican sentiment are to be found even in the extreme South, and these are almost wholly rural. They probably represent alignments surviving from Civil War and Reconstruction periods, rather than the effects of more recent disintegration of Southern political solidity.

Urban Voters more Sensitive to Public Opinion. As a hypothesis which might be checked by more extensive analysis of election statistics, the writer advances the suggestion that urban communities, admittedly more dynamic and more sensitive to currents of opinion than rural communities, tend to swing more strongly in any direction which public opinion in the nation as a whole is taking. If this be the case, an explanation is found for the greater strength displayed by the Republican ticket of 1920 in the cities than in the rural counties. The nation as a whole expressed in the election of 1920 a strong reaction against the preceding Democratic administration. More facile, more easily swayed by newspaper headlines and the infectious sentiments of the crowd, the cities exhibited this reaction in its most acute form. According to the hypothesis they would have exhibited equally well a marked shift of public opinion in any other direction.

TABLE IX

DEMOCRATIC VOTE FOR PRESIDENT, 1920, EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE OF
THE COMBINED DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN VOTE, BY SELECTED
URBAN AND RURAL COUNTIES IN EACH STATE ¹

State	Democrat- ic Vote Per cent	County most highly urban ² with city contained	Democrat- ic Vote Per cent	Rural Count- ies ³ Num- ber	Democrat- ic Vote Per cent	Excess Column IV over Column VI ⁴
I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Maine	30.2	Cumberland, Portland	29.9	3	29.0	.9
New Hampshire	39.7	Hillsborough, Manchester ⁵	44.8	1	35.1	9.7
Vermont	23.5	Chittenden, Burlington	33.1	3	16.4	16.7
Massachusetts ⁶	28.9	Suffolk, Boston	38.5	3	15.6	22.9
Rhode Island ⁷	33.9	Providence, same ⁸	36.2	1	23.0	13.2
Connecticut	34.5	New Haven, same	36.5	1	33.1	3.4
New York	29.5	Greater New York ⁹	30.5	4	32.2	— 1.7
New Jersey	29.7	Essex, Newark	26.1	1	29.6	— 3.5
Pennsylvania ..	29.2	Philadelphia, same ¹⁰	22.7	3	31.9	— 9.2
Ohio	39.8	Cuyahoga, Cleveland	32.1	3	40.2	— 8.1
Indiana	42.3	Marion, Indianapolis	43.5	5	43.2	.3
Illinois	27.3	Cook, Chicago	23.7	5	43.9	— 20.2
Michigan	23.4	Wayne, Detroit	19.0	6	24.9	— 5.9
Wisconsin	18.5	Milwaukee, same	17.9	4	19.3	— 1.4
Minnesota	21.6	Ramsey, St. Paul	34.4	8	18.4	16.0
Iowa	26.4	Polk, Des Moines	31.1	7	19.3	11.8
Missouri	44.1	St. Louis, same ¹¹	39.4	14	41.8	— 2.4
North Dakota ..	18.9	Cass, Fargo	20.8	52 ¹²	17.2	3.6
South Dakota ..	24.5	Minnehaha, Sioux Falls ¹³ ..	28.3	54 ¹⁴	23.8	4.5
Nebraska	32.6	Douglas, Omaha	39.2	14	29.7	9.5
Kansas	33.4	Wyandotte, Kansas City ..	41.6	12	28.9	12.7
Delaware	32.0	New Castle, Wilmington ..	39.9	1	46.7	— 6.8
Maryland	43.3	Baltimore City ¹⁵	40.9	3	45.8	— 4.9
Virginia	67.7	All cities ¹⁶	71.2	15	60.3	10.9
West Virginia ..	43.9	Ohio, Wheeling	39.5	6	46.3	— 6.9
North Carolina ..	56.7	New Hanover, Wilmington	85.2	11	51.4	33.8
South Carolina ..	96.1	Charleston, same	88.7	4	97.5	— 8.8
Georgia	71.0	Fulton, Atlanta	66.5	20	78.3	— 11.8
Florida	66.9	Monroe, Key West	65.7	6	77.6	— 11.9
Kentucky	50.2	Jefferson, Louisville	45.1	16	47.2	— 2.1
Tennessee	48.4	Shelby, Memphis	65.0	11	42.3	22.7
Alabama	68.6	Jefferson, Birmingham	77.8	8	75.2	2.6
Mississippi	85.7	Forrest, Hattiesburg	89.1	11	80.5	8.6
Arkansas	60.2	Pulaski, Little Rock	63.7	8	56.8	6.9
Louisiana	69.4	Orleans, New Orleans ¹⁷ ..	64.8	7	67.8	— 3.0
Oklahoma	47.0	Oklahoma, Oklahoma City	43.5	6	37.3	6.2
Texas	71.6	Potter, Amarillo	79.3	28	72.7	6.6
Montana	34.4	Deer Lodge, Anaconda	33.4	7	32.8	.6
Idaho	34.4	Ada, Boise	33.2	6	35.1	— 1.9
Wyoming	33.2	Natrona, Casper	28.1	4	28.9	— .8
Colorado	37.7	Denver, same ¹⁸	33.5	9	37.7	— 4.2
New Mexico ..	44.7	Chaves, Roswell	53.9	4	44.8	9.1
Arizona	44.4	Pima, Tucson	42.0	3	48.7	— 6.7
Utah	41.0	Salt Lake, Salt Lake City ..	40.9	4	39.2	1.7
Nevada	38.9	Washoe, Reno	36.0	16 ¹⁹	39.9	— 3.9
Washington ...	27.4	King, Seattle	22.9	4	32.4	— 9.5
Oregon	35.8	Multnomah, Portland	38.0	4	29.4	8.6
California	26.8	San Francisco City ²⁰	25.4	4	29.4	— 4.0

¹ Sources: *World Almanac*, 1923 pp. 841-878, for report of state and county vote for president, checked in some cases by official election reports contained in state legislative manuals. Selections of urban and rural counties were made from the *Fourteenth Census*, vol. i, Summary, table 50. The states are grouped by geographical divisions.

² The aim has been to obtain the vote of the county from which rural population was most completely excluded. Hence, this is usually though not always, the county containing the largest city in the state.

³ The aim has been to obtain the vote of the county from which urban population was most completely excluded. Where no counties are 100 per cent rural, the least urban county was chosen. In most states, however, a number of counties are wholly rural by census definition. In these cases sampling was resorted to according to the following basis of selection: A minimum of 3 rural counties selected, where 3 or more are in a state; every third county selected when the number is 11 or less; every fourth selected when the number is 12 to 15; every fifth selected when the number is 12 or more. The counties so sampled are arranged alphabetically by the Census Bureau. The votes of the sample counties in the aggregate are used to obtain the percentages in column vi.

⁴ A *positive* number in this column indicates the number of Democratic voters out of every hundred in the *urban* county in excess of the number of Democratic voters in *rural* territory. A *negative* number, on the other hand, indicates excess of Democratic voters in *rural* as compared with *urban* territory.

⁵ Hillsborough County contains the city of Nashua as well as the city of Manchester.

⁶ Counties in Massachusetts are not classified by the Census as rural and urban. Three having the least population per square mile were selected.

⁷ Counties in Rhode Island are not classified by the Census as rural and urban. The counties of greatest and least population per square mile were selected for columns iii and v, respectively.

⁸ Providence County contains five of the six cities in Rhode Island.

⁹ Containing the five counties of New York, Kings, Queens, Bronx and Richmond.

¹⁰ County and City of Philadelphia are co-terminous.

¹¹ County and City of St. Louis are coterminous.

¹² All the rural counties in the state are included.

¹³ Minnehaha was chosen rather than Davison, with a slightly higher percentage of urban population, because the city it contained was of larger size.

¹⁴ All the rural counties in the state are included.

¹⁵ Independent of county and separately reported.

¹⁶ All cities in the State separately reported, and their vote aggregated here.

¹⁷ Orleans County and City of New Orleans coterminous.

¹⁸ City and County of Denver coterminous.

¹⁹ All counties in state except Washoe are included.

²⁰ City and County of San Francisco coterminous.

Neither the data nor the hypothesis of this section answer in satisfactory manner the question whether farmers and industrial workers do as a matter of fact tend to vote on the same side of public questions, or for the same candidates, when they go to the polls. Even if it were shown that farmers were predominantly of one party faith and industrial workers of another, the problem would not be solved. Most voters are guided in marking their ballots by their past political customs and habits. Party names may be regarded as "shibboleths." When "up-state" farmers in New York vote for a Republican governor, and industrial workers in Greater New York vote for the Democratic nominee, the opposition in their votes cannot be *assumed* to result primarily from active and mutual attitudes of opposition. The vote of each group in such a case is largely an habitual response, stimulated by the party shibboleths associated with it in the mind of each individual. Hence it does not indicate the probabilities of alliance or of opposition between the two groups whenever an occasion should arise in which the element of traditional party loyalty is removed.

Situations of the latter sort in which the vote of farmers may be distinguished from the vote of industrial workers are not frequent. They are more commonly to be found in the case of state-wide primary elections. Here the contest is *within* a party, and the votes of both farmers and industrial workers are involved. The probability of error is ever-present, however, because of the possible association of one of the groups more strongly than the other with the party in which the primary is held.

In following sections of the present chapter, analyses are presented of a number of state elections in which the difficulties mentioned, if not eliminated, have at least been partially overcome.

32. NEW YORK

There has been no recent election in New York State in which the element of party habit could be eliminated in an analysis of the vote. In the present section the data serve merely to substantiate some of the statements made in the preceding section. They illustrate the contrast which exists between urban populations and rural with respect to the support given to one of the old-party candidates. The gubernatorial vote of 1920 has been selected for analysis. Election returns for that year are available from every city or town in the State.¹ In Table X we have segregated the vote polled by Alfred E. Smith, Democratic candidate for governor, in the case of each city of more than 100,000 population, for all other cities combined, for 233 towns containing one election district each and for 168 towns containing 3 election districts each. In each case the percentage of the total vote received by Smith has been calculated.

It is believed that 233 towns (townships) containing one election district each will contain a population made up preponderantly of farmers. The total vote for governor in 1920 equaled 28.5 per cent of the state's population. If the ratio of votes cast to population should be the same in these 233 towns, their population would average 982.² On the same basis the 168 towns containing 3 election districts each would average 2,935 inhabitants. The proportion of persons residing in villages within the one-precinct towns cannot be large. The three-precinct towns will contain a considerable proportion of persons who reside in small villages.

¹ *N. Y. Legislative Manual*, 1921.

² They averaged 280 votes cast to the town.

TABLE X

NUMBER OF VOTES CAST FOR ALFRED E. SMITH, DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE
FOR GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK, 1920, WITH PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL VOTES FOR GOVERNOR RECEIVED BY SMITH,
BY VARIOUS POPULATION UNITS

Population Unit	Vote for Smith	Total vote for Governor	Smith vote as a percentage of total for Governor
The State.....	1,261,812	2,962,645	42.6
New York City	709,604	1,315,658	53.9
"Up-State" (outside New York City)...	552,208	1,646,987	33.5
All "Up-State" cities.....	320,972	803,038	40.0
Cities of 100,000 or more population:			
Buffalo	55,629	135,630	41.0
Rochester.....	33,254	94,755	35.1
Syracuse	23,016	64,102	35.9
Albany	25,096	51,169	49.0
Yonkers	14,455	30,959	46.7
All other "Up-State" cities	169,522	426,421	39.8
All non-city "Up-State"	231,236	843,949	27.4
168 towns with 3 election districts each	35,637	140,542	25.4
233 towns with 1 election district each	13,082	65,188	20.1

The above table indicates that the vote for Smith tended to vary directly with the size and urban character of the community. Generally speaking, his vote was larger in the larger cities, smaller in the smaller communities, and *least* in highly rural or farming areas. The result corresponds with the popular belief that the "up-state" farmers are overwhelmingly Republican and that the working classes in New York City, and to a lesser extent in the smaller cities, are largely Democratic in *state elections*.

33. PENNSYLVANIA

On May 16, 1922, party nominations for governor and for United States Senator were made in a Pennsylvania primary. The two leading candidates for governor on the Republican side were Gifford Pinchot and Geo. E. Alter.

Two other candidates received negligible votes. For the Republican nomination for United States Senator, 3 candidates divided the vote among them. They were: George Wharton Pepper, William J. Burke and Edward R. Wood.

Pinchot ran as a "good government" and "anti-machine" candidate.¹ As a graduate of the Michigan Agricultural College, a member of President Roosevelt's Country Life Commission, a Chief of Division in the Department of Agriculture, an author of books on rural subjects and a member of several committees of the National Board of Farm Organizations,² he appealed strongly to the farmer vote. Representative-at-large Burke, one of the senatorial aspirants, appealed with equal strength to the labor vote. He had been identified with organized labor for more than 30 years, was chairman of the general committee of adjustment of the Order of Railroad Conductors of the Baltimore and Ohio Railway system and was generally known as a labor candidate.³

That Pinchot actually received stronger support in counties of the State in which farmers are more numerous is suggested although not proved by the coefficient of correlation between the percentage of the total vote which he received and the percentage of farmers in the total population in each of the 67 counties of Pennsylvania.⁴ The correlation is

$$r = .287 \pm .070$$

¹ Cf. *New Republic*, vol. 31, pp. 5-6, editorial "Progressivism in Pennsylvania."

² Source: *Who's Who in America*, vol. 12 and letter head of the National Board of Farm Organizations.

³ Source: *Who's Who in America*, vol. 12 and *Congressional Directory*, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., p. 94.

⁴ By the standard Pearson formula. The percentage of farmers in each county is derived from the *Fourteenth Census*, tables of county population and agriculture.

It appears to have been in the counties which gave Pinchot his heaviest support that Burke was weakest. The coefficient of correlation between the vote received by Burke and the percentage of farmers in the total population is

$$r = -.371 \pm .071$$

The coefficient of correlation between the percentage of votes polled by Burke for the nomination for senator and the percentage of votes polled by Pinchot for the nomination for governor is

$$r = -.405 \pm .069$$

Hence to the extent that Pinchot received the support of farmers and that Burke received the support of the labor interests to which he appealed, it appears that farmers and industrial workers were mainly in opposition rather than in alliance.

34. WASHINGTON

The outstanding characteristic of the State of Washington is its division into two contrasted geographical areas. The state is cut from north to south by the Cascade Mountains which condense the moisture from trade winds warmed by contact with the Japan Current and precipitate it over the western third of the State. As a result Western Washington is humid, heavily timbered and dependent upon the lumber industry for its main source of support. This fact, in conjunction with its harbors and fishing interests has given it a thorough industrial and urban character. Farms must usually be cleared of stumps at heavy expense and in consequence are small. Eastern Washington comprises two-thirds of the State. Deprived of moisture it has but one-third of the population and is largely rural and agricultural. Farms here except in the irrigated valleys, are large. These differences of physiographical character are reflected in political behavior.

In November, 1920, the Farmer-Labor Party of Washington, formed jointly by a number of economic and political organizations, including the State Federation of Labor, the Non-Partisan League and the Committee of 48, and informally supported by the Socialist Party organization, made a serious effort to capture control of the state government.¹ Mr. Robert Bridges,² former chairman of the Port of Seattle Commission, as the Farmer-Labor Party candidate for governor received 35.7 per cent of the votes in the 19 counties of Western Washington and 19.6 per cent only of the votes in the 20 counties of Eastern Washington. While the precinct vote in this election is not available the method of correlation by grades heretofore employed (*supra*, p. 54) may be used to throw considerable light on the votes of farmers and industrial workers. The 39 counties of the state have been graded according to the vote cast for Mr. Bridges and also according to a number of other criteria of agricultural or working-class strength. By correlating a number of these series in pairs it is possible to determine whether the counties in which labor sentiment is comparatively strong are the counties in which the strength of agricultural interests is comparatively strong or vice versa.

Labor Vote Negatively Related to Agricultural Interests.

It is evident from Table XI that the distribution of radicalism within the state was approximately the same in 1914 and 1920. Counties relatively radical in the former year were likewise relatively radical in the latter year. This is shown by the high correlation ($r = .80$) between the counties ranked according to their 1914 vote on the 8-hour

¹ For a concise and accurate historical summary of the Farmer-Labor Party's activities in the State of Washington from 1920 to 1922, cf. article by John C. Kennedy (Secretary of the state party organization) in the *American Labor Monthly*, June, 1923, entitled "The Outlook for a Labor Party."

² Now deceased.

TABLE XI

COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION BY GRADES BETWEEN CERTAIN VOTES
AND CERTAIN POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS IN THIRTY-
NINE COUNTIES OF WASHINGTON ¹

<i>Items on which counties are ranked and correlated</i>	<i>Coefficient of correlation r</i>
Referendum vote, 1914, on 8-hour day bill (promoted by Socialist group but repudiated by State Federation of Labor) and vote for Bridges, Farmer-Labor Party candidate for governor, 192080
Vote, 1914, on 8-hour bill and vote, 1914, on anti-employment office bill promoted by State Federation of Labor80
8-hour day vote, 1914, and per cent of farmers in total population, 1920	-.64
8-hour day vote, 1914, and value of farm property per farmer, 1920	-.66
8-hour day vote, 1914, and referendum vote, 1914 on prohibition	-.39
Vote for Bridges, Farmer-Labor Party, 1920 and per cent of farmers in total population, 1920	-.37
Vote for Bridges and value of farm property per farmer	-.55
Vote for Bridges and rapidity of population increase, 1910 to 192057
Percentage of farmers in total population and value of farm property per farmer14
Value of farm property per farmer with percentage of farms operated by owners	-.86
Percentage of farmers in total population, 1920, and vote for prohibition, 191433
Value of farm property per farmer and vote for prohibition, 191446

¹ The formula from which the coefficients of correlation in this table have been derived is presented in footnote 1, p. 54. It should be noted especially that no *probable error* is derived by this formula, which is often used when the number of cases is small and the *probable error*, by the standard Pearsonian formula, would be large. Sources for Table XI include the state tables on Agriculture and Population in the *Fourteenth Census* and reports on election returns of the Secretary of State of Washington.

bill and according to their vote for Bridges in 1920. It is equally evident that the "labor vote" in both years was in inverse ratio to the importance of agriculture, although farmers may have been more hostile to the 8-hour day bill than to the candidacy of Bridges. Thus the correlation between the 8-hour bill vote in 1914 and the percentage of farmers in the population is negative ($r = -.64$) and higher than the negative correlation between the 1920 vote of Bridges and the percentage of farmers in the population ($r = -.37$). The figures suggest that it was the more well-to-do farmers who gave Bridges the greater opposition, for the correlation between his vote and the value of farm property per farmer is negative and still higher ($r = -.55$). On the other hand, the counties where Bridges ran strongest tended to be the counties which are increasing more rapidly in population ($r = -.57$) which again are the industrial counties where labor is relatively strong.¹

The hostility of agricultural interests to the labor-supported candidate is further indicated if we isolate the vote polled by the Farmer-Labor Party in 9 counties in the southeastern corner of the State. These counties in 1910 produced 35,550,000 bushels of wheat or 87 per cent of the State's crop of this important agricultural commodity. Their aggregate population in 1920 was 117,000 persons.

¹ A number of correlations are introduced in this table that do not bear upon the immediate topic, but that relate to other parts of the study. Thus it is interesting to note that the 8-hour bill vote is negatively correlated with the prohibition vote in 1914 ($r = -.39$), whereas the latter is positively correlated with the percentage of farmers in the population ($r = .33$). This corresponds with evidence derived in Chapter VI to indicate that workingmen are "wet" and farmers are "dry." Again it appears to be the more prosperous farmers who were strongest in support of prohibition ($r = .46$). Once more, it is clearly indicated that tenancy is a condition which accompanies (at least in this state) the prevalence of high farm values; farm values are negatively correlated with the percentages of farms operated by owners ($r = -.86$).

They were 81.9 per cent rural by census definition as compared with 60.5 per cent for the Eastern Washington section as a whole and 55.2 per cent for the State at large. In these highly rural wheat-producing counties, the vote for Bridges was but 10.7 per cent of the total vote polled for the office of governor.

Eastern Washington in general and the wheat-producing counties referred to in particular have a high average acreage per farmer and a high average value of farm property. For the 20 Eastern Washington counties 39.4 per cent of all farms are 100 acres or more in extent while in the 19 counties of Western Washington, the corresponding figure is 66 per cent. The average value of farm property per farmer in Eastern Washington amounts to \$21,952 with a range between \$7,000 and 48,000 per county. In Western Washington the average is \$9,090 with a range between \$6,000 and \$12,000 per county. These values are indicative of the fact referred to in an earlier chapter (*supra*, 80—footnote) that Western Washington farms are conducted under conditions which lead to greater identification of interest between farmers and industrial workers.

An examination by the writer in 1920 of the precinct election returns for King, the Western Washington county which contains the city of Seattle, disclosed that the greatest strength of the Farmer-Labor Party was shown in the working class districts of Seattle, in several small towns inhabited largely by railroad men and coal miners, and in a number of precincts occupied wholly by farmers, in which the Non-partisan League's work of organization had been effective.

35. WISCONSIN

Wisconsin is an overwhelmingly Republican state. The Democratic Party and the Socialist Party are fairly matched for the second position. The State's primary election laws

are liberal and permit of much changing of party affiliations between primary day and election day. In consequence, a clear-cut contest in a Republican primary brings the greater number of voters into a natural alignment of interest or opinion without the complication of party loyalty being present to obscure the result.

Such a contest was presented to the voters in the primary election of 1920. Among 6 Republican candidates contesting for the nomination for governor, John J. Blaine, who was subsequently nominated and elected, was credited with having the endorsement of the Nonpartisan League, the Society of Equity and the LaFollette political organization. The Democratic, Socialist and Prohibition parties were represented in the primary as in the general election, by a single candidate each. Interest turned entirely, therefore, upon the Republican contest. The official returns of the vote in each precinct are printed by the Secretary of State. Provided the precincts in which farmers and industrial workers reside can be segregated, therefore, all of the conditions necessary for a direct comparison of their votes are fulfilled.

In the following table, diverse criteria have been employed for the determination of "conservative" and "labor" wards in the City of Milwaukee. The policy pursued by the conservative voters in the primary was evidently that of attempting to nominate a conservative Republican candidate for governor. After the nomination had been secured by Mr. Blaine these voters, in a large proportion of cases, threw their support to McCoy, the Democratic candidate. Thus 5 wards out of 25 in the City of Milwaukee were carried in the general election by McCoy. His vote in these 5 wards amounted to 57.5 per cent of all votes cast. In the same wards he polled but 7.8 per cent of all votes cast in the primary. In this territory, Coleman, the Socialist candidate,

polled 6.0 per cent of the votes cast in the primary and 8.8 per cent of the votes cast in the general election. These 5 wards, therefore, may be regarded as the residence of a highly conservative urban electorate. We have regarded as labor wards in Milwaukee, those which were carried by Coleman, the Socialist candidate in the general election.

The total number of votes polled by the Republican candidates and the total number and percentage of such votes received by Blaine are presented in Table XII for the groupings that have been segregated.

TABLE XII

VOTE OF JOHN J. BLAINE IN WISCONSIN REPUBLICAN PRIMARY,
1920, BY CERTAIN POPULATION UNITS INCLUDING
FARMING AND WORKING-CLASS AREAS ¹

Population Unit	Total vote for Republican Candidates	Vote for Blaine	
		Number	Percent- age of total
State.....	478,263	113,001	29.0
Unincorporated areas.....	138,667	53,846	38.8
Incorporated places of less than 2500 population	53,654	12,852	24.0
41 incorporated places of 2500 to 5000 population	30,143	6,687	22.2
20 incorporated places of 5000 to 10,000 population	25,091	6,698	26.7
12 cities of 10,000 to 25,000 population.....	35,083	8,568	24.4
7 cities of 25,000 to 50,000 population	44,322	14,978	33.8
Racine (population 58,593)	9,115	1,344	14.7
Milwaukee	42,248	8,028	19.0
5 conservative Milwaukee wards (carried by McCoy, Democrat, in general election) ²	12,763	1,355	10.6
10 labor wards in Milwaukee (carried by Cole- man, Socialist, in general election) ³	13,286	4,386	30.3

¹ Sources: *Wisconsin Blue Book*, 1921, "Election Statistics;" *Fourteenth Census*, Wisconsin, table 13.

² The 1st, 3rd, 4th, 16th and 18th.

³ The 7th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 14th, 20th, 21st, 24th and 25th.

It will be observed from this table that Mr. Blaine received his best support in unincorporated, that is in strictly farming, areas; in the labor wards of Milwaukee; and in the cities of from 25,000 to 50,000 population, a number of which are highly industrial in character. It is probable that the percentage of votes received by Blaine in the labor wards of Milwaukee would have been higher but for the strength of the Socialist vote in these wards. These results show clearly that farmers and industrial workers tended to throw their votes to the same candidate.

36. MINNESOTA

The State of Minnesota has peculiar interest for our study because of its representation in the United States Senate by two elected nominees of the Farmer-Labor Party.¹ This party in Minnesota is unconnected with the national organization bearing the same name, and is an outgrowth of a political movement which first made a serious effort to capture a major political office in 1920. Failing to secure the nomination of its candidates in the Republican primaries of that year, it entered an Independent ticket in the general election. Its candidate for governor was Hendrik Shipstead, who two years later won the Senatorial election.

In both elections Shipstead was supported by organizations ostensibly representing the farmers on one side, and the industrial workers of the state upon the other. It is useful to determine whether he was actually supported in this election by a coalition of voters belonging to these two groups. As in Wisconsin, the election returns are available for each voting precinct in the State, permitting the analysis which follows in Table XIII. Both elections were "three-

¹ Henrik Shipstead, elected over Kellogg, Republican and Anna Oleson, Democrat, on Nov. 7, 1922; Magnus Johnson, elected over Preus, Republican and Carley, Democrat, in special election on July 16, 1923, called to fill the unexpired term of the late Senator Knute Nelson. •

cornered" contests. The Republican candidate won in 1920 with 53.1 per cent of the vote cast for governor. Shipstead won in 1922 with 45.5 per cent of the total votes cast.

TABLE XIII

VOTE OF HENRIK SHIPSTEAD IN MINNESOTA, 1920 AND 1922, BY CERTAIN POPULATION UNITS INCLUDING FARMING AND WORKING-CLASS AREAS ¹

Population Unit	Vote received as Independent candidate for Governor, 1920		Vote received as Farmer-Labor candidate for U. S. Senate, 1922	
	Number of votes cast	Per cent of total vote	Number of votes cast	Per cent of total vote
The State of Minnesota	281,402	35.3	325,372	45.5
St. Louis County ²	15,430	29.6	19,903	43.6
City of Duluth	7,021	25.6	7,511	37.6
Towns and villages (iron ranges)	8,409	34.1	12,392	48.2
Entire state except St. Louis County....	265,972	35.7	305,469	45.7
"Urban" by Census definition	98,974	32.0	121,740	44.2
Minneapolis ³	47,488	35.7 ³	53,898	45.4
"Eight labor wards" ⁴	29,535	50.6 ³	32,868	60.6
Minneapolis ³ and St. Paul	71,442	35.4 ³	81,120	46.1
Eleven "working-class" wards (among 25) in both cities ⁵	33,758	50.7	35,265	63.3
7 cities, 10,000-25,000 population ..	7,496	22.9	10,580	42.1
14 cities, 5000-10,000 population ..	10,698	29.5	15,171	41.9
29 incorporated places of 2500- 5000 population	9,338	24.2	14,869	39.2
"Rural" by Census definition:				
Incorporated places of 1000-2500 population ⁶	12,362	19.1	19,873	32.0
"Rural" area outside of places of 1000-2500 population	154,636	41.6	163,856	49.4
40 counties wholly "Rural" by Census definition	76,223	38.6	86,054	47.0
Incorporated places of 1000-2500 population ⁷	7,043	18.8	12,271	32.7
Incorporated places of less than 1000 population ⁸	7,539	20.1	13,116	33.0
Area mainly unincorporated ⁹	61,641	50.2	60,667	57.4

¹ Sources: *Legislative Manual*, Minnesota, 1921 and 1923, General Election Returns; and *Fourteenth Census*, Population, vol. i.

² St. Louis County is separately classified for two reasons: (a) It

Farmers and Workers United. Table XIII demonstrates in striking form that the farmers and industrial workers of Minnesota *did* tend to support the same candidate for governor in 1920, and the same candidate for senator in 1922. Examination of the returns by counties from the special election of 1923, leads to the view that the same forces united to elect Mr. Magnus Johnson to the senate in the latter year. An interesting disclosure in the table is the opposition between the farmer vote and that of the small villages situ-

contains the Mesabi and Vermillion Iron ranges, and hence, has a unique industrial character within the State; (b) Much of the iron areas are urban in character but unincorporated.

³ The base used for Minneapolis in determining the percentage of the Shipstead vote in 1920 is the total vote for Governor, rather than the total number of ballots cast.

⁴ The 1st, 2nd, 6th, 7th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th.—so designated by John Lord, a writer in the *Minnesota Daily Star*, July 14, 1923, page 6. The 3rd ward appears to be much better entitled to the designation than the 2nd and may have been intended rather than the latter.

⁵ The wards are those which (a) are below the mean of each city in the percentage of persons 16 and 17 years of age who are attending school, (b) are above the city mean in percentage of foreign-born white population, (c) are above the city mean in illiteracy. The 11 wards having these characteristics are as follows: St. Paul: 1st, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 8th and 9th; Minneapolis: 1st, 3rd, 9th, 10th and 11th. It will be observed that these wards in the aggregate gave a higher percentage of their votes to Shipstead in both elections than the "eight labor wards" of Minneapolis named by Mr. Lord.

⁶ Numbering 100 in 1920 and 1922.

⁷ Numbering 57 in 1920 and 1922.

⁸ Numbering 192 in 1920 and 211 in 1922.

⁹ In a number of cases, the vote of a village and its adjacent township were not separated. In these cases, the vote was included among that of incorporated places. On the other hand, a number of villages reported by the U. S. Census could not be found in the election reports, and their vote is undoubtedly included with that of the unincorporated area. But for the overlapping on both sides, it seems probable that the contrast between the farmer and the small town vote that is here disclosed would be even sharper than appears.

ated in "rural" territory. In the 40 wholly "rural" counties of the State, Mr. Shipstead received in 1920 more than one-half of the vote outside of the small villages but less than one-fifth of the vote within them. Could the segregation have been more accurate, there is every reason to suppose that the contrast would have been even greater.¹ While the small towns remained the chief centers of opposition to Mr. Shipstead in 1922, it was in them that he made the largest comparative gains in that year over the preceding election.

In addition to the line of cleavage which placed farmers and industrial workers in alliance against non-working-class townsmen, a distinct concentration of the radical and the conservative vote along several other lines occurred. Among these were geographical or sectional lines, and the closely related divisions of the State into areas of crop-specialization. In Table XIV counties have been grouped in a number of ways to emphasize these cleavages.

The corn counties are situated mainly in the southern part of the State, the wheat counties are in the northwestern section, in the Red River Valley; the oats counties are scattered, falling partly in both of the other areas. From the geographical and crop standpoints, it is evident that Shipstead received heavy support from northwestern wheat counties and very light support from southern and corn-growing counties.

¹ This result tends to discredit any analysis of "urban" and "rural" votes based on the census definitions which fail to account for the actual or potential hostility between farmers and the townsmen in villages among them. For an interesting description of some reasons for the hostility here disclosed, see Galpin, *Rural Life*, pp. 18-51 and 94-96 inclusive.

TABLE XIV

VOTE OF HENRIK SHIPSTEAD IN MINNESOTA, 1920 AND 1922, BY CERTAIN
GROUPINGS OF COUNTIES ACCORDING TO GEOGRAPHICAL
LOCATION, AND CROP SPECIALIZATIONS ¹

Area Segregated	Vote received as Independent candidate for Governor, 1920		Vote received as Farmer-Labor Party candidate for U. S. Senate, 1922	
	Number of votes cast	Per cent of total vote	Number of votes cast	Per cent of total vote
The State of Minnesota	281,402	35.3	325,372	45.5
Two rows of 19 counties on the southern border of the State	31,601	23.9	41,666	36.0
Seven counties bordering on the Red River of the North	18,414	43.7	19,360	53.6
Block of 8 northwestern counties generally two deep from the Red River	19,999	48.1	20,912	57.6
Thirty counties producing one million or more bushels of <i>corn</i> and more corn than any other cereal crop, excluding Hennepin	70,518	31.7	65,036	42.6
Seventeen counties producing one million or more bushels of <i>oats</i> and more oats than any other cereal crop	50,986	40.0	55,169	50.1
Thirteen counties producing one-half mil- lion or more bushels of <i>wheat</i> and more wheat than corn. (Includes 7 of the oats counties)	35,965	44.7	36,969	53.1

37. NORTH DAKOTA

With one exception, North Dakota is the most highly rural state in the American Union. Among every 1,000 inhabitants, 864 reside in the country or in villages of less than 2,500 inhabitants. Mississippi alone, with 866 persons per thousand residing in rural areas surpasses North Dakota.

¹ Sources: *Fourteenth Census, Agriculture, Minnesota*, County table iv and *Legislative Manual of Minnesota*, 1921 and 1923.

in this respect.¹ Thus the industrial population of the State is quite negligible in numbers and in influence. In 1919, 4,472 wage earners were employed in 894 manufacturing establishments within the State. The wages paid to these employes aggregated \$5,401,330,² as compared with \$37,063,815 paid by farmers to agricultural labor during the same year.³ The number of workers employed by the three transcontinental railroads which traverse the State is probably several times the number engaged in manufacturing and in the small lignite coal mines, taken together.⁴ No election returns by precincts are available, as in the case of Minnesota and Wisconsin, and the industrial population is not sufficiently concentrated within particular counties to make the county figures of value. Hence we are able to draw no conclusions from election returns regarding the comparative political attitudes of farmers and industrial workers.

Labor Legislation Passed by a Farmer Legislature. Evidence of different character is to be found, however, in the type of labor legislation enacted by the farmers' Nonpartisan League while in control of the state government. The following measures adopted by "The Farmers' Legislature" of January, 1919, and approved by the Nonpartisan League governor, are cited by one writer⁵ as evidence of the farmer's friendliness for labor: House Bill 56, Workmen's Com-

¹ *Statistical Abstract of the U. S.*, 1921, p. 54. Based on *U. S. Census*, 1920.

² *Fourteenth Census*, Manufactures, State Report.

³ *Yearbook of the Department of Agriculture*, 1921, p. 496.

⁴ In 1919, there were 816 employes per 100 miles of American railroads, according to Statistical Reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission. (*Statistical Abstract of the U. S.*, 1921, p. 382). At this ratio, North Dakota with 5,311 miles of railroad in that year (*Statistical Abstract*, p. 375), would have had 43,338 railroad employes. The actual number was probably far less than this.

⁵ Charles Edward Russell, *The Story of the Nonpartisan League*, p. 266.

pensation Law: House Bill 57, Workingmen's Compensation Bureau authorized to fix wages and standards for women and minor workers; House Bill 186, 8½-hour day and 48-hour week for women engaged in manufacturing, etc.; House Bill 57, Forbidding injunctions or restraining orders in labor disputes; House Bill 163, Requiring the union label on all state printing; Senate Bill 85, Full crew train law; House Bill 45, Regulating the operation of coal mines. A number of the organizers and promoters of the Nonpartisan League had been closely identified with organized labor before entering the League, and returned to the labor movement again after the League entered upon its decline.¹ Officials of the North Dakota Federation of Labor are said to have cooperated closely with the farmers' League during its ascendancy.

The significance of such evidence would be far greater if North Dakota were not so overwhelmingly a farming state. Organized labor, when so greatly outweighed in strength, can hope to do little in politics except in alliance with some other group in the electorate. The tendency of labor in such circumstances to join forces with a movement of protest organized by farmers and the tendency of the farmers' movement to accept labors' help could be readily understood and explained as opportunism, apart from any real interests or motives held by the two groups in common.

Lines of Political Cleavage. Throughout the successive electoral contests between the Nonpartisan League and its opponents, two lines of cleavage have been apparent among the voters. The first has been drawn between farmers on one side, and the voters of the towns on the other. The second has been geographical, separating the conservative eastern counties from the more radical western counties.

¹For example, L. W. Buck, for a time editor of a Nonpartisan League paper in North Dakota, was subsequently during a two-year period from 1919 to 1921, Secretary-Treasurer of the Washington State Federation of Labor.

The referendum election of June 26, 1919, providing the most recent election returns from the state available to the writer, offered several clearly defined expressions of opinion by the voters, illustrative of these lines of cleavage. In Table XV, which follows, these cleavages may be seen in the referendum vote on House Bill 18, a cornerstone of the Nonpartisan League program, calling for the establishment of the state-owned Bank of North Dakota.

TABLE XV
VOTES CAST FOR AND AGAINST HOUSE BILL 18, ESTABLISHING THE BANK
OF NORTH DAKOTA, IN REFERENDUM ELECTION, JUNE 26, 1919,
BY VARIOUS GROUPINGS OF COUNTIES ¹

County Groupings	Votes		
	"Yes"	"No"	% "Yes" to total
The State, 53 counties	61,495	48,239	56.0
Bordering Red River, eastern boundary of State, 6 counties	9,241	11,959	43.6
Eastern Block including vertical tier formed by Rolette, Pierce, Wells, Kidder, Logan, McIntosh, 27 counties.	30,981	29,779	51.0
Western Block, not included in preceding item, 26 counties	30,514	18,460	62.3
Bordering Montana, western boundary of State, includ- ing Billings, 7 counties	7,091	3,900	64.5
Containing "urban" population (not wholly "rural") 12 counties	20,831	20,714	50.1
Cass, single county more than 50% "urban" containing City of Fargo	2,339	2,421	49.1
Grand Forks county, containing City of Grand Forks ..	1,755	2,623	40.1
Wholly "rural", 41 counties	40,664	27,525	59.6
Counties grouped by average value of all farm property per farm:			
\$10,000-\$15,000, 6 counties	7,590	3,813	66.6
\$15,000-\$20,000, 23 counties	25,418	15,831	61.6
\$20,000-\$25,000, 4 counties	4,311	4,634	48.2
\$25,000-\$30,000, 8 counties	9,635	9,205	51.1
\$30,000-\$35,000, 10 counties	11,061	11,153	49.2
\$35,000-\$40,000, 1 county	1,146	1,182	49.2
\$40,000-\$45,000, 1 county	2,339	2,421	48.4
Counties producing 2,000,000 or more bushels of wheat each in 1919, 11 counties	17,433	18,479	48.5

¹ Source: Legislative Manual of North Dakota.

The vote in favor of the state bank is seen to be half again as great, proportionately, on the western border of the state as in the Red River counties on the eastern border. It is in the western counties that the low average values of farm property are found, and these low values appear to be associated with the pro-bank vote. Of the 6 counties facing the Red River every one returned a majority vote against the bank bill. Of the 8 counties along the southern border, facing South Dakota, 5 returned a majority against the bill. Thirteen of the 16 counties voting "no" are in the eastern half of the state, and two of the remainder face the South Dakota boundary.

It is apparent from Tables XIV and XV that the Red River Valley counties of North Dakota and Minnesota, occupying the center of America's spring-wheat area, bear directly opposite relationships to the political geography of their respective states. The counties which lie on the right bank of the river were found to be among the most radical in Minnesota. Those on the left bank of the river are properly regarded as the most conservative in North Dakota. Nor are these distinctions due to the comparative proportions of urban and rural population in each. The wholly rural counties of Pembina and Traill are conservative relative to other North Dakota counties. The partially urban counties of Clay, Polk and Pennington across the river in Minnesota, are radical with reference to that state. At least one hypothesis would serve to explain this anomaly. North Dakota *as a whole* may be a more radical state than Minnesota. If there were some accepted standard of radicalism applicable alike to both states, we might find radical sentiment constantly decreasing in intensity as we traversed an arc, extending from western North Dakota, through that state and northwestern Minnesota to the Iowa border.

38. SOUTH DAKOTA

In the month of July, 1920, a Farmer-Labor Party was organized at Chicago. In the months remaining before the election in November, it was found impossible by the executives of the new party organization to nominate a ticket in more than 21 states. Of these, Washington and South Dakota ran a close race for first place in the proportion of votes cast for presidential electors nominated by the new organization.¹ In South Dakota, candidates for governor, U. S. senator and other state officers, were presented to the voters under the name "Non-Partisan Party." The platform of this organization included public ownership and control of natural resources, ownership and operation of public utilities, the Plumb Plan of railroad management, declarations regarding the right of workers to organize, limitation of working hours to 8 per day and 44 per week, a workmen's compensation law and state-owned terminal elevators, warehouses, flour mills, stock-yards, packing houses, cold-storage plants and sugar refineries. These features of the platform, as will be noted, were designed to appeal both to the farmer and to the industrial population. The best index of the strength of the Non-Partisan Party was provided by the vote for governor, since the senatorial race was complicated by the presence on the ballot of two independent candidates. Of approximately 184,000 votes cast for governor, McMaster, Republican, received 104,000, Howes, Democrat, 32,000 and Bates, Non-Partisan, 48,000 or 26.3 per cent.

Industrial Characteristics. In this comparatively homogeneous state, what were the factors responsible for variations in the strength displayed by the Non-Partisan candidate? We have been able partially to answer this question.

¹*Statistical Abstract of the U. S.*, 1921, p. 821.

Although South Dakota is predominantly agricultural, three groups of industrial labor are substantially represented in the state. In four counties on the western border, containing the Black Hills with their lead, silver and zinc mines, the metalliferous miners comprise the dominant part of the population. Thus in Lawrence County, approximately three-fourths of the population reside in the mining towns of Deadwood, Lead, Spearfish and two smaller communities. Of the population residing in unincorporated territory farmers number but 11.8 per cent of the population, a figure indicating the presence of a non-farming population which is most certainly industrial. In the adjacent county of Pennington, the proportion of farmers in the territory outside of the mining town of Rapid City and other incorporated places is somewhat larger, namely 18.1 per cent. On the whole these two counties may be regarded as predominantly industrial.

A second group of industrial workers is that of the railroad men. The influence of this group is particularly strong at Aberdeen, the second city in size in the state and an important railroad center. Labor sentiment at this point has at times been sufficiently strong to support a daily labor paper and a labor ticket in municipal political campaigns. Aberdeen contains approximately half of the population of Brown County.

A third group of industrial employes is to be found in Sioux Falls, a city of approximately 25,000 population and the leading city in size in the state. Sioux Falls contains approximately 60 per cent of the population of Minnehaha County. It is an important cattle market and employed in 1919, 1751 wage-earners in 155 manufacturing establishments.

If the political attitudes of the three groups of workers mentioned should differ materially from that of other classes

in the population, some indications of the difference would be expected to appear in the election returns of the counties named. In the following table, we present for selected population units the total vote polled, and the number and percentage of the vote polled for Bates, the Non-Partisan Party candidate for governor.

TABLE XVI

NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF VOTES CAST FOR BATES, NON-PARTISAN
PARTY CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR OF SOUTH DAKOTA, 1920,
BY VARIOUS GROUPINGS OF COUNTIES ¹

County Groupings	Total vote for Gov- ernor	Vote for Bates	
		Num- ber	Per cent of Total vote
The State	183,888	48,426	26.3
Lawrence County (Metalliferous miners)	8,427	504	6.0
Four Black Hills Mining Counties.....	11,804	797	6.8
Brown County (R. R. labor)	10,167	3,459	34.0
Minnehaha (Sioux Falls)	12,943	2,895	22.4
Eight counties containing cities of 5000 or more population.	50,403	12,167	24.1
Three counties more than 50% urban (included in preceding item)	22,466	6,027	26.8
Sixteen counties in which farmers comprise 15% or more of total population	24,902	4,772	19.2
Thirteen counties in which the wheat production exceeds one-half million bushels and in which wheat is the largest cereal crop.....	44,922	14,803	33.0
Twenty-four counties forming an irregular three-county column on the eastern border of the State, but omitting the three which border on the Missouri River.....	87,779	27,269	31.1
Three counties bordering on the Missouri River	10,131	1,494	14.7
Fourteen counties in the north and east border of the State, including Harding but not Union, that is facing North Dakota, Minnesota and a small portion of Montana.....	55,808	16,896	30.3
Thirteen counties on the south and west border including Union but not Harding and not including the unorganized counties of Shannon and Todd (that is, facing Nebraska, Wyoming and a corner of Iowa)	39,522	6,552	16.2

¹ Sources: *Fourteenth Census*, Volumes on Population and Agriculture, and *Legislative Manual of South Dakota*.

Political Cleavages Sectional. Careful study of the data upon which Table XVI is based leads to the conclusion that the vote in this election was determined by sectional influences associated with crop-producing areas, rather than by occupational or class distinctions. Of 17 counties in which 30 per cent or more of the vote for governor was polled by the Non-Partisan candidate, 13 lie in the eastern third of the state, while 16 lie in the eastern half of the state. Of the 5 counties which cast 40 per cent or more of their votes for the Non-Partisan candidate all are in the eastern one-third of the state. The wheat-producing areas are in this eastern section, especially in the northeastern corner at the southern end of the Red River Valley. The corn section is also in the eastern half of the state, but concentrated in the southeastern counties along the Missouri River, where the vote for Bates was very light.

In view of the sectional lines of cleavage, there appears to be little significance in the low vote cast for Bates in the highly industrial mining regions in the Black Hills and the comparatively high vote which he received in Brown County, the railroad center in the wheat belt. Nor does the comparatively low vote which the candidate polled in the counties inhabited most largely by farmers have greater significance, for the latter tend to be found in the western half of the state's area.

39. IOWA

Iowa, like Wisconsin, is an overwhelmingly Republican state. In a primary election in June, 1920, there was a clean-cut election contest between an alleged radical and an alleged conservative when Smith W. Brookhart attempted to wrest the Republican senatorial nomination from Albert B. Cummins, who was running for reelection. The vote polled in this contest provides a fair sample of the respective

attitudes of different geographical sections of the state. The record of votes cast is available by counties only so that industrial communities and farming areas could not be segregated in the result, except in so far as they are concentrated in certain sections. The following table presents the results of the primary with reference to various segregations of counties.

TABLE XVII

VOTES CAST FOR BROOKHART AND CUMMINS IN REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL PRIMARY, IOWA, 1920, WITH PERCENTAGE OF VOTE RECEIVED BY BROOKHART TO THE COMBINED VOTE FOR BROOKHART AND CUMMINS BY VARIOUS GROUPINGS OF COUNTIES

County Groupings	Votes			
	For Brookhart	For Cummins	For Brookhart and Cummins combined	Brookhart's as a percentage of the combined
The State of Iowa	96,563	115,768	212,331	45.5
Southern counties, 45 in 4 southern rows, including Cedar, Scott and Clinton	45,962	48,492	94,454	48.7
Northern counties, 54 in 5 northern rows	50,601	67,276	117,877	42.9
Southern border counties, 19 in two rows, excluding those touching the Missouri River ...	18,931	17,629	36,560	51.8
Northern border counties, 19 in two rows, excluding those touching the Missouri River ...	17,800	19,806	37,606	47.3
Missouri River counties, 9 on western border touching the river	6,999	11,618	18,617	37.6
Urban counties, 15 in which 50% or more of the population reside in cities of 10,000 or more population, 5% or more of whose population are wage-earners in manufacturing enterprises	26,412	30,300	56,712	46.6
Counties grouped by average value of all farm property, per farm:				
Less than \$20,000, 2 counties	3,189	3,125	5,314	60.0
\$20,000-\$25,000, 5 counties	4,008	4,433	8,441	47.5
\$25,000-\$30,000, 16 counties	16,662	18,667	35,329	47.2
Over \$35,000, 12 counties	8,108	12,553	20,661	39.2

If cleavages of political opinion occurred along occupational or class lines in the Iowa primary, they are not discernible in the data upon which Table XVII is based. As in the case of the South Dakota gubernatorial election of 1920, the alignments appear to have occurred largely along sectional lines. These lines appear to have run north and south as well as east and west. Out of 45 southern counties, 19 or more than $\frac{2}{3}$ gave a plurality for Brookhart. In the remaining 54 northern counties, 9 or $\frac{1}{6}$ only gave Brookhart a plurality. Brookhart's vote was stronger on both the northern and the southern boundaries of the state than in the central regions, but along the Missouri River, which forms the western border of the state, he failed to carry a single county and received but little more than one vote for every two given his opponent.

The residence of the candidate does not appear to explain the curious geographical stratifications that occurred in the vote. Mr. Brookhart resides in Washington County, near the eastern end of the third row of counties from the southern border. Mr. Cummins resides in Des Moines, the state capitol, about the center of the fourth row of counties from the same border. If we assume that the urban residence of Mr. Cummins prejudiced him in the eyes of rural voters, we are at a loss to account for the high vote which he received in the highly rural counties along the Missouri River.

In addition to the geographical cleavages, the association of another factor with the Brookhart-Cummins vote is indicated by Table XVII. This is the factor of average farm values. The conservative Cummins vote appears to have been proportionately greater in those counties in which the average value of all farm property was the highest. But these counties are found for the most part in the Missouri River Valley, running north and south, and in the central area of the state, running east and west, precisely those sec-

tions in which Brookhart was weakest; according to the sectional analysis.¹ It is in these areas, moreover, that the maximum production of corn occurs ² and that the maximum expenditures are made for feed ³ and for farm labor.⁴ The southern counties in which Brookhart was strongest show relatively lower average values of farm property and of average values per acre. They likewise show a slightly higher tendency to the production of winter wheat in place of corn.⁵

40. NEBRASKA

In the primary election of 1922, R. B. Howell, a "Progressive Republican" won the Republican nomination for U. S. senator in the State of Nebraska. C. W. Bryan, a "Progressive Democrat" won the Democratic Party nomination for governor. As a result, a "progressive" and "composite slate," headed by Howell and Bryan, and containing candidates nominated by the Progressive Party as well as by the old parties, was "officially endorsed by the Nonpartisan League, the local labor organizations and the Committee of 48."⁶ Both Howell and Bryan were elected, the former receiving 59.8 per cent of the combined vote of the Republican and Democratic candidates for senator, the latter 56.6 per cent of the combined Republican and Democratic vote for governor.⁷

¹ This may be seen graphically in the *Yearbook of the Department of Agriculture*, 1921, pp. 493 and 492.

² *Ibid.*, p. 437, fig. 27.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 495, fig. 108.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 496, fig. 110.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 438 and 437, figs. 29 and 27.

⁶ From leaflet announcing senatorial, congressional and state tickets for the election of 1922, issued by the Committee of 48, 15 East 40th Street, New York.

⁷ All election figures in this section are taken from the *Nebraska Blue Book*, 1922.

An Index of Progressivism. A measure of the extent to which voters of any group *split their votes* on behalf of the "progressive slate" will serve as an index by which the progressivism of the group may be gauged. It is obvious that if every Republican and Democrat had voted a "straight party ticket" the percentage of the total Republican and Democratic vote received by Howell would have varied inversely as the percentage of the vote received by Bryan, and *vice versa*. Each percentage would be the reciprocal of the other, for added together they would equal 100 per cent, i. e., all of the Republican and Democratic votes. Where Howell, Republican, was strongest, Bryan, Democrat, would be weakest, and so on. Hence the correlation between the percentage of Bryan votes and the percentage of Howell votes in the various counties would in such a case be negative and perfect; i. e., r would = -1.0.

On the other hand, if every Republican supporter of Howell voted likewise for Bryan, and if every Democratic supporter of Bryan voted likewise for Howell, the correlation between the percentages of the vote received by each would be positive and perfect; i. e., r would = 1.0. In this case Bryan and Howell would each receive 100 per cent of the combined Republican and Democratic votes.

A simple measure of progressivism is thus obtained by averaging the percentage of the senatorial vote received by Howell with the percentage of the gubernatorial vote received by Bryan. If the average is 100 per cent, then it is clear that *all* Republicans and Democrats *split their votes in support of both progressive candidates*. If the average is 50 per cent it is clear that all Republicans and Democrats cast *straight party ballots*.¹ If the average is 0 per cent it is clear that all Republicans and Democrats split their votes by

¹ Conservatives and progressives may both have split their votes, but in equal numbers so that they balance.

the rejection of both progressive candidates. Thus an average above 50 per cent indicates a tendency for voters to split ballots in behalf of the progressive candidates; the higher the average the greater the tendency. Conversely, an average of less than 50 per cent indicates a tendency for voters to split ballots in behalf of the conservative candidates on both tickets.

While in fact both Howell and Bryan were elected, it is nevertheless probable that each received a comparatively poor vote in the counties in which the other received a comparatively good vote. This is suggested when the percentages of the vote received by each in the various counties are correlated. The coefficient of correlation is found to be

$$r = -.228 \pm .038$$

Of 93 counties in Nebraska, Howell carried all but 6, while Bryan carried all but 10. There are no duplications among the 16 counties. Two counties only showed an average percentage of votes for Bryan and Howell of less than 50 per cent. Thus the state as a whole was quite uniformly progressive in its vote, although some sectional variations are visible.

The average vote received by Howell and Bryan in the state at large amounted to 58.2 per cent. Exclusive of Douglass County containing the City of Omaha, the average is 59.5 per cent. Counties in which this average exceeded 65 per cent, and which may therefore be regarded as unusually progressive, number 8. Six of these are in a compact geographical area in the central part of the state. Counties in which the average falls below 55 per cent, and which may therefore be regarded as "conservative" or "least progressive," number 12. Seven of these form a consecutive belt bordering the Missouri River above its confluence with the Platte. This is a region of corn, high farm values, and high expenditures for farm labor, corresponding to the

similar conservative regions on the opposite side of the river in Iowa and South Dakota.

The evidence seems to indicate that in this Nebraska election, as in several other state elections that have been examined, the non-party lines of political cleavage were sectional rather than occupational. In Douglass County, containing the industrial population of Omaha, and 93.7 per cent urban, the percentage vote for Bryan and Howell averaged was 49.3 per cent,—less than in any other county of the state. In Lancaster County, containing the City of Lincoln, the percentage vote for these candidates averaged was nearly 60 per cent. The first is one of the northeastern Missouri River group of counties which appear to be conservative regardless of whether they are urban or rural. The second is one of a group of 22 counties between the Missouri and Platte Rivers and the Kansas border, which are above the average for the state in the support which they gave to the progressive and Nonpartisan slate.

41. A MIDDLE WESTERN "CULTURE AREA" OF POLITICAL DISCONTENT

The foregoing analyses of cleavage lines among the voters of that compact group of trans-Mississippi states composed of Minnesota, the Dakotas, Nebraska and Iowa, has afforded a number of indications of a phenomenon that has now grown familiar to anthropologists, and that is technically known to them as a "culture area."¹ Briefly, it is supposed that any new element in the cultural life of a people—a method of chipping arrow-heads, a slang expression, a type of architecture, a decree of fashion, or what-not,—tends to spread in all directions from a common point of

¹The most accessible treatise for the general reader dealing with this interesting topic is contained in Clark Wissler's recent book on *Man and Culture*.

origin, but with diminished progress according to the resistance encountered, and with diminished intensity as it is removed farther and farther from its source. A boundary may finally be reached when a natural barrier is encountered, or when the spreading wave of a conflicting culture element of equal strength is encountered. The territory within which the culture element is found at a given time is known as the "culture area." A problem of the anthropologist and legitimately of the sociologist as well, is to determine the limits of the "culture area," the point of origin of the cultural elements involved, and the directions and rapidity of their concentric spread over adjacent areas.

Types of political opinion are elements of culture in a very real sense. They are just as subject to the laws which appear to govern the "diffusion" of cultural elements, as is, for example, a primitive religion, or a type of pottery or decorative art. There is a real possibility that "political agitators" may "infect" a group of discontented citizens with radical doctrines, *i. e.*, may form the nucleus for a new culture area of political opinion. The grounds of discontent must be present in the existing cultural situation or the new opinions will not spread. But the grounds of discontent alone will be insufficient to create radical political opinion, without the definite formulation of a radical doctrine at some central point, and its "diffusion" from thence over adjacent and receptive areas.


Apparent Lines of Diffusion. In Figure I, we have attempted to indicate roughly the lines of diffusion of radical political opinion in the 5 states discussed, so far as they may be inferred from the data that have been presented.¹ It has been already noted (p. 167) that from the western boundary

¹ The writer acknowledges the permission courteously given by Rand McNally & Co. for the use of the map from which this figure was prepared.

of North Dakota a decreasing tendency toward radical political behavior is to be noted as one passes from west to east across the state. If North Dakota as a *state* may be presumed to represent a higher degree of radicalism than Minnesota, its neighbor upon the east, the line of diffusion determined by the lessening degree of radicalism may be regarded as crossing the state line and continuing southward across the Iowa border. But Iowa counties along the Minnesota border were found to be more radical than those in the center of the state. Thus one line of diffusion of radical political tendencies starting in western North Dakota, appears

FIGURE 1

APPARENT LINES OF DIFFUSION OF RADICAL POLITICAL OPINION IN A
MID-WESTERN CULTURE AREA OF POLITICAL DISCONTENT ¹



to stop somewhere in the middle of Iowa, where another radical current traveling northward from the Iowa-Missouri boundary is encountered.

But the lines of diffusion from North Dakota appear to run southward as well as toward the Minnesota boundary. Southern North Dakota is more conservative than northern North Dakota and northern South Dakota is more radical than the southern portions of that state. A relatively conservative area is discovered in the Missouri River counties in the southeastern corner of South Dakota, and running southeasterly along both banks of the river in Iowa and Nebraska. Topographically and agriculturally, this section of the Missouri River Valley, falling in 3 states, is very much of a unit. While the average annual precipitation is slightly less at its northern end,¹ the soil is uniform,² the average length of the growing season is about the same throughout,³ and the principal crop is corn.⁴ Land values and average farm values are high⁵ and the average expenditures for farm labor are relatively great.⁶ It is evident that this prosperous farming region has offered a resistance to the diffusion of radical or progressive political opinions, that has not been encountered to an equal extent to the north, east or west of it.

In Nebraska, a separate center of progressive political opinion appears to exist in a cluster of counties about the middle of the state. The tendencies toward progressive political behavior appear to lessen as the eastern, northern or western borders of the state are approached. Thus, another line of diffusion appears to run from North Dakota, through South Dakota into Nebraska, where, as in the case

¹ See "A Graphic Summary of American Agriculture", *Yearbook of the Department of Agriculture*, 1921, p. 418.

² *Ibid.*, p. 420. Classed as "Dark-born silty soils, yellowish-brown subsoils."

³ *Ibid.*, p. 419.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 437.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 492-494.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 496.

of Iowa, it encounters another center of diffusion spreading outward to meet it.

Caution Necessary in Accepting Hypothesis. Too much must not be made of the indications here presented. We have inferred the existence of a radical culture area in north-western North Dakota, with lines of diffusion extending eastward and southward and again bending westward. But the data are like snapshot views of a highly unstable and dynamic movement. Numberless local influences assist in the retardation, acceleration or alteration of the culture elements which are originally propagated. The present discussion is not the place for an adequate analysis of the cultural processes that have been hinted at rather than demonstrated. The writer hopes at a future date to present a more convincing foundation for a theory of culture areas of political opinion.

The value of the concept will be apparent. With the passing of time, conservative parties often accept and enact into law, doctrines and policies which originally were regarded as dangerous and radical. The conservative's change of opinion in such a case may be due to a change in the circumstances by which the wisdom of the proposal is judged. It is much more likely that it is the result of a gradual spread and acceptance of the new doctrine by the people at large.

A given opinion or set of ideas may thus be accepted ultimately by all classes of the population, within the culture area of its diffusion, but at different rates of acceptance. Both the distance from the center of diffusion, and the special conditions which accelerate or retard acceptance are variables which help to determine its spread. The first variable contributes to the sectional characteristics that were noted (*supra*, pp. 111-12). It helps to stamp a certain typical character upon the New Englander, the Middle Westerner

or the Southerner. Variables of the second type contribute to the class differences within a given geographical section. They help to differentiate the capitalist, the farmer or the workingman.¹

Along any line of diffusion of political ideas, therefore, we should expect to find the views of two social classes *related* in a fairly definite and constant manner, in a moving equilibrium. For example, following one of the diffusion lines suggested in Figure I, if workingmen are more radical than professional men in Minneapolis, we might expect workingmen to be more radical than professional men in Des Moines, although both workingmen and professional men in the latter city might be more conservative than the corresponding groups in the first community.

In comparing the political behavior of farmers and industrial workers, greater differences of opinion may be found *within* each class, when comparisons are made geographically than *between* the two classes when comparisons are made in the same limited geographical area. The concept of culture areas enables us to make use of data of this character, for a constant *relationship* between the two classes in the same area is of more significance than a constant approximation of the views of each class to a fixed type of opinion.

42. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The data either do not exist or are not accessible for a comparative analysis of the votes of farmers and industrial workers throughout the United States. In the presidential election of 1920, the vote for Harding was relatively greater in the cities than in the rural districts, except in New Eng-

¹ Following this line of reasoning, the question may be asked whether the so-called "farmers' revolt" now expressing itself politically in middle western states is a revolt by a class or a revolt by a geographical section.

land. This fact may have resulted from a tendency on the part of the urban voters to exhibit more quickly and completely any political reaction affecting the nation as a whole. In a number of Northern states, in state elections, the urban voters are predominantly Democratic while the rural voters are predominantly Republican.

This alignment is demonstrated by an analysis of a state election in New York. In Pennsylvania a Republican candidate favored by the farmers was comparatively weak in counties which favored a Republican labor candidate. In Washington, the Farmer-Labor Party candidate was relatively strong in counties where labor sentiment was strong, and relatively weak in counties where the farmer's influence was great. Nevertheless a farmer-labor affiliation actually occurred in some cases in the Western Washington region, where the environment tends to bring the two groups into closer relationship.

In Wisconsin and Minnesota, the data are convincing that farmers and workingmen have supported the same candidates at recent elections. Election returns in a group of Middle Western states point to the existence of a "culture area" of political radicalism having a center of diffusion in western North Dakota. A center of conservatism is found in the Missouri River Valley in Iowa, Nebraska and South Dakota.

Although the present data are fragmentary, it may be inferred that a number of culture areas of political opinion would be disclosed by more extensive examination of election data. It is probable that within the Middle-western area, farmers and industrial workers are at present in political alliance. It is likewise probable that in eastern and southern culture areas, farmers and workers are in opposition. The culture-area concept makes it possible to disregard sectional differences in measuring the relationship between social classes.

CHAPTER VI

FARMER AND LABOR VOTES IN STATE LEGISLATURES

43. SCOPE AND CHARACTER OF THE ANALYSIS

THROUGHOUT the two preceding chapters indices or *measures* of the comparative political behavior of farmers and workingmen have been sought. In Chapter IV the measures obtained were indirectly indicative of the attitudes of each group on certain national issues. In Chapter V they concerned the behavior of the two groups with regard to choice of candidates rather than issues. In the present chapter we present a summary of an analysis of roll-call votes in state legislatures, designed to show whether farmers and workingmen themselves, when elected to legislative bodies, are in agreement or in opposition on certain types of issues.

Reasons for believing that elected legislators are representative, on the whole, of their constituents have been presented (*supra*, sec. 26). The election of a farmer to a legislative body is generally indicative of the presence of a high ratio of farmers among the voters of his district.¹ The election of a workingman usually takes place, if at all, in working-class wards. In both cases the legislator will act and vote in the legislature *about* as other members of his occupational group within the same district would act

¹ The number of farmers in the legislatures of agricultural states like Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota and North Dakota is very much larger than in states like Ohio which contain a large industrial population interspersed with the farming population.

and vote in the same circumstances. The recorded votes of farmer and labor legislators, therefore, may be regarded as samples of the reactions to certain issues of farmers and workingmen at large. Similar samples cannot be obtained in any other way with equal exactness.¹

Analysis of Votes in which Differences of Opinion were Registered. Our analysis has included in its scope roll-call votes in every state legislative session held in the years 1919, 1920 and 1921, in which at least two farmers and two workingmen participated as members.² In each session all roll calls pertaining to 9 types of issues were included in the study, provided 5 or more votes were recorded in opposition to the majority action when it took place in a lower house, and similarly, provided two or more votes were cast in opposition to the majority in an upper house.³ By this method of selection, unanimous and nearly unanimous roll calls were excluded, and the analysis was confined to those divisions in which substantial differences of opinion were indicated.⁴

¹ The entire mechanism of representative government might be described as a sampling process. With reference to wealth, intelligence and qualities of leadership a legislator would not constitute a fair sample of the voters in his district. With reference to habitual attitudes of mind on political and moral issues he would probably represent as fair a sample as could practicably be obtained.

² For the criteria employed to determine "farmer" and "labor" members, see Appendix A.

³ The size of the average state senate in proportion to the house is roughly indicated by the ratio 2:5. In a few cases where the number of roll calls taken on a single measure was large, an unbiased sample of such roll calls was taken.

⁴ Unanimous roll calls were excluded by A. Lawrence Lowell from the tables presented in his study, "The Influence of Party upon Legislation in England and America," Annual Report, *American Historical Association*, vol. i, 1901, pp. 321-542. Lowell says: "... to insert them seemed unnecessary, and in fact, they occur only in consequence of a peculiar procedure. No one would, of course, care to insist upon a call of the roll when there

Ninety-eight individual workingmen and 259 individual farmers, members of 21 legislative sessions in 17 states, met the criteria of selection that were employed. The roll calls participated in by these members and included within the scope of the analysis number 1,057. For reasons which will presently be explained, it was necessary to analyze the votes of all members of the various sessions on these roll calls, so that in the aggregate approximately 95,000 individual votes, classified in two or more ways, have entered into the determination of the summary figures that will be presented below.

Numerical Indices of the Voting Behavior of Groups. For each legislative session, two kinds of numerical indices have been derived with respect to the vote on all measures included in each of the nine categories of issues. These are: (1) an *index of cohesion within* each of the groups (*e. g.*, farmers, laborites, Republicans, etc.); (2) an *index of likeness between* any two of these groups.

The possible range of variation of the index in each case is from 0 to 100. A high index of cohesion within a group indicates a high degree of agreement among the members, and *vice versa*. Thus, if the index of farmer cohesion amounts to 100, the reader should understand that all farmer members voted *alike* on every roll call included

was no opposition; and hence the names of the persons voting in such cases would not be recorded were it not that in a number of states the constitution requires a ye-a-and-nay vote on the final passage of every bill. Under these circumstances the quantity of unanimous votes is sometimes prodigious. In the Senate of New York, for example, there were in the session of 1899 1,235 ye-a-and-nay votes, of which 961 were unanimous. Except for the provision in the constitution there would have been no roll call on these votes and to include them in our list would merely swell the tables inordinately without any corresponding advantage." Lowell's study provides the only precedent for a summary analysis of legislative votes of this kind of which the writer has knowledge.

within the class to which the index applies. That is, if we may judge by their voting behavior, the farmer members were completely *like-minded* with respect to the issues included in this class; they constituted a completely cohesive group.

Similarly, if the index of cohesion among farmers amounts to 0, the reader should understand that there was entire absence of unanimity among them; that their votes, in other words, appear to have been determined by factors unrelated to the common occupation. Diverse attitudes must be compressed during a vote into one or the other of two expressions—approval or disapproval of the proposition before the house.¹ Hence, 0 cohesion among farmers would indicate that their votes had been evenly distributed on both sides of every proposition, for this would be the division expected if their votes were determined by chance alone.² In such a case, farmers would not actually constitute a group at all with reference to the measures under consideration, although they might still be regarded as a potential group, ready to become active when other types of issues are presented.³

The index of likeness between groups, on the other hand,

¹ Cf., pp. 21-22.

² The index of cohesion for any group has been derived by ascertaining, first, the percentage of "aye" votes on a given roll call. Since an even division (50 per cent "aye") denotes absence of cohesion, and since complete unanimity is denoted equally by unanimous support or unanimous opposition, the scale between 0 cohesion and 100 cohesion will extend from 50 per cent "aye" in both directions to 0 per cent "aye" and 100 per cent "aye." For example, a roll call in which 70 per cent of the group vote "aye" and another in which 30 per cent vote "aye" will both give an index of cohesion of 40, for in both cases there is a 40 per cent departure from 0 cohesion toward 100 cohesion. The index of cohesion for a group of measures consists of the arithmetic mean of the indices of cohesion upon the separate measures in the group, this form of average having been found the most suitable.

³ Cf., pp. 19-20.

disregards the distinction between actuality and potentiality. It assumes that all members of a certain class do together constitute a group. It then provides a measure of the voting responses of this group in comparison with the voting responses of another group, each regarded as a unit. For example, if farmers and laborites are *both* divided equally between the "ayes" and the "nays" on a legislative roll call, the response of the farmer group and of the labor group is regarded as being the same. The index of likeness between them in this case will be 100. It will likewise be 100 if both groups, *at the same time*, vote unanimously "aye", or unanimously "nay", or 60 per cent "aye". In all of these cases, farmers are for or against the proposition before the house to exactly the same extent as are the labor members. As occupational groups their behavior is the same.

The index of likeness between farmers and laborites is 0, on the other hand, when all farmers are unanimously in opposition to all laborites, for here the voting behavior of the two groups is wholly antithetical.¹

Within the limits of error due to the number and selection of cases involved, the two indices that have been described will provide answers to the following questions:

Upon which of nine types of political issues are farmer legislators most in agreement? Upon which are labor legislators most in agreement? Which of these two groups is the more like-minded upon each type of issue? Do the responses of farmers and of laborites tend to be like or unlike upon each type of issue?

¹ It will be apparent that the arithmetic difference between the percentages voting "aye" in each of two groups will give an index of the difference in voting behavior between these groups. The index of likeness is regarded as the complement of the index of difference, and is employed rather than the latter in order that tendencies toward *like* behavior may be designated by high values on the scale, as with the index of cohesion.

The Variable Factor of Party Affiliation among Farmer and Labor Legislators. At this point, however, a difficulty arises. The existing political parties, in most cases, provide the major lines of cleavage within legislative bodies. Party loyalty usually has a greater influence upon the member's vote than do factors associated with occupation. If it were not so, party lines would already have reshaped themselves along occupational lines. The answers to the foregoing questions will have little significance, consequently, so long as the party affiliations of farmers and workingmen are variable factors. For example, the index of cohesion among farmers in a particular legislative session might be higher than the index of cohesion among workingmen. If the farmers were all members of the same political party, while the workingmen were divided between two political parties, the higher cohesion among the former might safely be attributed in large part to their common party loyalty. Similarly, the index of likeness between farmers and workingmen who are affiliated with the same party will usually be higher than the index of likeness between farmers of one party and workingmen of another.¹

¹ In a practicable problem of measurement, it is quite impossible to take account of all of the possible lines of cleavage within a legislative body. As the *major* line of cleavage, the factor of party must be held constant. Party and occupation are frequently correlated, but the correlation is not uniform in character. For example, farmer legislators are almost invariably Republican in New York, but quite as invariably Democratic in the south. In New England they may be of either party. The revolt of labor against existing conditions is likely to find expression by its identification with the *opposition* party—with the Democratic party in strongly Republican states and with the Republican party in strongly Democratic states. In the south the racial factor has obscured this tendency.

With respect to cleavages along lines other than party, we are forced to assume a *constant* correlation, or constant absence of correlation, with the occupational cleavage between farmers and laborites. The necessity of this assumption occurs if for no other reason because of the scanti-

The Variable Held Constant by Classification. As the most practicable method of holding the party factor constant, the various groups of farmer and labor legislators, whose voting behavior has been measured by the two indices mentioned, have been selected in each case wholly from the same political party. That is, the farmers who have been grouped together in any case are all Republicans, all Democrats, all Socialists, or all without party designation. The same is true of the members who have been grouped together as laborites. The questions which may be answered by the aid of the two indices may then be restated as follows:

(1) Upon which of nine types of political issues do farmer legislators disclose the greater agreement, relative, in each case, to the degree of agreement among the members of their party as a whole?

(2) Similarly, upon what types of issues do labor legislators show the greater relative agreement?

(3) Do farmers or laborites show the greater likemindedness, relative to that which would be expected of each group on the basis of the party affiliations of its members?

(4) In their voting behavior, are farmers and laborites *more alike* or *less alike*, mutually, than would be expected on the basis of their respective party affiliations alone?

Some Examples of the Methods of Inference. Suppose the indices of cohesion to be as follows: Republicans (as a whole) 60; Republican farmers, 70; Republican laborites,

ness of the data. It would be of no value to divide a legislative body into "Protestant, native-born, Republican farmers," "Protestant, German-born, Republican farmers," etc.; for the number of classes would far exceed the number of members to be classified. It is likely that the most important cleavage to be found in legislative bodies generally, other than the cleavages of party and occupation, is that between the representatives of urban and rural constituencies. The correlation would be high and constant between the farmer group and the rural group, and between the labor group and the urban group.

80. The cohesion existing among farmers and among laborites can be attributed mainly to the cohesion among Republicans at large. Yet both of the occupational groups are more cohesive than the larger party group. Hence we may say that occupation, in each case, provides a cohesive influence, which is stronger in the case of the laborites.

Again, assume that farmers and laborites are affiliated with different political parties, and that the indices of cohesion are the following: Republicans (as a whole) 70; Republican farmers, 80; Democratic laborites, 60; Democrats (as a whole) 40. As Republicans, we should expect the farmers to show cohesion of 70. Their cohesion index is actually 10 points greater. As Democrats we should expect the laborites to show cohesion of 40. Their cohesion is actually 20 points greater. Hence, while the cohesion among farmers is greater *absolutely* than among laborites, the latter show the greater cohesion *relative to party*.

When all farmers belong to one party and all laborites to another, the index of likeness between the two occupational groups may be compared with the index of likeness between the two party groups, each taken as a whole. If the first index be the greater, it is evident that farmers and workingmen are *tending toward* likeness of behavior, even though, because of party affiliations, their votes are in the greater number of cases opposed. Thus, if the index of likeness between Republican farmers and Democratic laborites is only 30, this figure still indicates a tendency toward farmer-labor like-mindedness, provided the index of likeness between Republicans and Democrats at large is still less, say 20. On the other hand, if the index of likeness between Republicans and Democrats were greater than 30, say 40, it would be clear that farmers and laborites were in agreement *less frequently* than were the average Republicans and Democrats.

When Farmers and Laborites Belong to the Same Political

Party. This case is more complex. Here it is necessary to ascertain whether the two occupational groups adhere generally to the *same wing* or to *opposing wings* of the party. An actual instance will serve to make the concept clear :

In the Pennsylvania legislature of 1919, House Bill No. 1400 provided for the enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment to the federal constitution. On the second roll call upon this measure in the lower house,¹ 175 Republicans cast their votes. Of this number, 90 voted "aye" and 85 voted "no". Thus the division was nearly even. Among these Republicans were 7 farmers and 8 labor members. All but one of the 7 farmers voted "no", whereas all of the 8 laborites voted "aye". In percentages, those voting "aye" in each group were as follows: Republicans, 51.4 per cent; Republican farmers, 14.3 per cent; Republican laborites, 100 per cent.

The distribution of votes is represented graphically in Figure 2. Each of the dotted squares in the area ABDC represents a Republican member who voted "aye". Each of the similar squares in the irregular area CDFE represents a Republican member who voted "no". The area *klnm* represents the labor members, all of whom voted "aye", while the area *pqsr* represents the farmer members, all but one of whom voted "no".

It will be seen that the Republican party group in the House was divided, on this issue, into two opposing groups which we have referred to as *opposing wings*.² If a member of the Republican group were selected at random, without regard to criteria other than his party membership, the

¹ Report in *House Journal*, p. 3352.

² Whether or not these wings were of permanent character (*i. e.*, were in the nature of *blocs*) does not concern us at this point. Nor are we concerned to learn which of the wings was on the "dry" and which on the "wet" side of the issue.

chances would have been 51.4 in 100 that he would have belonged to the *affirmative wing*. We may refer to this percentage of affirmative votes within the whole party group as the *probable* or *expected* proportion of affirmative votes within any lesser group of Republicans, such as Republican farmers or laborites. By comparing the *actual* with the *expected* division within these intra-party groups, we can ascertain whether they tend to be found in the same or in opposing wings of the party group.

The Concept of "Swing" Within a Party. In the roll call cited, farmers inclined more strongly to the negative side of the question than did Republicans generally. We will refer to this inclination as a "swing" to the negative. Laborites, on the other hand, disclosed a "swing" to the affirmative. Hence, with reference to each other, farmers and labor members showed a tendency toward opposition within the common party. When the "swing" of Republican farmers and Republican laborites is habitually in the same direction, it is evident that the voting behavior of the two groups tends to agree, *relative to party affiliations*, and the expectation based thereon. Conversely, when the "swing" is habitually in opposite directions, it is evident that the two groups tend to disagree in voting behavior, again *relative to party*.¹

Thus we have found it possible to determine whether the voting tendencies of farmers and laborites are in the direction of agreement or disagreement, regardless of whether the affiliations of each are with the same or with different political party organizations. In the following sections of this chapter summaries will be presented, based upon the indices of cohesion and the indices of likeness that have been derived. Attention will be centered in each case upon the *expected*

¹See Appendix B, which may be regarded as a footnote logically appearing at this point.

result, determined by the party affiliations concerned, and from this will be measured the deviation in the result which is actually found to occur.

44. COHESION AMONG FARMER LEGISLATORS

Summaries of our analysis are presented in two forms: in the first, the data have been arranged according to the legislative sessions in which the votes were cast; in the second, according to the nine categories or types of measures voted upon. Tables XVIII and XIX summarize the indices of farmer cohesion under each of these two classifications, respectively. In each table there is shown not only the average index for each item but the number of roll calls in which the index is greater than, less than, or equal to the expectation based on party affiliations.

Table XVIII serves to demonstrate that farmer legislators are influenced in casting their votes by factors associated with their occupation as well as by party ties. The average index of cohesion among farmers is greater by 10.2 than the cohesion which they would show if they voted merely as members of the same political party. In two only of the 26 groups of farmers, each homogeneous as to party membership, is the cohesion less than among the respective party groups to which each belongs; in one of these, moreover, but 5 roll calls are included. In two other cases the cohesion among farmers and the corresponding party cohesion are the same, but in one of these three roll calls only are included.

Sectional Differences Obscure. The table is not adequate to determine sectional differences in farmer cohesion, if any exist. Thus, farmer cohesion is high in the eastern industrial states of Pennsylvania, Ohio and New York, but it is still higher in Arkansas. It is high among Democratic farmers in Iowa, but negative (less than the expectation).

TABLE XVIII

SUMMARY OF INDICES OF "COHESION" AMONG FARMER MEMBERS OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, BY LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS

State and Legislative Session ¹	Farmer Members		Number of roll calls in which farmer "cohesion" is greater than, equal to or less than the expecta- tion based on party affiliations				Average amount by which farmer "cohesion" is greater than (+) or less than (—) the expecta- tion based on party ²
	Party	Num- ber	Greater than expecta- tion	Less than expecta- tion	Equal to expecta- tion	Total	
AlabamaH '19	D	14	24	14	..	38	+ 7.6
ArkansasH '21	D	5	12	2	..	14	+33.1
IndianaH '19	R	12	39	39	3	81	+ 1.0
IowaH '19	R	13	18	20	..	38	—3.8
IowaH '19	D	5	25	6	7	38	+22.6
LouisianaH '20	D	21	38	35	3	76	+ 4.4
MichiganH x '19	R	11	3	2	..	5	—4.2
MinnesotaH '19	NP	19	40	33	1	74	+ 4.8
MinnesotaS '19	NP	8	39	17	..	56	+ 9.8
MissouriH '19	R	3	33	27	4	64	+ 5.7
MissouriH '19	D	3	44	12	4	60	+18.6
New YorkH '21	R	21	50	2	8	60	+26.7
OhioH '19	R	3	51	10	2	63	+12.0
OhioH '19	D	3	38	15	9	62	+17.7
OhioS '19	R	2	47	5	7	59	+22.7
Pennsylvania...H '19	R	7	36	11	..	47	+26.4
Rhode Island..H '19	R	6	11	1	1	13	+11.0
South Carolina..H '20	D	29	8	8	..	16	+ 1.7
Washington...H '19	R	15	20	22	..	42	0.0
West Virginia..H '19	R	6	42	10	..	52	+17.0
West Virginia..H x '19	R	5	12	7	..	19	+18.9
WisconsinH '19	R	30	76	76	4	156	+ 0.2
WisconsinH '19	Soc	2	26	14	106	146	+ 1.8
WisconsinH x '19	R	30	2	1	..	3	+ 3.4
WisconsinH x '19	Soc	2	3	3	0.0
WisconsinH '21	R	24	53	21	..	74	+25.4
Total ³	299	787	410	162	1359	+10.2

* ¹The following abbreviations are used: H—Lower house of the legis-
lature; S—Senate, or upper house of the legislature; x—extra session;

in the larger group of Republican farmers in the same state. Similarly, Republican farmers in the Wisconsin House of 1919 show almost no cohesion above the expectation, but in the session of the same house two years later, Republican farmers showed cohesion greater by 25.4 than the cohesion within the larger Republican group to which they belonged.

Farmers Most in Agreement on Moral Issues. It is apparent from Table XIX that farmers are in greater accord on questions which concern public morals and public health than on questions of political or economic import. The comparative unanimity which is shown with respect to prohibition and its enforcement is particularly striking. On the other hand, farmers are least in agreement among themselves on measures dealing with agriculture and related subjects, which affect their own economic interests.

¹19—session of 1919, etc.; D—Democrat; R—Republican; Soc.—Socialist; NP—elected without party designation.

²The following interpretation of the first line of the table will make the latter more readily understood: In the lower house of the Alabama legislature meeting in 1919, there were 14 Democratic members who were classified as "farmers" under the criteria described in Appendix A. During the session there were 38 roll calls of the types included in the study (*cf. supra*, p. 185, and *infra*, Table XIX, footnote 1). For each of these 38 roll calls the index of cohesion was calculated (1) for all Democrats (2) for the group of 14 Democratic farmers. The cohesion among all Democrats is the "expected" cohesion among the Democratic farmers. In 24 roll calls the cohesion among Democratic farmers was greater than among all Democrats, *i. e.*, greater than the "expectation." In 14 roll calls, similarly, the farmer cohesion was less than the expectation. In no cases were the actual and the expected cohesion equal. The last column was derived by obtaining the averages (1) of the 38 separate indices of farmer cohesion, (2) of the 38 separate indices of cohesion among all Democrats. These averages were respectively 51.5 and 43.9. Deducting (2) from (1) it was found that Democratic farmers were more cohesive on the average by 7.6 points (on a scale of 100) than would be expected of Democrats in general. The other lines of the table are to be interpreted in similar manner, as are likewise the various items in tables xix, xx and xxi.

³Including duplications.

TABLE XIX

SUMMARY OF INDICES OF COHESION AMONG FARMER MEMBERS OF STATE LEGISLATURES, BY TYPES OF MEASURES VOTED UPON ¹

Type of Measures ²	Numbers of roll calls in which farmer cohesion is greater than, equal to or less than the expectations based on party affiliations				Average amount by which farmer cohesion is greater than (+) or less than (—) the expectation
	Greater than expectation	Less than expectation	Equal to expectation	Total ³	
1. Prohibition	118	17	17	152	+22.9
2. Sex relationships	28	17	..	45	+11.0
3. Morals (miscellaneous) ...	42	13	4	59	+17.0
4. Political reform	95	44	24	163	+ 8.6
5. (Woman suffrage)	(27)	(8)	(4)	(39)	(+ 7.6)
6. Public Utilities	127	65	35	227	+ 6.0
7. Labor	125	67	35	227	+ 7.7
8. Agriculture	87	73	14	174	+ 2.7
9. Taxation	100	83	29	212	+ 6.2
10. Public Health	65	31	4	100	+14.2
All measures	787	410	162	1359	+10.2

¹ For an interpretation of the entries in this table, *cf.* footnote 2, table xviii.

² Measures are usually reported by title in the Senate and House Journals. The full headings of the categories which have been employed in classifying measures are as follows: 1. Prohibition and its enforcement; 2. Sex and marriage relationships, including the regulation of dancing; 3. Miscellaneous proposals concerning public morals, including cigarettes, sabbath observance, prize fighting, gambling, movie censorship and "blue laws" generally; 4. Proposals affecting the degree of control over government by the voter, or the degree of his participation in government, including political devices not fully accepted, such as direct legislation, direct primaries, woman suffrage, etc.; 5. Woman suffrage, segregated from the preceding category and included therein; 6. Extensions of public ownership, public operation or public control over public utilities or public service; 7. Conditions of labor or employment; 8. Affecting agricultural or rural interests generally, including food distribution, marketing, etc.; 9. Shifts in the burden of taxation,

The explanation of this curious disclosure seems to be found in the prevalence of individualism among farmers. Because of his subjection to influences of nature that are relatively uniform wherever found, the emotional responses of farmers tend to be similar. Moral issues evoke emotional responses. The same influences in his environment have made the farmer individualistic. The lessons of cooperation, for instance, are learned slowly. Hence, although the responses to moral issues tend to be emotional and uniform, the responses to questions involving economic interests tend to be intellectual, individualistic and diverse.

45. COHESION AMONG LABOR LEGISLATORS

In this section we summarize the indices of labor cohesion in two tables, according to the same bases of computation employed in the preceding section.

excluding routine appropriations or tax bills not involving the question of incidence; 10. Extensions of public activity regarding health, safety and humane activity.

It will be noted that 1-3 concern public morals, 4-6 the scope and framework of government, including the extensions of governmental activity, 7-9 the economic relationship of groups, and 10 social welfare. The list is not intended to be exhaustive, nor is it contended that all of the measures in each category are limited in their application to that category alone. The writer believes, however, that since no known bias nor source of constant error has been present in making the classification, each category will represent on the whole a distinct type of measure. The purpose has been to include measures which raise an issue of principle or group interest within the various headings, and to exclude those which are concerned merely with administration or with applications of principles accepted by all groups.

³ The totals will be greater than the numbers of roll calls in each category for the reason that, as indicated in table xviii, farmer groups have been segregated in some states, within more than one party group. Nor will these totals correspond with the similar totals in tables xx and xxi devoted to labor cohesion. Because of absentees, it has been possible to obtain an index of cohesion in some cases for a farmer group but not for a labor group, and *vice versa*.

TABLE XX

SUMMARY OF INDICES OF "COHESION" AMONG LABOR MEMBERS OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, BY LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS ¹

State and Legislative Session	Labor Members		Number of roll calls in which labor "cohesion" is greater than, equal to or less than the expecta- tion based on party affiliations				Average amount by which labor "cohesion" is greater than (+) or less than (—) the expecta- tion based on party
	Party	Num- ber	Greater than expecta- tion	Less than expecta- tion	Equal to expecta- tion	Total	
AlabamaH '19	D	3	26	12	..	38	+19.2
ArkansasH '21	D	2	7	1	..	8	+43.7
IndianaH '19	R	3	48	30	3	81	+ 2.4
IndianaH '19	D	3	55	10	13	78	+26.8
Louisiana.....H '20	D	6	49	26	1	76	+13.5
MichiganH x '19	R	2	4	1	..	5	+22.8
MinnesotaH '19	NP	4	57	17	..	74	+25.8
MinnesotaS '19	NP	4	45	11	..	56	+33.4
MissouriH '19	R	3	42	10	4	56	+25.6
MissouriH '19	D	3	48	8	3	59	+24.5
New YorkH '21	R	5	15	35	10	60	—18.7
OhioH '19	R	3	32	29	2	63	—12.1
OhioH '19	D	3	36	11	7	54	+20.9
OhioS '19	D	2	43	6	10	59	+30.6
Pennsylvania...H '19	R	9	34	12	1	47	+25.2
Rhode Island ..H '19	D	2	2	..	11	13	+ 1.1
South Carolina..H '20	D	4	12	4	..	16	+31.8
Washington ...H '19	R	4	27	15	..	42	+12.4
West Virginia...H '19	R	13	37	13	2	52	+17.1
West Virginia...H '19	D	3	27	20	4	51	+ 6.5
West Virginia ..H x '19	R	13	16	3	..	19	+28.1
West Virginia...H x '19	D	3	6	9	4	19	—11.6
WisconsinH '19	Soc	9	27	16	113	156	+ 1.6
WisconsinH x '19	Soc	9	3	3	0.0
WisconsinH '21	R	3	63	11	..	74	+48.6
Total ²	118	758	310	191	1259	+15.7

¹ Abbreviations used same as in table xviii, footnote 1. Cf. also footnote 2, table xviii.

² Including duplications.

It may be inferred from Table XX that labor members of state legislatures, even more than farmer members, tend to cohere as compared with the members generally of the parties to which they belong. The average index of cohesion among labor members is greater by 15.7 than the average expectation. This degree is half again as great as the corresponding degree in the case of the farmers.

In Cohesion, Labor Groups More Variable than Farmer Groups. The range of the average variations from party cohesion among farmer groups is from -4.2 to $+33.1$ or 37.3 points. The similar range among labor groups is from -18.7 to $+48.6$ or 67.3 points. A rough measure of variability in labor cohesion is obtained from Table XX by averaging the deviations of each item in the last column from the "Total" or summary average item in the same column. The deviation of each item is weighted by the total number of roll calls in the session, given in the preceding column. For example, the deviation of the first item in the last column of Table XX (namely, $+19.2$) is 3.5 from the Total item (namely, $+15.7$). In computing an average deviation for the table, 3.5 is weighted by 38 , the number of roll calls given in the preceding column. In a similar manner a measure of variability in farmer cohesion may be obtained from Table XVIII. The average variability in cohesion arrived at in this way is, for farmers, 9.3 ; for labor members, 13.7 .

This greater variability is probably due in part to the smaller numbers included in the labor groups. This circumstance serves to increase the probability that variations will be large.¹ Another explanation is that labor members,

¹ Cf. appendix B. It may also be noted that while no *probable error* has been calculated for the indices presented in this chapter, reliability is usually determined in part by the number of cases involved in any problem. Hence the reliability of the indices of labor cohesion is probably less than the corresponding indices of farmer cohesion.

representing a number of different occupations and industries, are more diverse in type than farmers, who represent a single industry.

In at least three legislative sessions, the low average excess of labor cohesion above the respective party cohesion is due to the high degree of party regularity which prevailed. In the regular and special sessions of the Wisconsin House of Representatives in 1919, the 9 labor members among the 16 in the Socialist group voted exactly as did their party colleagues in 116 out of 159 roll calls. Since party regularity was exceptionally high, the index of cohesion for the Socialist Party group in the regular session was 88.9, leaving a possible excess cohesion of 11.1 for the labor Socialist group. Similarly, in the Rhode Island House of 1919, the labor group, made up of two Democrats only, voted with their party associates in 11 out of 13 roll calls included in the analysis. The cohesion among Democrats amounted to 98.9, leaving a maximum possible excess of cohesion for the labor group of 1.1, which is the excess shown in Table XX. That is to say, the labor Democrats were 100 per cent cohesive, but only more cohesive by 1.1 points than were Democrats generally.¹

¹ This raises the question whether measurements of farmer and of labor like-mindedness ought to be concerned not only with the difference between the actual and the expected, or party, "cohesion" but with this difference in relation to the maximum difference which would be possible. For example, suppose that in one session Republican cohesion amounts to 50, while Republican farmer cohesion amounts to 60. Suppose that in another session Republican cohesion amounts to 90 and Republican farmer cohesion to 92. Is not the difference between the actual and the expected cohesion of equal significance in the two cases, since in both the excess of the actual over the expected is one-fifth of the possible excess? The writer's reply would be negative. The party cohesion may be regarded as the norm, variations from which in the case of the cohesion of sub-groups indicate tendencies toward or away from like-mindedness within the sub-group. It makes no difference where the norm is found on the scale between complete divergence and

TABLE XXI

SUMMARY OF INDICES OF "COHESION" AMONG LABOR MEMBERS OF STATE LEGISLATURES, BY TYPES OF MEASURES VOTED UPON ¹

Type of Measures ²	Numbers of roll calls in which labor cohesion is greater than, equal to or less than the expectation based on party affiliations				Average amount by which labor cohesion is greater than (+) or less than (—) expectation
	Greater than expectation	Less than expectation	Equal to expectation	Total ³	
1. Prohibition	79	41	16	136	+ 9.6
2. Sex relationships	31	14	1	46	+15.5
3. Morals (miscellaneous) ..	28	22	5	55	—2.0
4. Political reform	86	37	29	152	+11.1
5. (Woman Suffrage)	(22)	(11)	(3)	(36)	(+ 9.3)
6. Public Utilities	110	57	42	209	+12.0
7. Labor	138	33	44	215	+23.5
8. Agriculture	104	35	19	158	+18.0
9. Taxation	124	42	26	192	+17.5
10. Public Health	59	28	9	96	+13.8
All measures	758	310	191	1259	+15.7

While the cohesion among laborites is greater on the whole than among farmers, the tendency to cohere is less pronounced with regard to particular types of measures.

complete cohesion—variations having the same numerical value possess the same significance. If party cohesion approaches 100, and the cohesion of a sub-group within the party exceeds the party cohesion by a point or two, the excess is just as likely to be due to accidental causes as would be a similar variation from a lower index of party cohesion. There is no means of estimating whether, with a lower degree of party discipline, the members of the sub-group would "stick together" relatively better than the members of the party as a whole.

¹ Cf., footnote 2 to table xviii.

² Cf., footnote 2 to table xix.

³ Cf., footnote 3 to table xix.

Comparison of Tables XIX and XXI will indicate that the farmers are in much greater agreement upon the prohibition issue than are the labor men. The same is true of a group of miscellaneous measures concerning public morals, such as Sunday observance, prize-fighting, gambling and movie censorship. The cohesion upon matters concerning public health is approximately the same within both groups of members.

Laborites Most in Agreement on Labor Legislation. Labor members are in greatest agreement upon the kind of measures which affect their own class interests—those which deal with conditions of labor or employment, such as wage bills, hours-of-labor bills, labor departments, or sanitary regulations in factories for employees. The greater tendency of laborites to agree on such things must be placed in contrast with the tendency among farmers, disclosed in Table XIX, to be least in agreement on proposals which similarly affect their own economic life. Laborites are much more in agreement upon agricultural proposals than are farmers themselves; they are in fact more in agreement upon agricultural measures than upon any other of the nine categories of proposals with the exception of labor measures.

In general, the labor members are most cohesive with regard to types of measures upon which farmers are least cohesive.¹

¹ This is indicated by the fact that if the types of measures listed in tables xix and xxi be graded in accordance with the cohesiveness, first of the farmers, and second of the laborites, and the two series be correlated, the coefficient of correlation is negative, namely,

$$r = -.52.$$

By the method employed no probable error is calculated.

46. THE "LIKENESS" BETWEEN FARMER AND LABOR
LEGISLATORS

The indices of likeness between farmers and laborites, like the indices of cohesion within these groups, attain significance only when they are considered in relation to party affiliations. It is obvious that the numerical measures of likeness with reference to party, when farmers and laborites are members of different parties, are not wholly comparable with the corresponding measures of likeness when both groups are members of the same party. In consequence, a separate summary comparison for each of these two cases has been presented.

Whenever possible the same group of farmer or labor members is introduced into both comparisons. For example, the votes of Republican farmers in the Ohio House of Representatives are compared not only with the votes of Democratic laborites, but with the votes of Republican laborites as well. The votes of Democratic farmers are compared with those of Democratic laborites and Republican laborites. Inasmuch as this involves some duplications, the numerical unit in the totals must be regarded as a *comparison* of farmer and labor votes on a roll call, rather than as a roll call itself.

In Tables XXII and XXIII the two types of comparisons have been summarized by legislative sessions. In Tables XXV and XXVI the comparisons have been classified according to types of measures voted upon.

TABLE XXII

SUMMARY BASED UPON INDICES OF "LIKENESS" BETWEEN FARMER AND LABOR MEMBERS OF STATE LEGISLATURES, WHEN EACH OCCUPATIONAL GROUP IS WHOLLY AFFILIATED WITH A *Separate* POLITICAL PARTY, BY LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS ¹

State and Legislative Session ²	Groups compared				Number of roll calls in which the "likeness" of farmer and labor members is greater than, equal to or less than the expectation based on the "likeness" between parties				Average amount by which farmer- labor "like- ness" is greater than (+) or less than (—) the expectation based on the "likeness" between the respective parties
	Farmer Members		Labor Members		Greater than expecta- tion	Less than expecta- tion	Equal to expecta- tion	Total	
	Party	Num- ber	Party	Num- ber					
Indiana H '19	R	12	D	3	23	53	2	78	—14.2
Iowa H '19	R	13	D	1	8	30	..	38	—18.1
Iowa H '19	D	5	R	1	11	21	..	32	—23.2
Missouri H '19	R	3	D	3	22	34	..	56	—15.2
Missouri H '19	D	3	R	3	24	27	..	51	—11.9
Ohio H '19	R	3	D	3	13	41	1	55	—22.5
Ohio H '19	D	3	R	3	30	27	2	59	+1.3
Ohio S '19	R	2	D	2	8	49	2	59	—30.3
Rhode Island .. H '19	R	6	D	2	..	12	1	13	—8.9
Washington ... H '19	R	13	D	1	10	24	..	34	—19.2
West Virginia .. H '19	R	6	D	3	25	26	..	51	—6.2
West Virginia .. H x '19	R	5	D	3	10	8	1	19	—4.7
Wisconsin H '19	R	30	Soc	9	80	73	3	156	+3.2
Wisconsin H x '19	R	30	Soc	9	2	1	..	3	+2.0
Wisconsin H '21	R	24	Soc	6	51	23	..	74	+8.0
Total ³	158	..	52	317	449	12	778	—9.1 ⁴

¹ The index of "likeness" is explained above, p. 187. On a given measure it represents the complement of the arithmetic difference in the percentages voting "aye" among each of the two groups being compared. On a series of measures, or votes, it represents the arithmetic mean of the complements of these differences.

The procedure actually followed in deriving the first line of the table

will serve to illustrate the method as well as the meaning of the various items: It is desired to compare the votes of 12 Republican farmers and 3 Democratic laborites in the lower house of the Indiana legislature of 1919. The purpose is to learn whether the votes of the two groups were more or less opposed than would be expected in view of the difference in their party affiliations. A total of 78 roll calls fall within the criteria of selection. Upon one of these 78 roll calls, 10 of the 12 farmers voted "aye" and 2 voted "no;" *i. e.*, 83.3% of the (Republican) farmers voted "aye." On the same roll call, all of the laborites voted "no;" *i. e.*, 0% of the (Democratic) laborites voted "aye." Deducting the lower of the two percentages from the higher (83.3—0.0) the result provides an index of *difference* between the votes of farmers and laborites, amounting in this case to 83.3. The complement of this amount, namely 16.7, provides an index of *likeness*. On the same roll call, 75.0% of *all* Republicans voted "aye" and 24.0% of *all* Democrats voted "aye." Thus the index of difference between Republicans and Democrats (75.0—24.0) was 51.0 and the index of likeness (100.0—51.0) was 49.0. As *party members*, therefore, farmers and laborites would be expected to show an index of likeness of 49.0, whereas the actual likeness is but 16.7. Hence in this case the likeness of farmers and laborites is less than the expectation.

The index of farmer-labor likeness and the index of Republican-Democratic likeness has been calculated in a similar manner for each of the 78 roll calls. In 53 of these, farmer-labor likeness is less than the expectation, *i. e.*, less than Republican-Democratic likeness. In 23 farmer-labor likeness is greater than the expectation while in 2 cases the expected and the actual likeness is the same. When the separate indices of likeness between farmers and laborites on 78 roll calls are averaged, the result is regarded as a summary index for the entire legislative session. Thus farmer-labor likeness for the session is 53.3 and Republican-Democratic likeness for the session is 67.5. Deducting the latter from the former, the result is —14.2, which is the amount by which farmer-labor likeness during this legislative session is less than the expectation. This amount is shown in the last column of the table.

² For abbreviations used, see footnote 1 to table xviii.

³ Totals of farmer and labor members include duplications when more than one session is reported for the same house. Totals of measures, or roll-call votes, include duplications when more than one comparison is made for the same session.

⁴ This summary average is derived by weighting the average in each line of the table by the number of roll calls included in the comparison.

TABLE XXIII

SUMMARY BASED UPON INDICES OF "LIKENESS" BETWEEN FARMER AND
LABOR GROUPS IN STATE LEGISLATURES, WHEN BOTH ARE
WHOLLY AFFILIATED WITH THE *Same* POLITICAL
PARTY, BY LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS ¹

State and Legislative Session ³		Party	Number in groups compared		Roll calls in which, with reference to the mode of party division, the “swing” of farmer and labor groups is in ²						Surplus Swings —Per cent ⁴
					the same direction		the opposite direction		No “swing”		
			Far- mer	La- bor	Num- ber	Per cent	Num- ber	Per cent	Num- ber	Per cent	
AlabamaH '19	D	14	3	15	39.5	23	60.5	38	—21.0
ArkansasH '21	D	5	2	3	21.4	11	78.6	14	—57.2
IndianaH '19	R	12	3	38	46.9	39	48.2	4	4.9	81	—1.3
LouisianaH '20	D	21	6	26	34.2	46	60.6	4	5.2	76	—26.4
MichiganH x '19	R	11	2	2	40.0	3	60.0	5	—20.0
MinnesotaH '19	NP	19	4	28	37.8	45	60.8	1	1.4	74	—23.0
MinnesotaS '19	NP	8	4	28	50.0	28	50.0	56	0.0
MissouriH '19	R	3	3	19	35.9	30	56.6	4	7.5	53	—20.7
MissouriH '19	D	3	3	31	59.6	18	34.6	3	5.8	52	+25.0
New YorkH '21	R	21	5	9	15.0	42	70.0	9	15.0	60	—55.0
OhioH '19	R	3	3	23	38.4	36	60.0	1	1.6	60	—21.6
OhioH '19	D	3	3	15	28.4	32	60.4	6	11.2	53	—32.0
Pennsylvania...H '19	R	7	9	15	31.9	32	68.1	47	—36.2
South Carolina..H '20	D	29	4	7	43.7	9	56.3	16	—12.6
Washington....H '19	R	15	4	14	33.3	25	59.5	3	7.2	42	—26.2
West Virginia ..H '19	R	6	13	24	46.2	28	53.8	52	—7.6
West Virginia ..H x '19	R	5	13	10	52.6	9	47.4	19	+5.2
WisconsinH '21	R	24	3	4 ²	64.9	26	35.1	74	+29.8
Total	209	87	355	40.7	482	55.3	35	4.0	872	—14.6

¹ Cf., footnote (1), table xxii. Likewise sect. 43 and appendix b.

² The column "no swing" includes cases in which the division within either occupational group is the same as within the larger party group

Farmer-labor Agreements Less Frequent than Expectation. Taken together, Tables XXII and XXIII show that in the legislative sessions of one state only—Wisconsin—was there a consistent tendency for farmer and labor members of state

with which the former is compared. Thus, if Republicans and Republican farmers are both 60 per cent in the affirmative, the roll call is included under "no swing," even if Republican laborites are not likewise 60 per cent in the affirmative.

³ Abbreviations used are explained in footnote to table xviii.

⁴ In this column is shown the arithmetic difference between the percentage of roll calls in which the "swing" is in the same direction and the percentage in which the swing is in the opposite direction. A plus sign (+) shows an excess in the same direction, i. e. like-mindedness above the expectation; a minus sign (—) shows an excess in the opposite direction, i. e. like-mindedness below the expectation.

Once more it will be desirable for the sake of clarity to follow the procedure employed in arriving at the items in the first line of the table: In the lower house of the Alabama legislature of 1919, 14 members were classified as farmers and 3 as laborites. All were Democrats, the total number of Democrats being 72. There were 38 roll calls in which both sub-groups participated and which fell within the criteria of selection. In one of these roll calls, 73.4% of all Democrats who answered their names voted "aye." Of the 12 farmers voting, 11 or 91.7% voted "aye," while of the 3 laborites one, or 33.3% voted "aye." Theoretically the farmer and the labor group, since both are composed of Democrats, would be *expected* to divide in the same proportions as did the larger groups of *all* Democrats to which both sub-groups belong. In this roll call, however, the "swing" (*cf. supra*, p. 194 and appendix b) of one sub-group was more to the affirmative, the "swing" of the other more to the negative. Hence with reference to the "mode of party division" (73.4% "aye." *Cf.* footnote, p. 230, appendix b) the swings of farmer and labor sub-groups were in *opposing* directions. In another one of the 38 roll calls, 65.0% of all Democrats who responded voted "aye," whereas 9 of the 10 farmers who voted, or 90.0%, and all of the laborites or 100.0%, voted "aye." In this case the "swing" of both sub-groups was in the *same* direction. Of the 38 roll calls, 15 or 39.5% showed swings by farmers and laborites in the *same* direction, while 23 or 50.5%, showed swings in opposing directions. Hence there was an excess of roll calls in which the swings were in opposing directions over roll calls in which the swings were in the same direction amounting (50.5—39.5) to 21.0% of the entire number of 38 roll calls. This percentage of surplus is shown with a minus sign in the last column.

legislatures to vote alike more frequently than would be expected in view of their party affiliations. Republican farmers and Socialist laborites were more nearly in agreement in the regular and special House sessions of 1919, and the regular session of 1921, than were the Republican and Socialist parties in these sessions generally. Moreover, Republican farmers and Republican laborites tended to *swing* to the same positions within the common party during the session of 1921.

In one set of comparisons out of 4 in Missouri sessions, in one set out of 5 in Ohio sessions, and in an extra session of the West Virginia House, slight tendencies toward greater farmer-labor likeness than would be called for by party membership are evidenced. In the Minnesota Senate, the number of "swings" in the same and in the opposite direction are balanced. In the remaining 25 sets of comparisons the tendency is for farmer and labor legislators to be in opposition more often than would be expected, in view of their party memberships.

In Tables XXIV and XXV the comparisons have been classified according to types of measures voted upon.

Tables XXIV and XXV, while measuring voting behavior in somewhat different terms, are alike in the respect that each shows the numbers of roll-calls upon certain types of measures in which farmer and labor legislators tend to be in greater or in less agreement than would be expected in view of their party affiliations. In Table XXVI we have aggregated these tendencies from the two tables preceding. Necessarily attention is paid only to the net *inclination* (toward like or unlike behavior) that is shown by each roll-call comparison. As in Tables XXIII and XXV, the *amount* of the inclination in each case has been neglected in view of the considerations set forth in Appendix B.

TABLE XXIV

SUMMARY BASED UPON INDICES OF "LIKENESS" BETWEEN FARMER AND LABOR MEMBERS OF STATE LEGISLATURES, WHEN EACH OCCUPATIONAL GROUP IS WHOLLY AFFILIATED WITH A *Separate* POLITICAL PARTY, BY TYPES OF MEASURES VOTED UPON ¹

Type of Measures ²	Number of roll calls in which the "likeness" of farmer and labor members is greater than, equal to or less than the expectation based on the "likeness" between parties				Average amount by which farmer-labor "likeness" is greater than (+) or less than (-) the expectation based on "likeness" be- tween the re- spective parties
	Greater than expecta- tion	Less than expecta- tion	Equal to expecta- tion	Total	
1. Prohibition	20	77	2	99	—19.8
2. Sex relationships	8	19	..	27	— 9.4
3. Morals (miscellaneous)	8	29	..	37	—17.6
4. Political reform	34	49	5	88	— 5.2
5. (Woman suffrage)....	(7)	(11)	(1)	(19)	(—15.8)
6. (Miscellaneous political reform).....	(27)	(38)	(4)	(69)	(— 2.3)
7. Public Utilities	56	53	2	111	— 2.6
8. Labor	73	61	1	135	— 0.9
9. Agriculture	44	47	..	91	— 5.1
10. Taxation	49	66	1	116	—11.3
11. Public Health	25	48	1	74	—22.5
All measures	317	449	12	778	— 9.1

¹The party affiliations of the farmers and labor members upon whose votes this table is based, it will be remembered, vary from session to session, or, more accurately, according to the comparison made. The number of individual farmers and laborites whose votes are summarized on each type of measure also varies, inasmuch as no measures of the given types were found in some sessions. In general, however, the numbers are those indicated in table xxii, less certain duplications.

²For a fuller description of these categories, see footnote to table xix. Woman Suffrage and Miscellaneous political reform (5 and 6) are subdivisions of category 4—political reform, and are not therefore summarized with other categories in the totals.

TABLE XXV

SUMMARY BASED UPON INDICES OF "LIKENESS" BETWEEN FARMER AND LABOR MEMBERS OF STATE LEGISLATURES, WHEN BOTH ARE WHOLLY AFFILIATED WITH THE *Same* POLITICAL PARTY, BY TYPES OF MEASURES VOTED UPON ¹

Type of Measures	Roll calls in which, with reference to the mode of party division, the "swing" of farmer and labor group is in						Total Number	Surplus "swings" —Per cent
	the same direction		the opposite direction		No "swing"			
	Num- ber	Per cent	Num- ber	Per cent	Num- ber	Per cent		
1. Prohibition.....	10	10.7	82	88.2	1	1.1	93	—77.5
2. Sex relationships.....	20	52.6	18	47.4	38	+ 5.2
3. Morals (miscellaneous)	11	25.0	32	72.8	1	2.2	44	—47.8
4. Political reform.....	50	52.1	38	39.6	8	8.3	96	+12.5
5. (Woman suffrage)....	(9)	(39.1)	(14)	(60.9)	(23)	(—21.8)
6. (Miscellaneous polit- ical reform).....	(41)	(56.1)	(24)	(32.9)	(8)	(11.0)	(73)	(+23.2)
7. Public Utilities.....	57	40.7	71	50.7	12	8.6	140	—10.0
8. Labor.....	74	54.8	58	42.9	3	2.3	135	+11.9
9. Agriculture.....	51	40.8	69	55.2	5	4.0	125	—14.4
10. Taxation.....	52	38.5	79	58.5	4	3.0	135	—20.0
11. Public Health.....	30	45.5	35	53.0	1	1.5	66	— 7.5
All measures.....	355	40.7	482	55.3	35	4.0	872	—14.6

Table XXVI shows that farmer and labor members more frequently displayed tendencies toward mutual opposition in their voting behavior than they displayed the opposite tendencies toward mutual support.² The comparisons in which

¹The various headings, signs, etc. employed will be understood by consulting the text and the corresponding footnotes in the preceding tables of this section. It should be noted particularly that under the heading "Type of measures," categories 5 and 6 represent sub-divisions of category 4, and are therefore excluded from the totals.

TABLE XXVI

SUMMARY OF ROLL CALL COMPARISONS INDICATING TENDENCIES TOWARD LIKE AND UNLIKE VOTING BEHAVIOR, WHEN FARMER AND LABOR LEGISLATORS ARE EITHER IN THE SAME OR IN DIFFERENT PARTIES, CLASSIFIED BY TYPES OF MEASURES VOTED UPON ¹

Type of Measures	Roll calls showing tendencies, as compared with the expectation based on party membership					Excess roll calls showing tendencies toward likeness (+) or toward unlikeness (-) ²			
	toward like behavior		toward unlike behavior		Un- cer- tain	Total Num- ber	Num- ber	Per cent of total	Per cent excess
	Num- ber	Per cent	Num- ber	Per cent	Num- ber				
1. Prohibition	30	15.6	159	82.8	3	192	-129	-67.2	-430.0
2. Sex relationships.	28	43.1	37	56.9	..	65	- 9	-13.8	- 32.8
3. Morals (miscellaneous)	19	23.4	61	75.3	1	81	- 42	-51.9	-321.1
4. Political reform	84	45.6	87	47.3	13	184	- 3	- 1.7	- 3.6
5. (Woman suffrage) . . .	(16)	(38.1)	(25)	(59.5)	(1)	(42)	(- 9)	(-21.4)	(- 56.2)
6. (Miscellaneous polit- ical reform)	(68)	(47.9)	(62)	(43.6)	(12)	(142)	(+ 6)	(+ 4.3)	(+ 8.9)
7. Public Utilities	113	45.0	124	49.4	14	251	- 11	- 4.4	- 9.7
8. Labor	147	54.4	119	44.1	4	270	+ 28	+10.3	+ 19.2
9. Agriculture	95	44.0	116	53.7	5	216	- 21	- 9.7	- 22.1
10. Taxation	101	40.3	145	57.8	5	251	- 44	-17.5	- 43.6
11. Public Health	55	39.3	83	59.3	2	140	- 28	-20.0	- 50.8
Total	672	40.7	931	56.4	47	1650	-259	-15.7	- 38.5

¹ It will be noted that this table is constructed in a manner similar to table xxv, and is to be interpreted in the same way as the preceding tables in the section. Reference should be made to footnotes concerning similar headings found in these other tables. Note especially that categories 5 and 6 under "type of measures" are sub-divisions of category 4.

² Figures in the column headed "Number" (of excess roll calls) are obtained by subtracting the number of roll calls showing unlike behavior tendencies from those showing like behavior tendencies. Hence a positive sign shows an excess of the latter and a negative sign an excess of the former. Similarly, the figures under the heading "Per

the former were evidenced are nearly 40 per cent more numerous than those in which the latter appeared.

Most Disagreement on Moral Questions. It is even more apparent that the disposition for each occupational group to oppose the positions taken by the other was largely dependent upon the type of legislative proposals under consideration. The tendency to disagree was most marked in the categories which include prohibition and its enforcement and miscellaneous "moral" issues. The tendency was nevertheless strong in the case of questions involving public health, sex relationships, woman's suffrage and shifts in the incidence of taxation. In the case of proposed changes in the framework of government (other than woman suffrage) there was a slight tendency to agree—a tendency which was still greater in the case of labor measures. The tendency to disagree more frequently, while it existed, was not particularly striking in the case of questions involving public utilities or the interests of agriculture.

Thus it appears that farmers and workingmen are least in agreement upon questions which evoke traditional sentiments and emotions regarding moral standards. They are less in disagreement, or even in some degree of agreement, upon questions which are more likely to be solved on rationalistic grounds, or which involve a calculation of self-interest. Questions of taxation seem to furnish the only exception to this generalization, and this is precisely the type of legislative question which is likely to produce opposing calculations of economic interest (*Cf. supra*, Sec. 14).

The tendency to agree with regard to labor questions will

cent of total", which are derived in the same manner, indicate an excess in the per cent of the total number of roll calls showing like behavior tendencies, or the reverse, as the case may be. Figures under the heading "per cent excess," denote the percentages which the numbers of roll calls in excess constitute of the smaller of the two numbers from which each is derived.

give encouragement to those who hope for a farmer-labor alliance. It should be noted, however, that the measures included under this category apply for the most part to industrial occupations, and seldom to agricultural labor, which is substantially without a voice in American legislatures. It seems probable that the farmer's own interests and emotional prejudices are not often affected by such measures.

47. SUMMARY

The responses of farmer and labor legislators when confronted with legislative issues, as expressed in their votes on roll-call, have been summarized in this chapter. The numerical indices presented have been based on approximately 95,000 individual votes, cast during 1,057 roll-calls in 21 sessions of American legislatures, during a period of 3 years (1919-21) when a farmer-labor movement was under much discussion. The votes of 98 labor legislators and 259 farmer legislators are included in the analysis.

The evidence is clear that farmers tend to be likeminded among themselves when elected to legislative bodies. Likemindedness among labor members is even greater. In both cases, however, significant differences in like-mindedness are to be found, according to the type of issues presented. Farmers are in greater agreement upon questions which are likely to provoke an emotional response and to be settled upon the basis of traditional attitudes and *mores*. They are in lesser agreement upon questions which evoke *rational* responses, and in *least* agreement upon questions which concern their own economic interests.

Labor members, on the contrary, are in *greatest* agreement upon questions involving their own economic class interests, and in *least* agreement upon questions such as prohibition and woman suffrage which are likely to be determined by traditional attitudes and *mores*.

Farmer and labor legislators showed a general inclination to support each other's positions in but a single state. This state was Wisconsin.

When the issues were classified, a general tendency for farmers and labor members to agree was apparent in the case of issues involving labor and political reform (other than woman suffrage). On all other issues, the tendency to disagree was unmistakable, though in some cases slight. The greatest mutual opposition was shown in the case of questions involving prohibition and its enforcement, upon which farmers and laborites were almost invariably to be found upon opposing sides.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

48. THE GROUNDS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN FARMERS AND WORKERS

THE evidence assembled in the preceding chapters bears out the theory of group formation presented in the introductory chapter. Every group is possessed of some common point (or points) of resemblance—whether it be a physical or social characteristic, a common experience, or a similar state of mind concerning a political question. So long as the stimuli playing upon individuals call attention to this common character, those who possess it will constitute a group in actuality. But no two or more individuals are alike in all things. When the stimuli change so that new points of resemblance among individuals are brought into the center of “social consciousness,” there will be a *re-grouping* of these individuals. The old points of resemblance may still exist, but the old groupings to which they gave rise are no longer *actual* but only *potential*.

A constant succession of issues which sooner or later affect political alignments is coming before the American public. They involve now one set of characteristics and now another. Resemblances and differences are at one time remembered and at another time forgotten. Potential groupings are continually becoming actual, and actual groupings are as frequently being submerged to the level of the potential. Hence, to ask whether farmers and workingmen will cooperate politically, *i. e.* whether they will enter a

larger political alignment or grouping, is equivalent to the inquiry, first, upon *what issues* will they cooperate, and upon what issues will they be in mutual opposition; second, what is the probability of one or the other of these issues becoming dominant, *i. e.*, becoming the *real* issue upon which policies and elections will be decided.

The review of economic, cultural and biological factors presented in Chapters II and III called attention to a number of "points of resemblance" between farmers and workingmen. It called attention to an even larger number of points of dissimilarity. If farmers and workingmen in the past have been predominantly antagonistic to each other on the political field, the reasons are to be sought in the frequency with which points of dissimilarity have been in the field of consciousness of both groups.

Agreement Unlikely Upon Issues Founded in Prejudice or Tradition. Actual contacts between members of the two groups are infrequent. When they occur, especially when they arouse no reflective process, they serve to call attention to the differing "ways" of each. Superficial observations tend to define and confirm the "stereotypes," as Lippmann calls them, which members of each group hold regarding members of the other. The urban worker pictures the farmer as a "hayseed," or as a grasping profiteer in the necessities of life. The farmer, on his side, thinks of the worker as an alien who is lacking in the standards of morality, thrift and industry which he applies to himself.

By this superficial selection of points of dissimilarity, some of which do not exist, a *consciousness of difference*, rather than a *consciousness of kind*, is aroused. Consequently, whenever an issue appeals to prejudice or tradition, rather than to the voter's reflective processes, it is likely to bring into play not only the real points of dissimilarity between farmers and workingmen which may exist, but this

consciousness of difference as well. The mere fact that farmers support one side of such a question, as prohibition is likely to strengthen the opposition of those who, like workingmen, regard themselves as differing from farmers in such matters.

Agreement Possible Upon Issues Involving Rational Calculation of Interests. When the issues arouse a rational process, traditional differences still tend to focus attention upon points of dissimilarity rather than upon points of resemblance. Thus, for example, both farmers and workingmen have regarded each other rationally from the viewpoint of their antagonistic interests as producers and consumers. In some states, however, notably in the middle west, attention has been deflected from this point of dissimilarity to the equally real common interests which both groups have in opposing middlemen. With this point of resemblance in the foreground of attention, farmer-labor cooperation has become a reality. It is precisely in these states that the propaganda directed against middlemen and "The Interests" has been most continuous and most effective.

An analysis of the actual political behavior of farmer and labor legislators has indicated that they were least disposed to cooperate upon the types of issues which are usually referred to as "moral." These questions—prohibition, sex, gambling, the regulation of personal conduct—are those which are usually *felt* most deeply, and opinions regarding which are maintained most tenaciously. Moreover, these were shown to be the questions upon which farmers are most in agreement among themselves. If, then, questions of this character are to dominate American politics during the near future, it appears unlikely that urban workers and farmers will be brought into the same alignment.

Should questions involving political reform, public utilities, or the rights and privileges of labor or agriculture be

come dominant issues, on the other hand, there seems a possibility (on the basis of our legislative data) that a successful political alliance between these classes might develop. It is significant that the evidences of farmer-labor cooperation in national affairs brought forward in Chapter IV are almost wholly based upon legislative issues falling within these categories. These are questions which, at least as compared with "moral issues," are likely to be decided on *rationalistic* grounds, and they are the questions upon which workingmen, among themselves, are most agreed.

It does not fall within the scope of this study to predict the issues which will confront the American people in the near or distant future. The writer believes that he has presented some authentic indications as to what the comparative political behavior of farmers and workingmen is *likely* to be in the case of certain types of issues being presented. In a fundamental sense, farmer-labor cooperation will be a function, whenever it occurs, of *rationalistic thinking* upon questions of economic structure and the political organization of government. It will arise only when public attention is directed to the newer problems of society arising out of modern economic developments. Farmer-labor cooperation will not arise when the minds of men are groping backward, fearful of losing touch with traditions learned in childhood, and with the fundamental standards of conduct and belief contained in their social heritage.

APPENDIX A

CRITERIA EMPLOYED FOR CLASSIFYING LEGISLATORS AS "FARMER" OR "LABOR"

THE occupations of farmer and labor legislators whose votes were analyzed in Chapter VI have been determined from the biographical data contained in the official state manuals which are printed, in most states, by the Secretary of State. These manuals bear various names such as *Blue Book*, *Legislative Handbook*, or *Legislative Manual*. In some cases supplementary information was available from such sources as *Who's Who*, and from city directories. In a number of states no manual is printed. In such cases its place is usually taken by an official "Legislative Roster," or list of members. This Roster usually gives the legislator's occupation but no biographical data. Or, the Manual may contain the Roster without the biographical data.

Our rule has been to *exclude* from the study any legislative session in which biographical data has been unavailable, inasmuch as the occupation set opposite the member's name was frequently found to be misleading. For example, the occupation set opposite the name of Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. in the roster of the New York Assembly of 1921 was that of "Farmer." However valid this designation may have been at the time of Mr. Roosevelt's election, it would be questionable to regard his political attitudes as a fair sample of those of New York farmers in general.

Given the biographical data which most state manuals contain, the following criteria of selection have been employed:

RULES FOR INCLUSION IN AND EXCLUSION FROM
THE CATEGORY "FARMER"

1. Present occupation must be "Farmer," "Retired Farmer," "Fruit Grower," "Stock Raiser," "Apiarist," "Poultryist," "Truck Gardener," "Dairyman;" or an occupation of the same meaning as one of the foregoing; or two or more of the foregoing in combination.
2. The existence of a non-agricultural occupation in combination with an agricultural occupation will exclude.
(Frequent combinations with "Farmer" that are thus excluded are "Banker," other than bank director, "Real Estate," "Insurance," "Teacher," "Merchant," "Miller," "Minister," and administrative public office presumed to require full-time service, such as "Sheriff," "County Auditor" or "county Treasurer.")
3. The member must be a farm owner or tenant, and not an employe.
(This rule has excluded a number of farm managers.)
4. The occupation recorded in any serial list of members must be substantiated by statements made in the biographical sketch.
5. A business or professional occupation other than teaching must not have been followed within ten years.
6. The member's residence must not be in a city of 15,000 or more population.
7. If the conditions of 1, 4 and 6 are met, the absence of information regarding 2, 3 and 5 will not serve to exclude.

RULES FOR INCLUSION IN AND EXCLUSION FROM
THE CATEGORY "LABOR"

1. Membership in a recognized labor union will serve to include, regardless of other criteria.
2. The present occupation must be one, the members of which are organized generally in a recognized labor organization, or who, if unorganized, are manual workers.
(Thus, while there is a union of teachers affiliated with the

American Federation of Labor, teachers generally are unorganized in labor unions, and are here excluded. Professional musicians, on the other hand, are generally organized and affiliated with other labor bodies. They are included.)

3. The member must himself engage in his occupation, and not merely supervise others.

(Under this rule, foremen would generally be excluded. Inclusion would be only in the case of clear evidence of union or other labor affiliation.)

4. "Clerk," "Salesman," and similar ambiguous occupations will not serve to include a member, unless there is clear evidence of identity with labor groups.

5. Reference to occupation as a "business" will serve to exclude.

(For example, an "electrician" would be regarded as belonging to the "labor" group, unless his occupation was referred to as a "business.")

6. The absence of a reference to occupation in the member's biographical sketch will not serve to exclude him when he is assigned the occupation elsewhere, unless statements in the sketch appear inconsistent with the occupation.

In most states, a tendency seems to exist for members to *emphasize* any farming connections which they may have, when they prepare their biographical sketches. It is probable that the designation has political value. Hence it has been necessary to impose rather rigid rules of selection for this category, and to interpret them strictly. On the other hand a tendency appears for labor members to *conceal* their occupations, which we may thus infer to be a political handicap. It is the latter tendency which has led to the inclusion of rule 6 among the labor criteria. It seems probable that a number of members have been excluded from the labor category who might properly have been included.

It follows that the criteria for inclusion in and exclusion -

from the category "farmers" are more open to challenge than the similar criteria for the category "labor." As a demonstration of their effect, we present below a summary of the results of the rules given above in determining the "farmer" group in the House of Representatives of Ohio, 83d General Assembly, 1919:

Number calling themselves farmers, 33.

Excluded by Rule 2: Farmer & Lawyer, 2; Farmer and Livestock dealer, 1; Farmer & contractor, 1; Farmer & teacher, 3; Retired farmer and wood dealer, 1; Grape grower and fermentologist, 1; Merchant & farmer, 1. Total, 10.

Additional exclusions under Rule 2 upon examination of biographies: Teacher & Farmer, 1; Real estate & farmer, 1. Total, 2.

Excluded by Rule 3: Member Superintendent of City Farms, Total, 1.

Excluded under Rule 4: Member called himself "Farmer" in legislative roster, but biographical sketch made no specific reference to present residence upon a farm, or ownership of a farm, or occupation upon a farm. Total, 1.

Excluded under Rule 5: Member, according to biographical sketch, had been engaged in a profession more recently than 1909. Total, 1.

Total excluded, 15; Remaining in group, 18.

Following the process of selection, the writer undertook to check the result by ascertaining the mail address when at home of the 18 members of the farmer group who complied with the criteria. These addresses were found to be as follows:

On rural mail routes	7
In towns of less than 5,000 population	10
In town of 5,037 population	1
	<hr/>
Total	18

The criteria were clearly effective in obtaining a highly *rural* group in a large industrial state.

When applied to the same legislative session, the criteria used for selecting "labor" members resulted in the inclusion of the following: a blacksmith, a motorman, a molder, a conductor, a railroad conductor and a musician. Those members who may have been admissible, but who were excluded under the rules adopted were as follows: a salesman, two clerks, a steward, an electrician and a foreman in a steel company.

Three of the 6 laborites selected were Republicans and 3 were Democrats. Three of the 18 farmers were Democrats. In this session, therefore, (which was one of the earlier sessions examined) a selection of 3 from among the 15 Republican farmers was made in order that the party and occupational groups might both be evenly balanced, and the party factor be held constant in this manner. The 3 Republican farmers selected were those who lived on rural mail routes leading from villages of the least population.

This method of holding the party factor constant was later abandoned in favor of that described in the text (pp. 189-90) but the farmer and labor groups in the Ohio House of 1919 were allowed to stand as first constituted, the methods of comparison only being altered to fit the revised method. In other legislative sessions, all members whose qualifications admitted them to the categories of "farmer" and "labor" were included in the tabulation, provided two or more in either category were found within a single political party.

APPENDIX B

THE "SWING" OF TWO SUB-GROUPS WITHIN A PARTY GROUP

In connection with the discussion of "swing" by sub-groups within a party group on page 194, it should be noted that the division within the party as a whole will be conditioned by the divisions within each of any subordinate groups into which the party may be segregated. For example, assume that our interest is with Republican farmers and Republican laborites; then a third group is tacitly understood, namely, Republican non-farmers-non-laborites. The divisions which occur (into "aye" and "no" wings) within these 3 groups together determine the division within the Republican party group as a whole.

Now the larger the subordinate group, the greater will be its influence in determining the party division. For example, in a group of 100 Republicans containing 50 farmers and 10 laborites, assume that 50 per cent of the farmers vote "aye" on a given roll-call. Then 25 per cent of all Republicans will vote "aye," even if all non-farmers vote "no." But if 50 per cent of the laborites vote "aye," then only 5 per cent of the Republicans will vote "aye" if all non-laborites vote "no." It follows that the *mode of division* in the subordinate group (by which is meant the proportions voting "aye" and "no") will have a probability of coinciding with the mode of division in the party group, which will vary directly with the ratio which the subordinate group bears in numbers to the numbers in the party group. Hence,

when we compare the votes of a farmer group and a labor group within the same party, we should expect the larger "swing" to occur in the case of that group which was smaller in membership.

This expectation has been supported experimentally by our data as follows: In the case of each of 20 sets of comparisons between farmer and labor sub-groups within the same party group we have determined, first, the ratio between the number of farmers and the number of laborites involved; second, the ratio between the "swing" of the labor group and the "swing" of the farmer group. When ranked according to these two sets of ratios, the correlation by grades (see footnote 1, page 54) is found to be

$$r = +.75$$

In other words, the smaller the proportionate number in the sub-group, the greater its "swing." For this reason it has seemed impracticable to derive comparable numerical measures of the *amounts* by which farmer and labor sub-groups tend to swing toward or away from each other on particular roll-calls or groups of roll-calls, inasmuch as there is considerable disparity between the number of farmers and the number of laborites involved in given cases.

It appears, moreover, that the tendency for farmers and laborites within the same party to "swing" in opposite directions will increase in inverse ratio to the relative strength of the non-farmer-non-labor group within the party. Thus, if the number of non-farmer-non-laborites shrinks to zero, leaving only farmers and laborites within the party, the "swing" of these groups would necessarily be in opposite directions, unless both divided on the given question in exactly the same proportions. A "swing" by both in the same direction would be an impossibility, for there would be no third group from which the "swing" could occur. When we compare the mode of party division with the modes of

division within subsidiary groups of farmers and laborites, we are in effect using the non-farmer-non-labor group as a "frame of reference," with which the votes of farmers and laborites are compared. We have preferred to make our measurements with respect to the party as a whole rather than with respect to the non-farmer-non-labor group, because only by so doing could we preserve the mould into which we have attempted to cast our data, namely, the "likeness" of farmers and laborites *relative to party*. Republican farmers and laborites contribute to the party attitudes, as has been said, not less than non-farmer-non-labor Republicans.

So long as the various roll-calls in each legislative session are distributed in approximately equivalent proportions between the different categories of subject matter (which is the case) the comparative tendencies within these categories will not be seriously affected by the relative size of the non-farmer-non-labor group. It is only in comparisons between tendencies in different legislative party groups, as for example in Table XXIII, and in deductions from the aggregate of these tendencies, that the probability of "swing" in the same or opposite directions, that is based on the size of the non-farmer-non-labor group need affect our analysis.

It might be possible to calculate in each case the mathematical probability that farmer and labor members would vote in such a manner that farmer and labor sub-groups would swing in opposing directions from the mode of party division. Such calculations would add greatly to the complexity of the comparisons sought without a corresponding advantage in increased reliability of the data. As a matter of political experience, the dominant party policy is usually determined within the group of party members other than farmers and laborites, if for no other reason than that this group is preponderant in size. In Table XXIII, com-

parisons between farmer and labor sub-groups within the same party group have been drawn only when the non-farmer-non-labor group was of overwhelming size as compared with either the farmer or labor group. This may be shown in the following table of ratios, applying to the legislative sessions included in Table XXIII.

TABLE XXVII

NUMBERS IN PARTY GROUPS AND SUB-PARTY GROUPS INCLUDED IN TABLE XXIII, WITH THE PERCENTAGES OF THE TOTAL CONSTITUTED BY THE NON-FARMER-NON-LABOR GROUPS

State and Legislative Session		Party	Sub-party groups				Total in Party
			Farmer	Labor	Non-farmer- non-labor		
			Num. ber	Num- ber	Num- ber	Per cent	Number
Alabama	H '19	D	14	3	55	76.3	72
Arkansas	H '21	D	5	2	75	91.6	82
Indiana	H '19	R	12	3	65	81.1	80
Louisiana	H '20	D	21	6	91	77.1	118
Michigan	H x '19	R	11	2	71	84.5	84
Minnesota	H '19	NP	19	4	106	82.2	129
Minnesota	S '19	NP	8	4	55	82.1	67
Missouri	H '19	R	3	3	70	92.0	76
Missouri	H '19	D	3	3	58	90.6	64
New York	H '21	R	21	5	90	77.5	116
Ohio	H '19	R	3	3	69	92.0	75
Ohio	H '19	D	3	3	39	86.7	45
Pennsylvania	H '19	R	7	9	164	91.1	180
South Carolina	H '20	D	29	4	81	71.0	114
Washington	H '19	R	15	4	67	77.9	86
West Virginia	H '19	R	6	13	43	69.4	62
West Virginia	H x '19	R	5	13	44	70.0	62
Wisconsin	H '21	R	24	3	62	69.6	89

It is evident from experimentation that the "swings"

recorded in Table XXIII have been little affected in their direction by the comparative size in the total of the non-farmer-non-labor group. In theory, as pointed out above, these legislative party groups in which the non-farmer-non-labor sub-group is proportionately small should exhibit a relatively greater tendency for the farmer and labor sub-groups to "swing" in opposing directions. In actual fact there is no evidence of such a tendency. We have ranked the various legislative party groups recorded in the above table and in Table XXIII, first, according to the relative *unimportance* of the non-farmer-non-labor group; second, according to the proportionate number of roll-calls showing a "swing" by farmer and labor sub-groups in opposing directions. If the tendency called for were perceptible, the correlation of these series should give a positive result. The result is actually

$$r = -.19$$

We feel justified from this result, as well as from practical considerations, in assuming an approximately equal opportunity for farmer and labor sub-groups included in the present data to "swing" in the same or opposing directions.

The determination of the direction of "swing" involves a comparison of the "mode of division" within the farmer group and the "mode of division" within the labor group with the "mode of division" within the party group as a whole.¹ In practice the writer has derived the index of likeness between the party and each occupational group in turn. He has then derived the index of likeness between

¹By "mode of division" is meant the proportion of the membership which votes "aye" or "nay" on a given roll call. This proportion may be regarded as a mode in the sense that it represents the normal or type division within a group, to which sub-groups, if determined by some method of random selection, would be expected to approximate in the divisions within *them*. In practice, the proportion voting "aye" has been consistently employed to represent the "mode of division."

the two occupational groups. It is evident that if the farmer and the labor "swings" are in the *same* direction, the "likeness" between them will be greater than the "likeness" between the party and at least one of the occupational groups. If the farmer and the labor swings are in *opposite directions*, the likeness between them will be less than the likeness between the party and at least one of the occupational groups.

It follows that a numerical measure of the tendency toward or against farmer-labor like-mindedness *with reference to party* may be obtained by subtracting one of the first two indices of likeness from the third. The subtrahend in such a subtraction will be the index of likeness between the party and that one of the two occupational groups whose mode of division is most divergent from that of the party. The sign of the remainder will be positive if the "swing" of farmers and laborites is in the same direction, and negative if the "swing" is in the opposite direction. However, the numerical result from such an operation will tend to vary with the comparative size of the farmer and of the labor group, and has not, therefore, been employed in the summaries presented in Chapter VI.